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SUMMARY 
In their development process, countries evolve from agrarian into industrial 
economies: manufacturing employs larger shares of the population and contributes 
more and more to GDP. Empirical evidence confirmed that structural change to-
wards manufacturing is consistently associated with faster economic growth. 
Hence, since early development economic theories, manufacturing has been con-
sidered an engine of economic growth. Given the role of industrialisation for de-
velopment, understanding why some countries successfully industrialised, while 
others did not, is of great importance.  
Since the Industrial Revolution, all countries have tried to industrialise. While some 
succeeded, most of them failed. In the post-war era, successful industrialisers have 
been mainly Asian countries, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Sin-
gapore. Latin American and African countries, instead, started to (prematurely) 
deindustrialise already in the 1980s. The case of Latin America is certainly the most 
striking. In the 1970s, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico were believed the next coun-
tries to catch up with the advanced world. The observed unexpected divergence in 
the industrial performance of Latin America and East Asia has attracted the atten-
tion of academics and policymakers. This thesis contributes to this literature and 
investigates the determinants of industrialisation in a historical-comparative setting. 
It consists of empirical studies that combine quantitative and semi-qualitative re-
search methods, and macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives.  
The first study of this thesis goes back to the model of manufacturing as an engine 
of growth developed by John Cornwall in 1977. It estimates the equation of manu-
facturing output growth by applying modern econometric panel data techniques to 
a dataset that covers roughly 70 developed and developing countries from 1960 to 
2005. By doing this, this study puts industrialisation at the centre of the analysis 
and identifies its determinants and their evolution over time. Results indicate that 
countries with relatively underdeveloped industrial sectors, large domestic markets, 
strong export performances and undervalued exchange rates industrialise faster. 
While in this analysis labour costs are not significant determinants of industrialisa-
tion, innovation plays an important role for industrialisation, especially since the 
mid-1990s. This finding is in line with the evolutionary literature on innovation 
and development and confirms that innovation is a key driver of catch up. 
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Industrial policies and macroeconomic conditions are often cited as important de-
terminants of industrialisation, especially in the cases of East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. The debate on industrial policy polarised around two opposite interpretations. 
According to neoclassical economists, East Asian governments implemented mar-
ket-friendly policies that aimed only at ensuring favourable basic conditions for 
business. By contrast, Latin American selective industrial policies distorted market 
incentives, maintained inefficient industries, and diffused corruption. According to 
structuralists and industrial strategists, East Asian governments were at least as in-
terventionist as the Latin American ones. In both regions, selective industrial poli-
cies shaped the direction of structural change. 
Not only the nature of policies has been discussed, but also the empirical facts -
how much intervention there has been- have been fiercely disputed. This thesis 
contributes to this literature by quantifying industrial policy in some of the most 
studied country cases, namely Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
The thesis critically reviews the historical-comparative literature on industrial pol-
icy in East Asia and Latin America. Based on this, it builds a detailed taxonomy of 
industrial policy instruments and discusses the indicators used in the literature to 
quantify them. In a second stage, the thesis systematically constructs and presents 
solid empirical evidence on the extent and nature of government intervention in 
the selected country cases. The novelty of this study consists precisely in quantify-
ing industrial policy instruments. This is deemed essential to overcome what has 
become an unfruitful confrontation on the merits (and demerits) of industrial poli-
cies.  
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis confirms most of the accepted styl-
ised facts about the divergence of East Asia and Latin America. First, data confirm 
that Latin American countries more strongly protected their domestic markets, al-
though the East Asian degree of domestic market protection was not negligible. 
Second, East Asian governments spent more on export promotion than Latin 
American governments. Our data also confirm the role of East Asian governments 
in directing financial resources towards strategic industries. Expenses for fiscal and 
financial incentives were higher in Korea and Taiwan than in any other Latin 
American country under scrutiny. Finally, Latin American governments supported 
science more than innovation in firms, while East Asian policies were more bal-
anced between science and innovation and spurred interactions between the two. 
Not only disbursements for innovation incentives were larger in East Asia, but also 
 v 
the kind of intervention differed: by combining financial and fiscal incentives, East 
Asian governments proved to be more entrepreneurial than Latin American gov-
ernments. Targeted industries also differed, with East Asian governments directing 
funds to strategic industries like ICTs. 
Adverse structural macroeconomic conditions are often considered among the 
main causes of low investments in developing countries. The last empirical study 
of this thesis takes a microeconomic perspective and analyses the impact of mac-
roeconomic factors on firms’ investment behaviours in the manufacturing indus-
try. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we estimate a multilevel 
model of firms’ investment decisions. Data cover roughly 50 countries from vari-
ous developing regions, from 2002 to 2010. The main source of novelty of this 
study consists in the use of firm-level data, rather than national aggregate invest-
ments. These allow exploring the micro-macro interactions that shape aggregate 
investments. Findings suggest that macroeconomic factors are significant determi-
nants of firms’ investments. Fiscal policies, external debts, inflation, and exchange 
rate management contribute to explaining why firms decide to invest and how 
much they invest. This study also investigates if the structural component of mac-
roeconomic conditions influences firms’ investment behaviours. While descriptive 
statistics show that macroeconomic factors vary more between countries than 
within countries, firms’ investments are associated more with the within country 
variation component of macroeconomic factors rather than their between coun-
tries variation component. This result seems to suggest that firms’ investment be-
haviours follow business cycles’ fluctuations, while structural macroeconomic con-
ditions are not significant determinants of firms’ investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
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It is well established that economic development is accompanied by pervading 
processes of transformation involving the economic, productive, and social 
spheres. At the economic and productive level, resources shift from industries that 
are less productive to industries that are more productive. At the social level, new 
firms’ organisational models, based on large factories and impersonal management, 
urbanisation and secularisation challenge existing social structures and ideologies.  
The shift of resources from industries that are less productive to industries that are 
more productive is referred to as structural change. Early empirical studies (Clark, 
1940; Kuznets, 1966) found that manufacturing output growth is associated with 
higher economic growth. It was argued that manufacturing has considerable ad-
vantages compared to agriculture and services. Manufacturing is more productive 
and more capital intensive. It offers greater opportunities for dynamic economies 
of scale: larger volumes of production, made possible by higher capital intensity, 
reduce unit costs and increase the scope for learning. Manufacturing proved to be 
the locus of technological progress: machines embody state-of-the-art technologies 
and knowledge and managerial capabilities accumulate with production. Finally, 
manufacturing spurs economic growth via its linkages to the rest of the economy. 
These linkages are stronger for manufacturing than for agriculture or services. 
Early econometric studies confirmed that economic growth is consistently associ-
ated with higher rates of manufacturing output growth (Kaldor, 1966; UN, 1970; 
Cripps and Tarling, 1975).  
Based on this empirical evidence, economists put forth the idea that manufacturing 
is the engine of growth in the economy. Cornwall (1977) developed a model of the 
engine of growth hypothesis according to which aggregate output growth depends 
on output growth in the manufacturing industry. Recent analysis demonstrated 
that manufacturing is still an engine of growth in developing countries (Fagerberg 
and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2011; Felipe et al., 2014). These 
studies also emphasised the role of skills’ accumulation and flexibility, intended as 
the ability of the economy to shift resources towards more dynamic activities. 
Great Britain was the first country to industrialise. Its highly productive agricul-
tural sector allowed shifting labour to manufacturing. The application of new ma-
chineries made Great Britain the technological leader of that time. Since the Indus-
trial Revolution, all countries have developed by industrialising: after Britain, 
European countries and the United States caught up, and later on Russia, Japan, 
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and the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). Every-
where industrialisation spurred economic growth, created employment, and lifted 
large portions of the population out of poverty. Today, newly industrialising coun-
tries, such as China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam, are among the coun-
tries that are undergoing rapid structural transformations. 
Virtually all countries in the world have implemented strategies to industrialise. 
Historically, not all endeavours turned out to be successful. Rather, it could be said 
that the opposite is true. China, India, and several Latin American countries had 
developed an industrial sector already at the end of the nineteen century. Historical 
accounts of Latin American industrialisation show that after a period of decelera-
tion of manufacturing output growth due to upswings in terms of trade, industri-
alisation took off again around 1870 (Williamson, 2006). Since then, the Latin 
American industrialisation has gone through different phases. Data on the shares 
of manufacturing in GDP confirm that in the 1950s Latin America was the most 
industrialised region of the developing world. However, from the 1980s, Latin 
America experienced premature deindustrialisation, meaning that the share of 
manufacturing in GDP decreased before the economy could achieve higher in-
come levels. The same occurred in the African continent (Rodrik, 2015).  
Because of premature deindustrialisation, the majority of today low income and 
middle-income countries did not fully industrialised, i.e. did not become rich in-
dustrial economies. While deindustrialisation is considered a natural phenomenon 
and a sign of economic success in advanced countries, in developing and middle-
income countries deindustrialisation is detrimental to socio-economic develop-
ment. Premature deindustrialisation has long-term negative effects on economic 
growth because the benefits of industrialisation are not fully reaped (Tregenna, 
2011). 
In contrast with deindustrialisation in Latin America and Africa, some Asian coun-
tries experienced continuous growth of manufacturing since the 1950s. In a span 
of two decades, the Asian Tigers increased their manufacturing production. Within 
manufacturing, they moved towards higher value-added activities and production 
of increasingly sophisticated goods. This occurred although these countries pos-
sessed a relatively underdeveloped industrial sector after the World War II. A large 
body of literature emerged from the observation of these divergent processes of 
structural change. While there is consensus that institutions and public policies 
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played a major role in these processes, the literature has reached little agreement 
on what type of policies were most conducive to industrialisation and catch-up. 
According to neoclassical economists, the main determinant of the success of the 
East Asian countries was their limited state intervention. In this view, East Asian 
policies exclusively aimed at ensuring favourable business conditions by guarantee-
ing macroeconomic stability and providing high-level human capital and good in-
frastructures. Latin American governments, instead, were accused of being too in-
terventionist. Selective and discretionary policies distorted market incentives and 
kept inefficient firms in the market. This ultimately wasted public money and dif-
fused rent-seeking behaviours and corruption. 
In the debate on industrial policies, trade policies have occupied a central position. 
Neoclassical economists praised the East Asian trade regime and used East Asia as 
the proof that export-led growth is the best way to catch up. The East Asian trade 
regime was described as a “virtually free” regime that simultaneously promoted 
export and liberalised imports. While East Asia became the paradigm of the suc-
cess of market-based policies and export promotion, Latin America was heavily 
criticised for not abandoning import substitution in time. In the neoclassical view, 
these policies introduced biases against exports and directed structural change to-
wards a pattern of specialisation inconsistent with comparative advantage. 
So-called revisionists, or industrial strategists, (e.g. Robert Wade, Alice Amsden, 
and Ha-Joon Chang) and Latin American structuralists were the major opponents 
of this interpretation. Industrial strategists made a great effort in unveiling the de-
tails of policy-making in East Asia. Their analysis emphasised how governments 
systematically “got prices wrong” to push structural and technological change to-
wards industrial sectors that would have not prospered otherwise. According to 
their studies, obstacles to free trade were maintained longer than generally ac-
knowledged by neoclassical economists. Moreover, preferential credits and favour-
able fiscal regimes stimulated investments in strategic industries. Hence, according 
to this interpretation, East Asian governments intervened in market functioning 
much more than acknowledged by neoclassical economists and their industrial 
policies were comparative-advantage-defying, rather than comparative-advantage-
following. According to Latin American structuralists, in Latin America import 
substitution initiated and fuelled firms’ learning and affected the direction of struc-
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tural change towards engineering-intensive manufacturing industries (Katz, 2000a 
and 2000b, 2001; Cimoli and Katz, 2003).  
As recognised by advocates of both views, some elements of Latin American in-
dustrial policies were undoubtedly flawed. Firstly, Latin American policies 
abounded in carrots but largely lacked sticks: firms were hardly punished for their 
misconduct and incentives were rarely conditional on clear performance targets. 
Secondly, policies were rarely adjusted or abandoned when they proved ineffective, 
but tended to change whenever governments changed. Lack of long-term com-
mitment to given developmental and industrial goals damaged the relationship be-
tween governments and business by adding uncertainty and destroying trust. Fi-
nally, Latin American firms lacked sufficient incentives for capabilities’ accumula-
tion, which ultimately affected the rate and direction of technological change. 
Neoclassical economists and Latin American structuralists (unintentionally) agree 
that adverse macroeconomic conditions hindered industrialisation in Latin Amer-
ica. In the 1980s, Latin America entered a huge debt crisis that signed the end of 
active industrial policy in the region. Insolvent countries were pressured to accept 
a new policy agenda, the Washington Consensus. This type of policies is also 
commonly referred to as structural policies, or structural adjustment programs, because 
they aimed at forging the structural conditions for investment and economic 
growth. Following the Washington Consensus, markets were freed from “distor-
tive” government interventions. Policies were set to achieve and maintain macro-
economic stability and fiscal discipline. Trade and financial liberalisations, privati-
sations, deregulations, price and tax reforms further reduced the role of the state.  
There is little agreement about the impact of structural policies on industrialisation 
and economic growth. Some empirical studies found that structural policies were 
associated with faster economic growth and higher rates of private investments 
(e.g. Serven and Solimano, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Bleaney, 1996; East-
erly et al., 1997). According to structuralists, macroeconomic instability in Latin 
America is the result of a variety of mechanisms that depend on production struc-
tures. Abundance of natural resources makes developing countries specialise in 
primary commodities. This makes them vulnerable to volatile commodity prices 
and causes cyclical overvaluations of the exchange rate. In particular, high com-
modity prices increase the profitability of resource-based industries, which attracts 
national and international capital and generates capital account booms. High 
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commodity prices and capital account booms tend to appreciate the exchange rate. 
Appreciated exchange rates penalise manufacturing firms by reducing the cost of 
imported substitutes and eroding firms’ competitiveness in international markets. 
Exchange rates’ movements and volatile commodity prices also affect inflation. 
These mechanisms have long-lasting and reinforcing effects on investments and 
push the direction of technological change away from productive diversification 
(Ocampo, 2011; Bresser-Pereira, 2008, 2012). 
In the structuralist view, the lack of recognition of macroeconomic instability as a 
structural phenomenon (i.e. related to countries’ production structures) explains 
why structural policies failed to generate truly stable and favourable macroeco-
nomic conditions in Latin America. According to this interpretation, inflation tar-
geting and fiscal discipline depressed economic growth by affecting investment 
behaviours and modifying the direction of structural change away from engineer-
ing-intensive manufacturing industries. It has been argued that Latin American ad-
verse macroeconomic conditions -and the unsuccessful attempts at macroeco-
nomic stabilisation of structural policies- permanently mutated firms’ investment 
behaviours and induced firms to prefer low-risk high-return investments. Struc-
tural policies ultimately reversed the direction of technological change: natural re-
source-based industries prospered, while R&D and engineering-intensive manufac-
turing industries were the most hit. Evidence of this comes from a long series of 
case studies pioneered by the work of Jorge Katz.  
This reading of Latin American macroeconomic conditions leads structuralists to 
advocate for a dual development strategy. Its central objective is to promote the 
diversification of production structures -naturally hampered by the mechanisms 
described above- by boosting innovation in industrial sectors with the strongest 
linkages to domestic production and counterbalancing external vulnerabilities -
caused by international prices and capital account shocks- via counter-cyclical fis-
cal, monetary, and exchange rate policies (Ocampo, 2011). Hence, while neoclassi-
cal economists propose structural policies as a means to ensure favourable macro-
economic conditions, structuralists advocate in favour of selective industrial poli-
cies to counteract the adverse structural macroeconomic conditions that character-
ise Latin America and potentially other developing regions. 
The debate on structural policies has seen a revival with the recent European crisis 
and the imposition of structural adjustment programs in peripheral European 
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countries. These are deemed necessary to improve business conditions and bring 
Southern Europe closer to Northern Europe. Although these policies are creating 
recession, unemployment, and social unrest, it is still believed that they will have 
long-term positive effects on the chronically low levels of investments of Southern 
European countries in the last decades. 
The debate on industrialisation started long ago and attracted considerable atten-
tion, but key factors and mechanisms behind it are still disputed. Different policy 
approaches have been experimented since the 1950s. There is an abundant litera-
ture that evaluated their impact, but reached contradictory conclusions. Disagree-
ment arose especially in two policy areas: industrial and macroeconomic policies. 
The debate on industrial policies polarised around the concepts of functional and 
selective industrial policies and analysed their effects on industrialisation and eco-
nomic growth. This debate, however, has resulted in an unproductive confronta-
tion that cannot enlighten policymakers, especially in newly industrialising and de-
veloping countries. The literature on the role of macroeconomic policies for eco-
nomic growth argues that developing countries’ economies are affected by struc-
turally adverse macroeconomic conditions that depress investments. However, 
how to counteract these adverse structural macroeconomic conditions remains 
disputed. This thesis hinges on these literatures and adds to their polemics.  
Nowadays, it is argued that manufacturing is not the only modern industry capable 
of driving economic growth. Agriculture, natural resource-based industries, and 
services apply more and more knowledge and technologies (e.g. von Tunzelmann 
and Acha, 2005; Perez, 2010; Spithoven, 2000). Consequently, the term structural 
change has been also used in a broader way to indicate shifts from lower to higher 
value-added productive activities. Within the service sector, it is possible to distin-
guish between traditional and modern services, where modern services refer to 
ICT-enabled tradable services, such as computer, financial, and business services. 
In the last decades, the share of services in GDP has increased tremendously both 
in advanced and emerging economies (Szirmai, 2012). Some authors, therefore, put 
forth the idea that modern services can be the new engine of economic growth, or 
at least play the role of an additional engine (e.g. Dasgupta and Singh, 2006, 2005; 
Timmer and de Vries, 2008; Chakravarty and Mitra, 2009; Felipe et al., 2009). De-
spite acknowledging that other industries could have acted as engines of economic 
growth at least in the last two decades or so, this thesis focuses on the manufactur-
ing industry. 
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The thesis investigates the determinants of industrialisation. Why some countries 
industrialised and others did not is the fundamental question that motivates each 
chapter of the thesis. After the Second World War, most of the attempts at indus-
trialisation failed -except for the notorious cases of the so-called Asian Tigers. Un-
derstanding the causes of these failures is not only historically important, but also 
necessary to formulate sound policy recommendations for newly industrialising 
countries. A large number of countries are still trying to industrialise. Their advan-
tage of backwardness is not only in terms of knowledge and technologies, but also in 
terms of industrial strategies and policy practices.  
We tackle this research question in three sequential steps, each of them with an 
empirical study. Given the nature of the topics treated, quantitative and semi-
qualitative research methods are applied. First, we explore the determinants of in-
dustrialisation in a large number of developed and developing countries. Then, we 
delve deeper into the analysis by looking at the role of industrial and macroeco-
nomic policies.  
In the second step, we provide a detailed account of industrial policies in the most 
debated cases of successful and relatively less successful industrialisation processes, 
namely East Asia and Latin America. These cases are illustrative of the role of in-
dustrial policies, especially given the initial economic conditions of the two re-
gions. In this part of the thesis, we are interested in assessing the extent and nature 
of industrial policy in East Asia and Latin America. The ultimate objective of the 
analysis is to identify the elements that distinguished East Asian and Latin Ameri-
can industrial policies and understand if these elements can explain their patterns 
of structural and technological change. Industrial policies alone are not enough to 
industrialise. Favourable macroeconomic conditions are also important.  
In the third step of our analysis, we investigate how macroeconomic factors affect 
manufacturing growth. As mentioned above, both neoclassical economists and 
structuralists talked about structural macroeconomic conditions. However, what 
structural means and how to counteract adverse structural macroeconomic condi-
tions is very much debated. This study aims at verifying if the structural compo-
nent of macroeconomic factors -as opposed to the cyclical movements expected in 
any capitalist economy- explains firms’ investments.  
The main source of novelty of this thesis consists in analysing the role of public 
policies for industrialisation in a (semi-)quantitative fashion. This is accomplished 
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by a major effort in constructing suitable semi-quantitative indicators of industrial 
policies, and distinguishing the channels through which public policies affect in-
dustrialisation. 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. In the first study (Chapter 2), we explore the 
determinants of industrialisation by estimating the equation of manufacturing out-
put growth of the Cornwall (1977) model. This is a two-equation model where the 
first equation explains output growth in manufacturing and the second explains 
aggregate output growth as a function of manufacturing output growth. Because 
the manufacturing share is endogenous to economic growth, it is generally instru-
mented with all the other exogenous variables of the model. This estimation con-
stitutes the first step of a two-step instrumental variable estimation. Generally, 
with two-step estimations, only the second step (the equation of aggregate output 
growth) is reported and discussed, while the first step is used only to feed into the 
second equation. This study estimates the equation of manufacturing output 
growth to identify the variables that truly instrument for manufacturing output 
growth in two-step instrumental variable estimations. In this way, this study puts 
manufacturing at the centre of the analysis and investigates its determinants and 
their evolution over time. 
Following the debates outlined so far, we are interested in testing the following 
two hypotheses. First, policies matter more than broadly defined institutions, as 
captured by traditional indicators like democracy indexes. The policies analysed in 
this paper are trade policies, and more specifically trade liberalisation and exchange 
rate policies. The second hypothesis that we want to test is that skills and knowl-
edge accumulation contribute more to industrialisation than prices. This hypothe-
sis is based on the Schumpeterian idea according to which differences in interna-
tional competitiveness are determined more by technological capabilities than price 
competitiveness (Fagerberg, 1988, 1996; Fagerberg et al., 2007).  
In order to test these hypotheses, we apply modern panel data techniques to a 
dataset that covers a large sample of developed and developing countries from 
1960 to 2005. A large and long database improves generalizability of results and 
allows exploring if some forces were more important in some periods than in oth-
ers. In order to preserve the size of the database, this study relies on secondary 
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data and excludes potentially interesting variables for which data are not readily 
available. This partly motivates our second study. 
Several important determinants of industrialisation cannot be investigated in an 
econometric setting. In countries where these determinants are likely to have 
played a key role, our econometric model poorly predicts manufacturing growth 
rates. These countries can be considered outliers in the econometric analysis, 
meaning that, after taking into account important determinants of industrialisation, 
unexpectedly positive or negative outcomes are observed. These outcomes must 
be explained by other factors. We hypothesise that public policies, and in particular 
industrial policies, are among those.  
Therefore, the third and fourth chapters of this thesis deal with the role of indus-
trial policies and focus on the experiences of few selected countries in Latin Amer-
ica and East Asia, namely Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, South Korea (Korea hereaf-
ter), and Taiwan. As mentioned, after the Second World War, Latin America was 
better positioned than East Asia to catch up. Indeed, many observers believed that 
Latin American countries would have been the next to industrialise. Given this ad-
vantaged position, the relative failure of Latin America vis a vis East Asia has been 
attributed to the industrial strategies implemented after the Second World War. 
The third chapter of this thesis provides a detailed and critical review of the his-
torical- comparative literature on industrial policy in East Asia and Latin America. 
It defines industrial policy in a broad way and distinguishes two types and four 
domains of intervention of industrial policy. Industrial policies are defined as func-
tional or selective. The former equally affects all industries of the economy by im-
proving the functioning of markets without discriminating among industries. The 
latter deliberately target particular industries or firms. Industrial policies are also 
categorised according to their domain of intervention into framework conditions, 
trade, investment, and science, technology, and innovation policies. Based on this 
categorisation, we build a detailed taxonomy of industrial policy’s instruments. 
This chapter lays the ground for a quantitative comparative analysis of industrial 
policies implemented in the five countries.  
In the fourth chapter, the thesis attempts at quantifying industrial policy by defin-
ing, constructing, and systematically comparing indicators of industrial policy in-
struments used by the five countries under analysis. By using these data, the thesis 
tries to assess whether East Asian and Latin American states directed countries’ 
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processes of structural and technological change; that is, to what extent their in-
dustrial policies were functional or selective. Understanding the extent and nature 
of industrial policies only by quantitative indicators is impossible: any quantitative 
indicator cannot account for the processes of policy-making, implementation, and 
enforcement of policies. Moreover, idiosyncratic political arrangements, conse-
quences of the history and evolution of the institutions of the country, reduce the 
degree of cross-country comparability of indicators. Still, our proxy of industrial 
policy is a first attempt at bringing solid empirical evidence in the historical debate 
on industrial policy. 
Adverse macroeconomic conditions can alter the effects of industrial policies. The 
relative unsuccessful industrialisation of Latin America has been partly imputed to 
adverse macroeconomic conditions. It would be unfair to conclude our analysis 
without a treatment of this issue. This is why the last study of this thesis (Chapter 
5) focuses on macroeconomic policies and in particular, on the role of macroeco-
nomic factors as structural determinants of firms’ investments. Firms’ investments 
in manufacturing are the micro-equivalent of industrialisation. In other words, 
firms’ investments choices determine aggregate investments and output of the 
manufacturing industry.  
With this study, we add the microeconomic dimension to our macroeconomic 
analysis. This approach is novel and interesting because it contributes to a better 
understanding of the micro-macro interactions that shape investment patterns in 
manufacturing. In this chapter, we test if macroeconomic conditions are structural; 
that is, if macroeconomic conditions affect investments because they are structur-
ally adverse or favourable. We use data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
for the period 2002-2010 and estimate a multilevel Heckman selection model in 
which firms’ investments depend on macroeconomic policies. Following the de-
bate on the effects of the Washington Consensus, we explore the effect of policies 
for macroeconomic stability, financial and trade liberalisation, and tax reforms. 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions and policy implications of the thesis. 

  
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
An Analysis of the Determi-
nants of Industrialisation, 1960-
2005 
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2.1 Introduction 
The term industrialisation refers to the movement of productive resources from low-
productivity traditional sectors (agriculture) to high-productivity modern industries 
(manufacturing). Owing to the higher capital intensity and technological content 
and the stronger linkages with the rest of the economy of manufacturing, acceler-
ated growth of manufacturing output is associated with faster economic growth 
(Kaldor, 1967; UN, 1970; Cripps and Tarling, 1975; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 
1999; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2011).  
Recent empirical analysis showed that in the last decades both manufacturing and 
modern services act as engines of economic growth (e.g. Felipe et al., 2009; 
Timmer and de Vries, 2008). In light of this empirical evidence, some scholars 
questioned the idea that industrialisation via manufacturing is still a necessary step 
towards development and proposed modern services as the new engine of growth 
(e.g. Dasgupta and Singh, 2005, 2006). While it is undeniable that in the last dec-
ades modern services played an important role in the economy, this study adopts a 
long-term perspective and therefore looks only at the manufacturing industry. 
This chapter analyses the long-term dynamics of industrialisation and investigates 
its determinants in a sample of 74 developed and developing countries from 1960 
to 2005. In order to do so, the study goes back to the model of the engine of 
growth hypothesis developed by John Cornwall in 1977. This model is made of 
two equations that describe aggregate output growth as a function of manufactur-
ing output growth. Recent econometric estimations applied two-step instrumental 
variable techniques and instrumented manufacturing output growth with all the 
other exogenous variables of the model. This literature reports and discusses only 
the second step of the estimations -the results of the estimation of the equation of 
aggregate output growth. The first step -the estimation of the equation of manu-
facturing output growth- is only used to feed into the second equation.  
This study looks at the equation of manufacturing output growth before it feeds 
into the equation of economic growth. This means looking at what variables truly 
instrument for manufacturing growth when estimating the model of the engine of 
growth hypothesis with two-step instrumental variable techniques. This not only 
informs the literature on the hypothesis of manufacturing as an engine of growth, 
but also the academic and policy debate on industrialisation. By putting manufac-
turing at the centre of the analysis, this study investigates how some countries 
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managed to industrialise, while others did not, and how conditions for industriali-
sation changed over time. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a literature review 
on the role and drivers of industrialisation. Section 2.3 presents our econometric 
model and describes the data used. Section 2.4 presents the results of the econo-
metric estimations. Robustness checks are reported in section 2.5. Section 2.6 
briefly concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
In early structural development economics, industrialisation referred to the process 
of structural change that backward countries experience in their development from 
agrarian to industrial urban economies (Clark, 1940; Kuznets, 1966; Cornwall, 
1977). The positive relationship between economic growth and growth of the 
manufacturing industry was explained by the properties of manufacturing. It was 
argued that manufacturing is more productive and more capital intensive than the 
other industries (Hoffmann, 1958; Chenery et al., 1986). Because capital goods 
embody state-of-the-art technologies and learning accumulates with production, 
manufacturing is considered the locus of technological progress (Cornwall, 1977). 
Finally, stronger backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy charac-
terise the manufacturing industry (Rosenstein Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953; 
Hirschman, 1958; Cornwall, 1977). 
Based on this evidence, in his 1977 book, John Cornwall developed a model of the 
engine of growth hypothesis, according to which economic growth depends on 
manufacturing output growth. Using data for market economies for the 1950s and 
1960s, early empirical analysis confirmed that economic growth is significantly as-
sociated with manufacturing output growth (Kaldor, 1967; UN, 1970; Cripps and 
Tarling, 1975). Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) and Szirmai and Verspagen (2011) 
verified the engine of growth hypothesis using more recent data and larger data-
sets. They show that manufacturing is still an engine of growth, if countries target 
the most dynamic industries and possess enough absorptive capacity. Country case 
studies (e.g. Tregenna, 2007; Kuturia and Raj, 2009) and reports by international 
organizations (e.g. UNIDO, 2009, 2013) confirmed the importance of manufactur-
ing for industrialisation. 
Early structural development economics evolved into two approaches: the struc-
tural approach to development economics, represented by Hollis Chenery and his 
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co-authors, and the Latin American structuralism. The structural approach to de-
velopment economics focused on the role of trade and exports. In their empirical 
analysis, these authors find that trade openness and outward-oriented development 
strategies led to rapid export growth and structural change. On the export-side, the 
export push allows countries to specialise in industries where domestic demand is 
limited. On the import-side, increased availability of foreign exchange allows im-
ports of modern intermediate and capital goods (Chenery, 1960, 1975, 1980; 
Chenery et al., 1974, 1986; Syrquin, 1988). Based on this analysis, the structural 
approach to development economics advocated for trade openness and outward-
oriented development strategies. 
Latin American structuralism focused on the relationship between productive spe-
cialisations and balance of payment constraints. Inspired by the writings of Raul 
Prebisch (1950, 1973), Latin American structuralists argue that developing coun-
tries tend to specialise in primary commodities and resource-intensive industries, 
for which they have comparative advantages. However, this specialisation causes a 
decline in their terms of trade and constrains their balance of payments (Furtado, 
1961; Pinto, 1965, 1970).1 Dependency on primary commodities makes developing 
countries vulnerable to volatile international commodity prices and to capital ac-
count shocks. This causes cyclical overvaluations of the exchange rate that penalise 
the manufacturing industry (Bresser-Pereira, 2008; Ocampo, 2011). In these cir-
cumstances, active industrial policies are required to redirect the process of struc-
tural change away from primary commodities (ECLAC, 1998; Ocampo, 2011). 
Modern versions of these two approaches were formulated. Lin (2010) put forth 
the framework of new structural economics. In this framework, modern industri-
alisation requires knowledge accumulation, technological upgrading, and innova-
tion. Bresser-Pereira (2012) developed the new developmentalism, based on het-
erodox and structuralist approaches and inspired by the lessons of the East Asian 
experience.  
In a review of Latin American structuralism, Bielschowsky (2009) noticed that 
modern Latin American structuralism is giving increasing importance to innova-
tion by incorporating views from the Schumpeterian approach. Schumpeterian (or 
evolutionary) economists studied the role of innovation for economic growth and 
demonstrated that international competitiveness is driven more by technological 
                                                     
1 A similar argument was made by Singer (1950). 
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than cost competitiveness (e.g. Fagerberg, 1988, 1996; Fagerberg et al., 2007). This 
finding was corroborated by the experience of East Asian countries that managed 
to catch up thanks to their efforts in technology adoption and capabilities’ accu-
mulation (e.g. Kim, 1992, 1997; Nelson and Pack, 1999; Lall, 2004; Lee and Lim, 
2001; Lee, 2009).  
In the Latin American context, Katz (2000b, 2001) and Cimoli (Cimoli and Katz, 
2003) analysed the processes of structural and technological change in Latin 
American firms during the different phases of Latin American industrialisation. 
According to their analysis, abrupt trade and financial liberalisations imposed in 
the 1980s and 1990s changed the direction of structural and technological change 
by spurring growth in resource-based industries and hitting R&D and engineering-
intensive industries. Most penalised industries were technology-intensive indus-
tries: exposure to international competition, devaluations of local currencies, and 
contraction of aggregate demand halted the processes of learning initiated and 
spurred by import substitution strategy.  
2.3 Approach and data overview 
Approach 
The model of the engine of growth hypothesis developed by Cornwall (1977) is 
made of two equations: 
  =	 +		 + 	
 +	 +	( ⁄ ) (1.1) 
  =  +		 (1.2) 
The first equation explains output growth in the manufacturing industry () and 
the second aggregate output growth ( ). Aggregate output growth depends on the 
growth rate of manufacturing output, as reflected by the coefficient, e1, the meas-
ure of the power of manufacturing as an engine of growth. The determinants of 
the growth rate of manufacturing output are the level and growth rate of aggregate 
income ( and  ), income relative to the most developed economies (), and in-
vestments (( ⁄ )). The level and growth rate of income capture demand side 
factors. The ratio of per capita income relative to high-income economies is a 
measure of the potential for technological catch up. Investments measure the ef-
forts to develop imported and indigenous technologies. 
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This paper empirically tests a revised version of the first equation of this model, 
i.e. the equation of manufacturing output growth. This revised version of the 
model builds on previous estimations of the Cornwall model (Kaldor, 1967; UN, 
1970; Cripps and Tarling, 1975; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and Ver-
spagen, 2011). 
To capture manufacturing output growth, we use the first difference of the share 
of manufacturing in GDP. As suggested by Corwall himself, the level and growth 
rate of aggregate income should not be simultaneously included in estimations be-
cause the simultaneous inclusion of variables containing income would create col-
linearity. Therefore, only the income relative to the most developed economy (US) 
is included in the model. Together with income relative to the US, we include the 
lagged value of the manufacturing share in GDP to account for catch up or cumu-
lativeness in the industrialisation process. We expect the coefficients of these two 
variables to be negative. Because the level of investment is endogenous to manu-
facturing growth, it is accounted for by the variables that drive it in the first place.  
Following previous estimations of the model of the engine of growth hypothesis 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2011), we augment the 
original model by adding labour costs, skills, and capabilities to account for supply-
side factors, and size of the domestic and export markets to account for demand-
side factors.  
Labour costs are a measure of international competitiveness: higher labour costs 
make exports more expensive and countries less competitive. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to the Kaldor paradox (Kaldor, 1978), rapidly growing countries are char-
acterised by high growth rates of labour costs. This suggests that labour costs can-
not be a determinant of industrialisation in the long run. Moreover, depending on 
countries’ industrial specialisation, low wages can be explained by low productivity, 
which would mean lower competitiveness. Despite this might vary across indus-
tries, the overall effect of labour costs on industrialisation is expected to be nega-
tive (Amable and Verspagen, 1995).  
Empirical studies showed that price competitiveness is not the most important de-
terminant of international competitiveness in the long run. Instead, skills and tech-
nological capabilities are more important (Fagerberg, 1988; Amendola et al., 1993; 
Fagerberg et al., 2010; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and Verspagen, 
2011). In this study, traditional measures of education levels account for skills’ ac-
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cumulation (Barro and Lee, 2010). Patents and R&D expenditures measure tech-
nological capabilities.  
In a first stage, we use the number of USPTO patents per capita. Due to its clear 
advantages in terms of data availability and cross-country comparability, this is the 
most widely used indicator in the literature. However, USPTO granting procedures 
require a high degree of novelty of the patented invention. These requirements are 
likely to be excessive in developing countries’ contexts. Therefore, in a second 
stage, we use depreciated USPTO patent stock, the number of patent per capita at 
national offices (granted to residents), R&D expenditures, and a measure of tech-
nological level developed by Fagerberg (1988). National patent offices’ criteria to 
grant patents are less stringent than the USPTO are, allowing capturing a much 
broader range of innovations. In contrast with patents that represent the output of 
innovation processes, R&D expenditures are an indicator of innovation input. For 
this reason, R&D expenditures and patents can be considered complementary 
measures of innovation. This is why Fagerberg (1988) combines them in a single 
indicator, the indicator of technological level.  
With respect to demand-size factors, population size accounts for the size of the 
domestic market. The size of the external market is captured by merchandise ex-
ports as percentage of GDP. Exports depend on exchange rates: by making the 
price of tradable goods higher relative to that of non-tradable, undervalued ex-
change rates encourage the transfer of resources towards the more profitable trad-
able sector. Since the tradable sector is mainly made of industrial activities, the ef-
fect of the real exchange rate on growth is channelled by industrialisation. To ac-
count for exchange rates, we use the undervaluation index proposed by Rodrik 
(2008). This index, taken in logarithmic form, is positive when the currency is un-
dervalued. 
Following previous studies (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Rodrik, 2008), we 
also account for institutional and macroeconomic factors. With respect to institu-
tions, in the literature there is broad consensus that institutions matter for growth. 
This paper tests if institutions affect growth via industrialisation. The indicators of 
institutions used in the literature mainly capture political systems variables, such as 
democracy index and rule of law. Fagerberg and Schrolec (2008) demonstrated 
that good governance contributes to economic growth more than democratic po-
litical systems. However, indicators of good governance are not available for long 
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time series. In order to preserve the length of our panel, we chose to rely on indi-
cators of political systems. Our preferred measure of institutions is the Vanhanen 
index (Vanhanen, 2000). Compared to other measures (e.g. Polity and Freedom 
House data), this indicator uses quantitative data, rather than subjective evalua-
tions. With respect to macroeconomic conditions, inflation and terms of trade in-
fluence investment choices. 
We also include a variable that accounts for the portion of land in temperate cli-
matic zones. Geographical variables are the classic instruments in empirical studies 
on economic growth. While institutions and trade are endogenous because they are 
mutually determined and in turn influenced by economic growth, geography is an 
exogenous determinant of economic growth (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dollar 
and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Lee and Kim, 2009). 
Details on the sources and definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in 
Table A.1 (Appendix A). 
Data overview 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of 74 developed and developing countries cov-
ering the period from 1960 to 2004. Table A.2 (Appendix A) gives details of the 
countries and period covered in the analysis. Before delving into the econometric 
analysis, it is worthwhile showing that indeed many countries in our sample are not 
industrialised, meaning that they have not yet become rich (industrial) countries. 
Felipe et al. (2014) found high correlation coefficients between being an industrial-
ised, i.e. rich, country today and having experienced a peak in manufacturing em-
ployment share higher than 18-20% and a peak in manufacturing share in GDP 
higher than 22% between 1970 and 2010.2 This means that roughly speaking, a 
country could be defined industrialised if its share of manufacturing in GDP sur-
passed the threshold of 22%.3 By applying this rule to our sample, we find that 40 
countries out of 74 reached the peak of 22%, or higher, in manufacturing shares in 
GDP between 1960 and 2005.  
                                                     
2 A rich country is defined as a country whose average per capita GDP during 2005–2010 exceeds a 
cutoff of $12,000 in 2005 prices (not PPP corrected). This roughly corresponds to the World Bank’s 
definition of a high-income economy. 
3 Felipe et al. (2014) show that emplyment shares are better predictors of GDP today, than output 
shares. Nevertheless, due to data availability and in line with our definition of industrialisation, we 
look at output shares rather than employment shares. 
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Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. This guides the 
choice of the type of econometric model to adopt. 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
  Overall Between Within N N 
T-
bar 
First difference of the manufac-
turing share in GDP 
0.10 2.30 1.30 2.73 613 85 7.2 
Lagged manufacturing share in 
GDP (manL1) 
18.27 8.06 7.48 3.99 645 85 7.6 
GDP per capita as % of US 
GDP (relus) 
0.31 0.28 0.28 0.07 734 85 8.6 
Wage  7.99 1.26 1.02 0.81 559 80 6.9 
Population (pop) 9.32 1.64 1.63 0.28 758 85 8.9 
Merchandise exports (export) 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.09 712 84 8.5 
Undervaluation index 
(underval) 
0.05 0.46 0.37 0.30 706 85 8.3 
Democracy index (democracy) 14.32 13.68 12.33 5.98 699 84 8.3 
Education (edu) 5.59 2.78 2.48 1.37 751 85 8.8 
Terms of trade (tot) 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.07 729 85 8.6 
Inflation 2.20 1.08 0.74 0.82 661 83 8.0 
USPTO patents (patents) 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.06 715 82 8.7 
Depreciated stock of USPTO 
patents  
0.09 0.28 0.27 0.09 753 84 9.0 
National offices’ patents 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.09 455 72 6.3 
R&D expenditures 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.07 307 63 4.9 
Technological level 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.03 300 61 4.9 
 
The table shows that the within component of the standard deviation of the de-
pendent variable (the first difference of the share of manufacturing in GDP) is lar-
ger than its between component. The opposite is true for all the explanatory vari-
ables, but inflation (because of its high volatility). Because variation in the data is 
mainly between rather than within countries, we would rather not rely on a fixed 
effect model. Fixed effects models look at within countries variations and wipe out 
between effects. Moreover, because our objective is to understand why some 
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countries industrialised and others did not, we are interested in between countries 
variations rather than within countries variations.  
Finally, because data start in 1980, R&D expenditures data dramatically affect the 
length of our dataset. While patent indicators and R&D expenditures are generally 
highly correlated, this correction is much lower for developing countries. The cor-
relation between USPTO patents and R&D expenditures is 0.86 for the whole 
sample, 0.62 for Africa, and 0.31 for Latin America. Similarly, the correlation be-
tween USPTO and national offices’ patents is 0.74 for the whole sample, 0.84 for 
Africa, 0.6 for Asia, and 0.2 for Latin America. This justifies the use of these alter-
native indicators. 
2.4 Results 
We begin our econometric analysis by comparing fixed and random effects, be-
tween, and Hausman and Taylor (1981) specifications. Following Jacob and Osang 
(2007) and Szirmai and Verspagen (2011), we separately inspected each explana-
tory variable by means of Hausman tests (not reported here) in order to identify 
endogenous explanatory variables. The lagged share of the manufacturing share in 
GDP, the undervaluation index, and population are endogenous.  
Because the lagged dependent variable is included in all these models, fixed effects 
models are biased (Nickell, 1981). Similarly, the Hausman and Taylor models are 
also likely to be biased, since they partly rely on within transformations. For this 
reason, Section 2.5 reports a number of robustness checks, including system GMM 
estimations that solve the dynamic panel bias.  
Results of the estimations are reported in Table 2.2.   
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Table 2.2. Determinants of industrialisation, 1960-2005 
 
Fixed effects Random effects Between Hausman-Taylor 
 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1 # -0.385 0.049 *** -0.182 0.027 *** -0.052 0.041 
 
-0.349 0.033 *** 
pop # 3.786 1.456 * 0.358 0.124 ** 0.086 0.142 
 
1.493 0.599 * 
underval # 1.655 0.821 * 1.484 0.574 ** 0.786 0.700 
 
1.925 0.570 *** 
export 8.440 2.487 ** 5.448 1.550 *** 5.009 1.773 ** 8.170 1.806 *** 
relus 0.620 2.839 
 
-2.779 1.377 * -0.029 1.993 
 
-1.317 2.387 
 
wage 0.417 0.294 
 
0.084 0.234 
 
-0.841 0.398 * 0.343 0.306 
 
edu 0.249 0.346 
 
0.141 0.094 
 
0.022 0.126 
 
0.354 0.220 
 
democracy -0.024 0.030 
 
-0.021 0.020 
 
-0.059 0.029 * -0.019 0.024 
 
patents -1.362 2.445 
 
-0.110 1.109 
 
0.346 1.886 
 
-1.456 2.062 
 
inflation 0.306 0.189 
 
-0.062 0.158 
 
0.077 0.235 
 
0.287 0.162 + 
tot 3.207 2.466 
 
2.103 1.518 
 
-1.216 2.820 
 
3.221 2.004 
 
kgatemp 
   
1.479 0.486 ** 1.455 0.589 * 1.602 1.740 
 
D65-70 -0.501 0.633 
 
-0.069 0.678 
 
-2.067 4.079 
 
-0.328 0.539 
 
D70-75 -2.918 0.624 *** -1.733 0.529 ** -0.502 3.971 
 
-2.586 0.604 *** 
D75-80 -3.950 0.938 *** -1.864 0.710 ** 3.001 4.441 
 
-3.269 0.733 *** 
D80-85 -5.176 1.182 *** -2.450 0.767 ** -8.036 5.267 
 
-4.312 0.905 *** 
D85-90 -5.468 1.343 *** -2.486 0.714 *** 3.886 4.977 
 
-4.557 0.992 *** 
D90-95 -5.757 1.553 *** -2.549 0.777 ** -0.736 2.992 
 
-4.671 1.127 *** 
D95-00 -7.532 1.803 *** -4.076 0.768 *** 0.350 3.023 
 
-6.303 1.238 *** 
D00-05 -7.790 1.936 *** -3.882 0.765 *** -2.180 2.656 
 
-6.475 1.365 *** 
constant -31.216 13.606 * 0.598 2.063 
 
6.785 4.165 
 
-10.509 5.987 + 
rho 0.849 0.075 
 
0.881 
obs. 435 435 435 435 
countries 74 74 74 74 
R2 within 0.334 0.289 0.002 
 
R2 between 0.041 0.418 0.608 
 
R2 overall 0.047 0.316 0.031 
 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Standard errors for fixed and random effects are robust (adjusted for clusters). The # indi-
cates the variables that are treated as endogenous in Hausman and Taylor estimations. 
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Results of fixed effects, random effects, and Hausman and Taylor estimations are 
quite similar: lagged manufacturing shares, population size, export shares, and un-
dervalued exchange rates are significant determinants of industrialisation. In coun-
tries with less developed manufacturing industries, manufacturing grows faster, 
meaning that there is catch-up in industrialisation. Size of the domestic market, 
export shares, and the undervaluation index are related positively and significantly 
to industrialisation. This confirms existing empirical evidence on the role of ex-
ports and undervalued exchange rates. Wages are positively associated to industri-
alisation, but never significantly. Income relative to the US is most of the times 
negative and significant only in the random effects estimation. The coefficient of 
education is positive but never significant, while the one of USPTO patents is 
negative.  
With respect to macroeconomic factors, the coefficients of inflation rates are posi-
tive in all estimations but in random effects, and significant only in the Hausman 
and Taylor estimation. This suggests that inflation control is not a necessary ele-
ment of industrial development strategies. Terms of trade are usually positive but 
never significant.  
The coefficient of the institutional indicator (democracy) is always negative and 
becomes significant only in the between specification. We further test for the role 
of institutions by using alternative indexes (see Table A.3 in Appendix A). Because 
results confirm that broadly defined institutions are never significant determinants 
of industrialisation, we decide to omit democracy indexes from the rest of the 
analysis. All period dummies but the first are significant and negative. Coefficients 
suggest that industrialising has become increasingly difficult over time.4  
The story that emerges from the between estimation is quite different. Because the 
between model transforms explanatory variables into countries’ means, these esti-
mations exploit the pure cross-country dimension of the data. What these results 
suggest is that between-countries differences in industrialisation are explained by 
exports, labour costs, democracy, and geography. As expected, countries with 
higher export shares, lower labour costs, and in temperate climatic zones experi-
ence faster manufacturing growth. Less democratic countries industrialise faster. 
                                                     
4 A significance test on whether these coefficients are statistically different from each other indicates 
that dummies from the 1980s until the 1990s and the dummies for 1995 and 2000 are not statistically 
different from each other. 
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The Hausman test of over-identifying restrictions strongly rejects (p= 0.0000) the 
null hypothesis of consistency of the random effects model. The same test per-
formed for the Hausman and Taylor specification does not reject the null hypothe-
sis (p= 0.9645), meaning that the Hausman and Taylor specification is both consis-
tent and efficient. Therefore, the Hausman and Taylor model is our preferred 
model. The model by Hausman and Taylor combines the advantages of fixed and 
random effects models because it deals with endogeneity and does not eliminate 
country time-invariant effects. 
As a first robustness check, we estimate a Hausman and Taylor model where we 
follow existing empirical evidence to determine which variables are endogenous. 
We treat lagged manufacturing shares, exports, wages, education, patents, and the 
democracy index as endogenous explanatory variables. Results (in Table A.4 in 
Appendix A) do not vary and the p-value of the test of over-identifying restriction 
is 0.8061, which again would confirm that the Hausman and Taylor specification is 
consistent and the most efficient. All results are also robust to the inclusion of 
continent dummies and to the inclusion of both period and continent dummies 
(results not reported here). 
Table 2.3 reports Hausman and Taylor estimations where we test for four alterna-
tive measures of technological change, namely the depreciated USPTO patent 
stock (column 1); patents at national patent offices (column 2); R&D expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP (column 3); and the indicator of technological level devel-
oped by Fagerberg in 1988 (column 4). Hausman tests indicate that these four 
variables are exogenous. Because R&D and secondary education are too closely 
related, education was dropped in column 3 and 4. 
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Table 2.3. An exploration of alternative measures of technical change 
Patent stock National patents R&D Tech. level 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1 -0.349 0.034 *** -0.380 0.040 *** -0.490 0.056 *** -0.484 0.055 *** 
pop 1.447 0.585 * 1.064 0.655 
 
1.553 0.990 
 
1.757 1.116 
 
underval 2.006 0.568 *** 2.736 0.766 *** 2.873 0.774 *** 2.395 0.714 *** 
export 8.380 1.814 *** 8.396 2.139 *** 9.678 2.176 *** 10.281 2.168 *** 
relus -1.836 2.293 
 
0.904 2.474 
 
1.358 3.673 
 
2.666 4.038 
 
wages 0.319 0.306 
 
0.084 0.394 
 
-0.263 0.365 
 
-0.248 0.357 
 
edu 0.353 0.219 
 
0.510 0.252 * 
      
innovation -1.980 3.481 
 
0.085 1.610 
 
3.329 1.856 + 3.017 3.942 
 
inflation 0.259 0.162 
 
0.382 0.170 * 0.355 0.187 + 0.324 0.186 + 
tot 3.302 2.002 + 3.103 3.235 
 
-9.017 4.457 * -9.604 4.016 * 
kgatemp 1.508 1.661 
 
0.517 1.653 
 
0.422 2.397 
 
0.163 2.791 
 
D65-70 -0.358 0.538 
 
0.425 0.693 
       
D70-75 -2.600 0.602 *** -2.372 0.737 ** 
      
D75-80 -3.236 0.733 *** -3.190 0.857 *** 
      
D80-85 -4.271 0.904 *** -4.162 1.058 *** 1.680 0.669 * 1.683 0.665 * 
D85-90 -4.604 0.983 *** -4.331 1.135 *** 1.521 0.612 * 1.685 0.601 ** 
D90-95 -4.762 1.112 *** -4.568 1.264 *** 1.566 0.556 ** 1.757 0.543 ** 
D95-00 -6.404 1.223 *** -5.812 1.370 *** 0.395 0.444 
 
0.401 0.433 
 
D00-05 -6.661 1.347 *** -6.692 1.509 *** 
      
constant -9.926 5.882 + -6.103 6.681 
 
-9.721 10.653 
 
-12.011 11.976 
 
rho 0.869 0.877 0.913 0.943 
obs. 432 321 238 241 
countries 72 62 58 58 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The stock of USPTO patents is negatively associated with industrialisation, while 
the other three indicators are positively associated with industrialisation. This can 
be explained by the low number of USPTO patents held by industrialising coun-
tries: only the most successful of them industrialise by gradually accumulating 
technological capabilities. Moreover, only the coefficient of R&D expenditures is 
significant. The indicator of technological level, built on both R&D expenditures 
and USPTO patents, is not significant. This confirms how difficult it is to measure 
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technological efforts in industrialising countries. The introduction of alternative 
measures of innovation does not affect the other results, but makes education sig-
nificant in column 2.  
We now test if and how the determinants of industrialisation changed over time. 
According to the data, between 1960 and 1975 the share of manufacturing in GDP 
increased in the developing world, but decreased in developed countries. After 
1975, only Asia continued to industrialise, while Africa and Latin America started 
to deindustrialise (Szirmai, 2012). In addition, previous estimations evidenced that 
industrialisation became increasingly difficult over time (the coefficients of the 
time dummies were negative and decreasing). In order to check how determinants 
of industrialisation changed over time, we aggregate the 9 time dummies into 3 
sub-periods: 1960-1975, 1975-1990, and 1990-2005. These slope dummies are in-
teracted with all the explanatory variables. We estimate three models: the base 
model (column 4 of Table 2.2), a model with R&D expenditures, and one with 
Fagerberg (1988) indicator of technological level. As in previous estimations, the 
introduction of R&D expenditures and technological level reduces the length of 
panel to the period 1980-2005. Moreover, when these two variables are included, 
education is dropped because of collinearity. Results are reported in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4. Evolution of the determinants of industrialisation 
Base model R&D Tech. level 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1_60_75 -0.367 0.067 *** 
      
manL1_75_90 -0.330 0.049 *** -0.377 0.063 *** -0.373 0.064 *** 
manL1_90_05 -0.427 0.050 *** -0.602 0.066 *** -0.597 0.066 *** 
pop_60_75 1.168 0.395 ** 
      
pop_75_90 1.032 0.369 ** 0.720 0.711 
 
1.063 1.001 
 
pop_90_05 0.962 0.343 ** 0.960 0.682 
 
1.277 0.987 
 
underval_60_75 0.581 1.027 
       
underval_75_90 0.844 0.726 
 
0.667 0.980 
 
0.744 0.964 
 
underval_90_05 3.084 1.037 ** 3.859 1.256 ** 3.947 1.290 ** 
relus_60_75 -3.393 3.110 
       
relus_75_90 -5.327 2.928 + -2.430 3.981 
 
-2.265 4.436 
 
relus_90_05 -5.672 2.541 * -2.270 3.774 
 
-1.541 4.246 
 
wage_60_75 1.109 0.831 
       
wage_75_90 0.484 0.504 
 
-0.148 0.567 
 
-0.122 0.564 
 
wage_90_05 0.906 0.391 * 0.300 0.425 
 
0.451 0.423 
 
exp_60_75 8.673 3.415 * 
      
exp_75_90 5.999 2.451 * 6.345 3.061 * 6.696 3.035 * 
exp_90_05 7.533 1.766 *** 11.319 2.248 *** 11.938 2.268 *** 
edu_60_75 0.492 0.246 * 
      
edu_75_90 0.355 0.227 
       
edu_90_05 0.134 0.199 
       
tot_60_75 3.340 2.328 
       
tot_75_90 1.209 3.365 
 
-9.925 4.921 * -9.861 4.957 * 
tot_90_05 4.677 4.224 
 
-2.608 6.417 
 
-1.692 6.438 
 
infl_60_75 1.289 0.388 *** 
      
infl_75_90 0.173 0.216 
 
0.414 0.225 + 0.373 0.227 + 
infl_90_05 -0.094 0.230 
 
0.179 0.236 
 
0.161 0.235 
 
inn_60_75 -2.137 2.710 
       
inn_75_90 -0.258 2.868 
 
3.324 2.205 
 
6.589 4.311 
 
inn_90_05 2.619 2.296 
 
5.049 2.045 * 7.006 4.064 + 
kgatemp 2.123 1.118 + 1.410 2.224 
 
1.146 2.560 
 
rho 0.685 0.901 0.928 
obs. 442 238 236 
countries 75 58 57 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Constant and time dummies included in the estimations but not reported.  
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Four interesting results emerge from these estimations. First, lagged manufacturing 
and exports are the only two variables that are consistently significant in all sub-
periods. The signs of their coefficients confirm previous estimations. Coefficients 
of export shares also show that exports were particularly important in the period 
from 1960 to 1975 and from 1990 to 2005. Second, undervaluation index is sig-
nificant only in the last period (1990-2005). Its significance and higher coefficient 
show that exchange rate management became more important from the 1990s. 
Third, income relative to the US, which was rarely significant in previous estima-
tions, becomes significant from the mid-1970s in the base model (column 1). Its 
negative sign confirms the presence of catch-up forces in industrialisation.  
Finally and most importantly, the coefficient of USPTO patents per capita, nega-
tive in previous estimations, becomes positive (although not significant) in the last 
period. This suggests a more prominent role of technological change in modern 
industrialisation efforts. In column 2 and 3, where R&D expenditures and techno-
logical level substitute for USPTO patents, the coefficient of both R&D expendi-
tures and technological levels are always positive and significant in the period from 
1990 and 2005. Hence, these estimations confirm that accumulation of technologi-
cal capabilities became increasingly important in the last two decades. 
2.5 Robustness check 
All our estimations are likely to be strongly affected by endogeneity. Although this 
was already addressed by Hausman and Taylor estimations and by preserving the 
length of the panel, this section further verifies the validity of our results by using 
General Methods of Moments (GMM) and mixed effects estimations. Because 
USPTO patents did not turn out to be a significant determinant of industrialisation 
and other measures of technical change severely reduce the length of the panel, we 
exclude innovation measures from the next estimations. 
In Table 2.5, we report OLS and fixed effects estimations in column 1 and 2 re-
spectively. In columns 3-5, results of three different specifications of system GMM 
models are reported. Roodman (2006) suggests that for a correct implementation 
of system GMM a panel must be characterised by small T and large N and the 
model should include time dummies (which is our case). The standard treatment of 
endogenous variables is to use lag 2 and deeper for the transformed equation and 
lag 1 for the levels equation. Moreover, the number of instruments must not ex-
ceed the number of groups, as this would weaken the Hansen tests. The p-value of 
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the Hansen test must be higher than 0.1 and lower than 0.25, and the AR(2) above 
0.1. Roodman (2009) proposes three solutions in the case of instrument prolifera-
tion and weak tests: limiting the set of instruments to certain lags, collapsing the 
instrument set, and combining the two former solutions.  
Following Roodman (2006, 2009), model (1) in column 3 instruments all endoge-
nous variables (the lagged value of manufacturing, population, and the undervalua-
tion index) with lags 2 and deeper for the transformed equation and lag 0 in differ-
ences for the levels equation. Because the number of instruments becomes too 
high, model (2) in column 4 reduces the number of instruments by collapsing 
them.5 In model (3) of column 5, we adopt another strategy suggested by Rood-
man (2009). We reduce the number of instruments by using only some lags instead 
of the full set of available lags. We take lags 2-5 of the lagged dependent variable 
for the first difference equation and lag 0 in differences for the levels equation. 
The other two endogenous variables (population and undervaluation) are instru-
mented by lag 2 for the transformed equation and lag 0 in differences for the levels 
equation. This is the maximum number of instruments that we can include without 
exceeding the number of countries. 
At the end of the table, we report the number of observations, countries and in-
struments, the p-value of the test for autocorrelation of order 2 and the p-value of 
the Hansen test. 
 
                                                     
5 This is done by using the option collapse in STATA. 
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Before discussing the results of the GMM estimations, we set the credible range 
for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (manL1). OLS and fixed ef-
fects estimations define the credible range for the coefficient of the lagged value of 
the manufacturing share between -0.157 and -0.381.  
When we use all possible lags (column 3), the p-value of the Hansen test is 1.000. 
This is a telltale sign that the Hansen test is weak. The coefficient of lagged manu-
facturing share is highly significant as in all previous estimations and falls within 
the credible range. All previous results are largely robust, with the exception of 
RELUS and education that become significant. By collapsing instruments (model 
2), the number of instruments drops from 130 to 41. The p-value of the Hansen 
test decreases considerably (from 1.000 to 0.367), but is still not in the range sug-
gested by Roodman (2006). The coefficient of lagged manufacturing is in the 
credible but it is not significant. Only export shares, kgatemp, and the time dum-
mies are significant. In model 3, the p-value of the Hansen test is 0.223 and the 
AR(2) above 0.1 (0.393), both within the ranges suggested by Roodman (2006). 
The lagged value of manufacturing is significant and falls within the credible range. 
As in previous estimations, the undervaluation index and the share of exports are 
significant and positive. The coefficients of relus and wages are also significant and 
the other results are largely confirmed.  
We now check if mixed linear models would confirm or add on to our results. 
Mixed linear models permit random parameter variation to depend on observable 
variables; that is, allow explanatory variables to have a different effect for each 
country. Here we apply a random slopes model in which not only the intercept (as 
in a random effect model) but also the coefficients of some variables are allowed 
to change across countries. We estimate random slopes models allowing one single 
variable at a time to have a random coefficient.6 In each estimation, we check the 
p-value of the LR test and retain only the model for which the LR test rejects the 
null hypothesis (the null hypothesis is that all the parameters are equal to zero, so 
that adding random slopes does not add information to the random intercept 
model). Table 2.6 reports estimations’ results of these mixed effects models. 
                                                     
6 We repeated this procedure for each single explanatory variable and we did not impose restrictions 
on the correlation of the random effects, i.e. we did not assume that they are uncorrelated. 
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Table 2.6. Second robustness check: mixed effects models 
Random intercept Random coefficient: exp Random coefficient: pop 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1 -0.178 0.023 *** -0.225 0.024 *** -0.196 0.024 *** 
population 0.356 0.103 *** 0.452 0.105 *** 0.451 0.115 *** 
undervaluation 1.453 0.435 *** 1.566 0.429 *** 1.498 0.443 *** 
relus -3.233 1.169 ** -3.115 1.162 ** -3.058 1.168 ** 
wage 0.056 0.234 
 
0.162 0.227 
 
0.082 0.230 
 
export 5.348 1.093 *** 6.995 1.700 *** 5.967 1.082 *** 
edu 0.119 0.088 
 
0.165 0.083 * 0.116 0.085 
 
inflation -0.099 0.130 
 
0.025 0.125 
 
-0.086 0.131 
 
terms of trade 2.058 1.562 
 
1.039 1.534 
 
1.904 1.553 
 
kgatemp 1.273 0.424 ** 1.422 0.398 *** 1.204 0.415 ** 
D65-70 -0.084 0.574 
 
-0.066 0.547 
 
-0.066 0.570 
 
D70-75 -1.702 0.589 ** -1.784 0.560 ** -1.709 0.585 ** 
D75-80 -1.773 0.632 ** -2.068 0.604 *** -1.838 0.628 ** 
D80-85 -2.339 0.695 *** -2.826 0.670 *** -2.444 0.692 *** 
D85-90 -2.437 0.707 *** -2.951 0.680 *** -2.541 0.702 *** 
D90-95 -2.535 0.763 *** -3.171 0.733 *** -2.620 0.755 *** 
D95-00 -4.085 0.782 *** -4.680 0.750 *** -4.193 0.772 *** 
D00-05 -3.890 0.829 *** -4.605 0.799 *** -4.091 0.820 *** 
constant 0.838 1.911 
 
-0.537 1.911 
 
-0.038 1.944 
 
sd (constant) 0.563 0.238 1.285 0.438 3.843 1.310 *** 
sd (residual) 2.301 0.089 *** 2.181 0.082 *** 2.277 0.088 *** 
sd (variable) 7.991 1.988 *** 0.362 0.126 ** 
obs. 435 435 435 
countries 74 74 74 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Results show that adding random slopes for all variables, except for export shares 
and the size of the population, does not add information. Lagged manufacturing 
shares, size of the domestic market, undervaluation and export shares are persis-
tent determinants of industrialisation. According to these estimations, also income 
relative to the US (relus) is significantly related to industrialisation. Coefficients on 
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period dummies confirm that industrialising became more and more difficult over 
time. 
As a final robustness check, we use the growth rate of the manufacturing share in 
GDP as dependent variable. Hausman tests suggest that the lagged share of manu-
facturing, population size, and the undervaluation index are endogenous (as in pre-
vious estimations). In Table 2.7, we report results of four estimations: fixed effects, 
random effects, between estimation, and Hausman and Taylor model estimations.  
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Table 2.7. Dependent variable: growth rate of the manufacturing share in GDP 
Fixed effects Random effects Between Hausman and Taylor 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1# -0.023 0.003 *** -0.014 0.002 *** -0.004 0.003 -0.021 0.002 *** 
pop# 0.110 0.095 0.030 0.009 *** 0.008 0.011 0.062 0.026 ** 
underval# 0.138 0.045 *** 0.081 0.034 ** -0.005 0.055 0.136 0.041 *** 
export 0.406 0.144 *** 0.310 0.089 *** 0.188 0.140 0.418 0.121 *** 
relus -0.062 0.206 -0.168 0.108 0.046 0.158 -0.169 0.147        
wage 0.078 0.024 *** 0.026 0.018 -0.089 0.031 *** 0.062 0.021 *** 
edu 0.042 0.021 * 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.010 0.017 0.012        
democracy -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002        
patents 0.024 0.168 0.032 0.099 0.095 0.149 -0.015 0.135        
inflation 0.029 0.013 ** 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.019 0.022 0.011 ** 
tot 0.362 0.158 ** 0.312 0.124 ** 0.102 0.223 0.367 0.139 *** 
kgatemp 0.072 0.038 * 0.053 0.047 0.069 0.071        
D65-70 -0.023 0.042 0.018 0.042 0.103 0.323 -0.004 0.039        
D70-75 -0.200 0.049 *** -0.106 0.043 ** 0.092 0.314 -0.154 0.042 *** 
D75-80 -0.312 0.063 *** -0.155 0.047 *** 0.331 0.351 -0.235 0.049 *** 
D80-85 -0.423 0.079 *** -0.198 0.052 *** -0.188 0.417 -0.317 0.059 *** 
D85-90 -0.452 0.088 *** -0.196 0.054 *** 0.112 0.394 -0.330 0.063 *** 
D90-95 -0.491 0.102 *** -0.205 0.058 *** 0.092 0.237 -0.349 0.070 *** 
D95-00 -0.619 0.114 *** -0.295 0.060 *** 0.367 0.239 -0.456 0.075 *** 
D00-05 -0.654 0.126 *** -0.295 0.064 *** 0.032 0.210 -0.479 0.083 *** 
constant -1.194 0.895 -0.065 0.154 0.588 0.329 * -0.540 0.295 * 
rho 0.584 0.136 0.611 
obs. 435 435 435 435 
countries 74 74 74 74 
R2 within 0.331 0.303 0.000 
R2 between 0.014 0.322 0.560 
R2 overall 0.086 0.287 0.030 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In fixed and random effects and Hausman and Taylor estimations, previous find-
ings are largely confirmed. In contrast with previous estimations, wages are highly 
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significant and positive in fixed effects and Hausman and Taylor estimations. The 
coefficient of education is positive and significant in fixed effect regressions. In the 
between estimation, only the coefficient of wages is significant and negative. This 
confirms estimations results in Table 2.2. As in previous estimations, time dum-
mies are always significant and negative. Their coefficients confirm that industrial-
ising is becoming more difficult over time. The Hausman test rejects (p= 0.0016) 
the null hypothesis of consistency of the random effects model and does not reject 
the null hypothesis (p= 0.9953) for the Hausman and Taylor model. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Since early theories in economic development, manufacturing has been considered 
an engine of economic growth and socio-economic development. In 1977, John 
Cornwall developed a model to explain the role of manufacturing in economic 
growth. This model is composed of two equations: the first explains manufacturing 
output growth; the second explains aggregate growth as a function of manufactur-
ing output growth. This model was referred to as the model of the engine of 
growth hypothesis. Empirical studies estimated the reduced form of this model 
and confirmed that manufacturing is an engine of economic growth (Kaldor, 1967; 
UN, 1970; Cripps and Tarling, 1975; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and 
Verspagen, 2011). 
This chapter goes back to the Cornwall (1977) model and estimates a revised ver-
sion of the first equation of the model, i.e. the equation of manufacturing output 
growth. In this way, this study puts industrialisation at the centre of the analysis 
and shows which variables instrument for manufacturing output growth in reduced 
form estimations of the engine of growth hypothesis. Understanding what are the 
drivers of industrialisation, and so why some countries industrialised and others 
did not, is important for the historic account of industrialisation, but also for pol-
icy discussions on catch up and industrialisation. 
Following recent empirical estimations of the engine of growth hypothesis (Fager-
berg and Verspagen, 1999; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2011), our econometric model 
includes demand and supply side factors. Sizes of the domestic market and export 
shares in GDP account for demand-side factors. Labour costs, education levels, 
and measures of innovation such as patents and R&D expenditures capture sup-
ply-side factors. We also include indicators of institutions and macroeconomic fac-
tors. We use a panel dataset that covers 74 developed and developing countries 
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from 1960 to 2005. We deal with the issue of endogeneity by estimating Hausman 
and Taylor models. Results are robust to alternative model specifications (system 
GMM and mixed effects models). 
Results show that faster industrialisation occurs in countries with relatively under-
developed manufacturing industries, large domestic markets, strong export per-
formance, and undervalued exchange rates. Undervalued exchange rates signifi-
cantly contributed to manufacturing expansion, especially from the 1990s. This is 
in line with the abundant literature on export promotion (especially in East Asia), 
and with the empirical evidence and development theories on the role of the ex-
change rate (e.g. Rodrik 2008; Bresser-Pereira, 2008, 2012). Price-related variables 
are only partly related to industrialisation: while exchange rate management matters 
for industrialisation, labour costs do not. Labour costs are in most of the regres-
sions positively and not significantly related to industrialisation. By contrast, inno-
vation-related variables matter for industrialisation.  
When we look at how the impact of the determinants changed over time, results 
show that R&D expenditures and the measure of technological level developed by 
Fagerberg (1988) are significant determinants of industrialisation only from the 
1990s. Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) investigated the role of manufacturing as 
an engine of growth in the 1970s and 1980s and found a positive but not signifi-
cant coefficient of R&D expenditures. We interpret our results as further evidence 
that industrialisation increasingly requires skills and technological capabilities.  
Taken together, results on price-related variables and innovation-related variables 
at least partly confirm the Schumpeterian-evolutionary idea that competitiveness is 
based more on knowledge than prices, especially in recent decades (Fagerberg, 
1988, 1996; Fagerberg et al., 2007) and that catch up became more demanding over 
time, insofar as it requires more knowledge and skills (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 
1999, 2002, 2007).  
The literature emphasised the role of institutions in economic growth and industri-
alisation. Several definitions of institutions exist. Among these, Fagerberg and 
Schrolec (2008) distinguish between indicators of political systems (e.g. measures 
of democracy and rights) and indicators of quality of governance, such as ease of start-
ing and conducting a business. Results of their empirical analysis show that good 
governance matters for growth, while political systems matter only for richer coun-
tries. In order to preserve our panel, we chose to rely on indicators of political sys-
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tems. Our findings show that democracy is not significantly, and sometimes nega-
tively, associated with manufacturing output growth. This suggests that democrati-
sation is not a necessary pre-condition for industrialisation.  
In contrast with political system indicators, indicators of macroeconomic policies 
are significantly associated with industrialisation. Together with the findings on ex-
change rate policies, the chapter shows that inflation is positively and significantly 
related to industrialisation. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. Definitions and sources of variables used in the study 
Variable Definition Source 
Industrialisation First difference of share of manufacturing in GDP 
Szirmai and Ver-
spagen (2011) 
Income relative to 
US (RELUS) 
GDP per capita as a percentage of US GDP, first year 
of the period 
Szirmai and Ver-
spagen (2011) 
Size of the market 
(POP) 
Logarithm of the population, first year of the period 
Szirmai and Ver-
spagen (2011) 
Wages (WAGE) 
Logarithm of total wages and salaries (at current 
prices) in manufacturing divided by number of per-
sons engaged and number of employees, first year of 
the period 
UNIDO IND-
STAT2 2011 ISIC 
Rev.3 
Merchandise ex-
ports (EXP) 
Merchandise exports (current dollars) as percentage of 
GDP 
Lavopa and Szir-
mai (2012)  
Undervaluation 
index (UNDER-
VAL) 
Real exchange rate adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, 5-year averages 
PWT 7.0 
Terms of trade 
(TOT) 
Logarithm of terms of trade (2005 constant prices), 5-
year averages 
PWT 7.0 
Inflation (INFL) Logarithm of inflation rate, 5-year averages 
WDI and IMF 
WEO7 
Human capital 
(EDU) 
Average years of schooling for the population above 
15 years of age, first year of the period 
Szirmai and Ver-
spagen (2011) 
Institutions 
(DEM) 
Vanhanen index, first year of the period 
Quality of Gov-
ernment Dataset 
Geography 
(KGATEMP) 
Percentage of land in a temperate climatic zone, trans-
formed in a binary variable  
Szirmai and Ver-
spagen (2011) 
Patents per capita  
Number of patents per capita at USPTO (PATPC), 
first year of the period (normalized) 
USPTO 
Number of patent per capita at national offices 
granted to residents (NATPATPC), first year of the 
period (normalized) 
WIPO8 
R&D expendi-
tures (R&D) 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, first year 
of the period (normalized) 
CANA database 
(Castellacci and 
Natera, 2011) 9 
 
  
                                                     
7 For Chile and the UK, gaps were filled with data from Banco Centrale de Chile and Office of Na-
tional Statistics respectively. 
8 WIPO data start in 1965 and do not include some countries such as Taiwan. 
9 Data for Korea come from Lim (1995), table 5; OECD. For Taiwan: Smith (2000), table 2.12; Na-
tional Science Council (2003). 
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Table A.2. Country and period coverage 
Country Period Country Period 
Argentina 1980-2005 Jordan 1970-2005 
Australia 1960-1995 Kenya 1965-2005 
Austria 1960-2005 Korea 1965-2005 
Bangladesh 1980-2000 Luxembourg 2000-2005 
Belgium 1960-2005 Malawi 1970-2005 
Belize 1990-1995 Malaysia 1965-2005 
Bolivia 1970-2005 Malta 1970-1995 
Botswana 1980-2005 Mauritius 1980-2005 
Brazil 1990-2005 Mexico 1980-2005 
Cambodia 1995-2005 Morocco 1975-2005 
Canada 1960-2005 Netherlands 1960-2005 
Chile 1960-2005 Norway 1960-2005 
China 1975-1990; 2000-2005 Panama 1960-1970; 1985-2005 
Colombia 1960-2005 Paraguay 2000-2005 
Costa Rica 1960-1970; 1980-2005 Peru 1980-2005 
Cote d'Ivoire 1965-1985; 1990-2000 Philippines 1960-2005 
Cyprus 1980-2000 Portugal 1995-2005 
Denmark 1960-2005 South Africa 1960-2005 
Dominican Republic 1960-1990 Spain 1960-1970 
Ecuador 1960-2005 Sri Lanka 1965-1970; 1980-2005 
Egypt 1980-2005 Sudan 1970-1975; 2000-2005 
El Salvador 1965-2000 Sweden 1960-1995 
Eritrea 1995-2005 Syrian Arab Republic 1965-1970; 2000-2005 
Ethiopia 2000-2005 Taiwan 1970-2000 
Finland 1960-2005 Tanzania 1965-1970; 1995-2005 
France 1975-2005 Thailand 1965-2005 
Germany 1970-2005 Trinidad and Tobago 1965-1970; 1990-2005 
Ghana 1965-2005 Tunisia 1970-1985; 1995-2005 
Guatemala 1965-2000 Turkey 1960-2005 
Honduras 1960-2000 Uganda 1970-1975; 1980-2005 
India 1960-2005 United Kingdom 1960-2005 
Indonesia 1970-2005 Uruguay 1965-1970; 1985-2005 
Ireland 1960-1980 USA 1960-2005 
Israel 1960-2005 Venezuela 1960-2000 
Italy 1965-2005 Vietnam 1995-2005 
Jamaica 1965-1970; 1995-2005 Zambia 1990-1995 
Japan 1960-2005   
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Table A.3. Hausman and Taylor model with alternative indicators of institutions 
Polity - Democracy Polity - Constraint Henisz index 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1 -0.334 0.034 *** -0.333 0.033 *** -0.340 0.033 *** 
lnpop 1.467 0.587 * 1.386 0.543 * 1.202 0.547 * 
underval 1.893 0.574 *** 1.761 0.562 ** 1.987 0.567 *** 
relus -1.846 2.322 
 
-1.886 2.248 
 
-2.489 2.252 
 
wage 0.332 0.317 
 
0.277 0.302 
 
0.269 0.305 
 
export 8.153 1.799 *** 7.991 1.771 *** 7.904 1.802 *** 
edu 0.365 0.211 + 0.350 0.200 + 0.359 0.212 + 
patents -2.085 7.445 
 
-2.263 7.331 
 
-0.169 7.489 
 
inflation 0.238 0.169 
 
0.227 0.160 
 
0.266 0.161 + 
tot 3.594 2.110 + 3.172 2.049 
 
3.578 2.080 + 
democracy -0.029 0.064 
 
0.012 0.009 
 
0.343 0.890 
 
kgatemp 0.895 1.579 
 
0.766 1.412 
 
1.450 1.547 
 
D65-70 -0.341 0.541 
 
-0.382 0.525 
 
-0.394 0.534 
 
D70-75 -2.647 0.606 *** -2.575 0.591 *** -2.596 0.601 *** 
D75-80 -3.466 0.740 *** -3.355 0.715 *** -3.178 0.728 *** 
D80-85 -4.296 0.911 *** -4.220 0.879 *** -4.169 0.894 *** 
D85-90 -4.636 0.991 *** -4.430 0.954 *** -4.514 0.972 *** 
D90-95 -4.761 1.119 *** -4.607 1.076 *** -4.663 1.098 *** 
D95-00 -6.493 1.224 *** -6.330 1.172 *** -6.303 1.201 *** 
D00-05 -6.651 1.369 *** -6.460 1.303 *** -6.495 1.334 *** 
constant -10.245 6.000 + -9.158 5.587 
 
-7.351 5.568 
 
rho 0.845 0.804 0.848 
obs. 420 429 435 
countries 71 71 74 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, indicators come from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) 
and are the democracy index and the measure of constraint on the executive, one of the components 
of the democracy index. In the third column, we use the index of political credibility by Henisz (2000, 
2002). It measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences 
of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. It goes from 0 to 1, with higher 
scores associated with less feasibility of policy change. As in previous estimations, the exogeneity of 
these variables is checked by means of Hausman tests. The Polity measure of political constraint is the 
only endogenous variable. 
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Table A.4. Hausman and Taylor estimations with alternative endogenous variables 
Hausman and Taylor - Model 1 Hausman and Taylor - Model 2 
coef se sig coef se sig 
manL1 -0.349 0.033 *** -0.344 0.033 *** 
pop 1.493 0.599 * 1.044 0.427 * 
underval 1.925 0.570 *** 1.993 0.558 *** 
export 8.170 1.806 *** 7.950 1.828 *** 
wage 0.343 0.306 0.321 0.308 
edu 0.354 0.220 0.351 0.244 
democracy -0.019 0.024 -0.020 0.024 
patents -1.456 2.062 -1.332 2.136 
relus -1.317 2.387 -1.412 2.453 
inflation 0.287 0.162 + 0.295 0.162 + 
tot 3.221 2.004 3.168 2.000 
kgatemp 1.602 1.740 1.744 1.745 
D65-70 -0.328 0.539 -0.281 0.538 
D70-75 -2.586 0.604 *** -2.509 0.605 *** 
D75-80 -3.269 0.733 *** -3.110 0.729 *** 
D80-85 -4.312 0.905 *** -4.100 0.903 *** 
D85-90 -4.557 0.992 *** -4.320 1.002 *** 
D90-95 -4.671 1.127 *** -4.393 1.144 *** 
D95-00 -6.303 1.238 *** -5.964 1.256 *** 
D00-05 -6.475 1.365 *** -6.097 1.386 *** 
constant -10.509 5.987 + -6.401 4.553 
rho 0.881 0.881 
obs. 435 435 
countries 74 74 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Column 1 refers to the base Hausman and Taylor model (last column of Table 2.2). In 
Column 2, manL1, exports, wage, education, democracy, and patents are treated as endogenous 
variables. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Towards a Quantification of In-
dustrial Policy in East Asia and 
Latin America 
 44 
3.1 Introduction 
“There exists probably no greater challenge in the area of economic development 
than that of explaining how eight East Asian economies (...) managed to increase 
their per capita incomes (...) considerably faster than any other developing region. 
Despite a large body of research, there is little consensus on the role that public 
policies have played in this performance. (...) Even the facts -how much interven-
tion has there really been?- have been in dispute” (Rodrik, 1994a, p. 13).  
Twenty years of debate passed since Rodrik’s observation and the central dispute is 
neither solved, nor has compelling empirical evidence been systematically gathered. 
The literature is polarised around two conflicting interpretations of why in spite of 
lower initial GDP levels and relatively underdeveloped manufacturing industries, 
East Asian countries industrialised and overcame Latin American countries. Ac-
cording to the neoclassical interpretation, the so-called East Asian miracle was the 
result of limited state intervention, market-friendly policies, and a focus on export 
expansion. By contrast, Latin American selective industrial policies maintained in-
efficient industries and diffused rent-seeking behaviours. According to industrial 
strategists, industrial policies did play a crucial role also in East Asia by deliberately 
“getting prices wrong”. Hence, industrial policy per se cannot explain the diver-
gence between the industrial performances of the two regions.10 
Today, more and more authors have expressed the need to overcome what has be-
come an unfruitful discussion and have advocated for a more pragmatic view of 
industrial policy (Wade, 2006; Chang, 2009; Naudé and Szirmai, 2013; Weiss, 
2013). This paper contributes to this literature by setting the ground for a quantifi-
cation of industrial policy in five of the most studied country cases, namely Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
debate on industrial policy by discussing the main dichotomies that permeated the 
historical-comparative literature on East Asia and Latin America. In Section 3.3, 
we review the main instruments of industrial policy used by Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan. Based on this review, Section 3.4 builds a detailed 
                                                     
10 Even more, revisionists, or industrial strategists, also argued that, not only East Asian countries 
used industrial policies, but also industrialised countries did so, by protecting their domestic markets 
(Chang, 2002) and by spurring technological development of industries like the ICTs and aerospace 
via public procurements (Mazzucato, 2013). 
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taxonomy of industrial policy instruments. Section 3.5 discusses the indicators of 
industrial policy instruments used in the literature. Section 3.6 briefly concludes. 
3.2 An overview of the industrial policy debate 
In this thesis, industrial policy is intended as all measures used to alter the alloca-
tion of resources in favour of the manufacturing industry. Weiss (2013) distin-
guishes three dimensions of industrial policy that are sometimes confused in the 
literature: overall vision or strategic direction, policy instruments, and process of 
industrial policy-making. This chapter concentrates on the second and touches 
upon the third dimension. 
3.2.1 Functional and selective industrial policies 
The most common dichotomy in the industrial policy debate is of functional (hori-
zontal) and selective (vertical) policies. Functional industrial policies equally affect 
all industries of the economy by improving the functioning of existing factor mar-
kets without discriminating among industries. Selective industrial policies deliber-
ately target particular industries or firms and favour them over the others. Selec-
tion is based on the strategic value of the industry: in advanced countries, strategic 
industries or strategic technologies are generally those with a national economic or 
political interest; in industrialising countries, those that facilitate catching up. Ex-
amples of functional industrial policies are investments in infrastructures and edu-
cation, or R&D tax incentives (when available to all industries and firms). Exam-
ples of selective policies are tariffs and import quotas, subsidies and directed cred-
its.  
The concepts of functional and selective industrial policies are central to the expla-
nation of the East Asian industrialisation process. Neoclassical economists inter-
preted the success of East Asia vis a vis Latin America as the result of functional 
industrial policies that maintained macroeconomic stability, guaranteed free trade, 
and improved the business environment, without distorting market functioning 
mechanisms. Following this interpretation, East Asia became the paradigm of the 
success of market-friendly policies and export promotion strategies. In this litera-
ture, an active role of the state is generally not acknowledged (Wolf, 1988; Ed-
wards, 1988; Krueger, 1997) and those that acknowledged the use of selective in-
dustrial policies judged them growth-reducing (e.g. Kim, 1990; Yoo, 1990; Park 
and Kwon, 1995; Kwon and Paik, 1995; Pack and Lin, 2001).  
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Latin American industrial policies, instead, were criticised for being too selective 
and distortive. By distorting market prices, these policies maintained inefficient in-
dustries and introduced biases against exports (e.g. Little et al., 1970; World Bank, 
1979; Edwards, 1993; Balassa, 1990). Selective industrial policies require consider-
able ability and knowledge on the part of the state. Moreover, uncertainty about 
where and how to intervene and which results to expect reduce the attractiveness 
of selective industrial policies (Pack and Westphal, 1986). Consequently, the lesson 
for governments of industrialising countries is to refrain from intervention because 
government failures generally outweigh market failures (Krueger, 1990).  
According to industrial strategists (Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990; Chang, 2002), East 
Asian governments actively intervened in markets’ functioning by protecting se-
lected domestic industries and promoting specific industries (and firms) via di-
rected credits, selective export incentives, and incentives to production and capa-
bilities’ accumulation.11 
In an effort to reconcile these two views, in 1993 the World Bank released a de-
tailed report, “The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy”, 
where it acknowledged, but downsized, the degree of intervention of East Asian 
governments (Fishlow et al., 1994). Notwithstanding the programmatic intentions, 
the World Bank’s conclusions are still consistent with the neoclassical view. The 
World Bank recommends to “do less in those areas where markets work”, i.e. in 
the production sector, where they suggest privatisations as a means to spur compe-
tition, and “do more in those areas where markets cannot be relied upon”, i.e. hu-
man capital formation, health, nutrition, social, physical, and legal infrastructures 
(ibid., p.9).  
The dichotomy between functional and selective industrial policies still permeates 
the literature on industrial policy. Peres and Primi (2009) classified industrial poli-
cies according to two dimensions: policy-making capacity, which depends on insti-
tutional capacity for design, implementation, and assessment of policies, and the 
number and scope of instruments used to implement a policy. Functional policies 
                                                     
11 Despite supporting selectivity, industrial strategists recognise the challenges of implementing selec-
tive industrial policies. The success of these interventions critically depends upon the detailed forms 
that these policies take and the willingness and ability to fully enforce them. Especially in the case of 
technological sectors, the provision of an ‛entrepreneurial vision’ that provides guideline for private 
business’s investment requires ‛intermediary institutions’ to link the state with the business world 
(Chang, 2002). 
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necessitate lower degrees of state capacity and fewer policy instruments, while se-
lective policies require greater state capacity and a mix of policy instruments. Peres 
and Primi identify greater institutional capacity -evident in the strong discipline ex-
ercised over the private sector- as one of the key determinants of the success of 
East Asian public policies.  
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) and Weiss (2013) used different terminologies that 
resemble, but do not perfectly correspond to the traditional dichotomy of func-
tional and selective industrial policies. Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) distinguish 
between pro-market policies, aiming at removing impediments to markets and 
stimulating entry of new firms, and pro-business policies, that raise profitability of 
existing firms. Similarly, Weiss (2013) distinguish between market-based policies, that 
intend to correct for market failures and affect existing businesses, and promotional 
policies, that promote or create new (potentially successful) businesses. 
Despite its prominence in theoretical debates, the distinction between functional 
and selective industrial policy loses sharpness in policy practice. Even the most 
horizontal policies have differential impacts because they affect markets for factors 
of production and benefit the industries that are more intensive in those factors 
(Rodrik, 2007; Peres and Primi, 2009; Weiss, 2013). Moreover, a certain level of 
selectivity, for example in the form of prioritisation, is always present in policy-
making (Lall and Teubal, 1998; Weiss, 2013).  
3.2.2 The debate on picking winners 
Some scholars referred to selective industrial policies as policies for picking winners 
(e.g. Noland and Pack, 2002; Pack and Saggi, 2006; Easterly et al., 2009). The ex-
pression picking winners refers to the process by which governments choose 
which industries and/or firms to support. When governments pick winners, public 
investments and financing by public development banks are preferentially directed 
towards the targeted industries or firms. Whether picking winners is a synonym of 
selective industrial policy is very much debated. 
Another strand of this literature describes picking winners as the negative sub-
domain of selective industrial policy, indicating the process of arbitrarily choosing 
firms or industries, without a rigorous process of definition and application of suit-
able selection criteria. Following this argumentation, the absence of suitable selec-
tion criteria increases the chances of rent seeking behaviours, corruption, and 
waste of public money (Aghion et al., 2011). According to Ocampo (2011), be-
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cause governments learn how to implement industrial targeting, it is unfair to cate-
gorize all industrial policies as picking winners. Justin Lin and Celestin Monga (Lin 
and Monga, 2010; Lin, 2011) argued that when policies that pick winners are too 
ambitious and do not account for country’s comparative advantage, they are 
doomed to pick losers, instead of winners. 
Others (e.g. Amsden, 2001; Cimoli et al., 2009; Stiglitz, 1996; Wade, 1990, 2010, 
2012) argue that the concept of picking winner is based on the presumption that 
there are several competitors in the market and the government selects one of 
them. However, this is often not the case because, more than picking winners, 
governments create winners. This has been the case in East Asia, where governments 
played an entrepreneurial role by finding and sizing market opportunities (Stiglitz, 
1996). Wade (2010) distinguishes two types of industrial policies: leading the market 
policies, through which governments undertake investments that private entrepre-
neurs would not undertake (e.g. the establishment of POSCO in Korea) and follow-
ing the market policies, which support some of the investments that private actors 
would probably undertake anyways (e.g. fiscal incentive schemes). According to 
Wade, the latter is the furthest away from the concept of picking winners. Hence, 
in this view, picking winners would refer to the most radical forms of industrial 
policy. 
To summarise, in the literature there are three views about picking winners. Ac-
cording to the first, picking winners is equal to selective industrial policy and both 
are to avoid because good selectivity is impossible. According to the second, pick-
ing winners refers only to misguided selective industrial policies, while selective in-
dustrial policy can be growth-enhancing if selection criteria for industrial targeting 
are suitably chosen. According to the third, picking winners is a way for the state 
to lead markets towards more risky investments. Hence, picking winners is not to 
be labelled as negative per se.  
3.2.3 Selection criteria for industrial targeting 
The discussion above shows how important selection criteria are for industrial tar-
geting. The debate on selection criteria has gravitated around three main concepts: 
economies of scale and linkages; learning and technical change; and conformity to 
comparative advantage. 
According to the balanced growth theory (Rosenstein Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953), 
modernisation and its production techniques require large investments (a big push) 
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in mutually supporting industries. These investments are needed to build a critical 
market and benefit from economies of scale and complementarities between indus-
tries. In contrast with the balanced growth theory, the unbalanced growth theory 
(Hirschman, 1958) advocates for limited investments that prioritise industries with 
the strongest backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy.12 
In early development economics, learning opportunities were considered an impor-
tant criterion for industrial targeting. According to the infant industry protection 
argument (Hamilton, 1791; List, 1841; Mill, 1848; Bastable, 1921), newly estab-
lished domestic industries face higher costs than internationally established indus-
tries because of imperfections of the local capital market and limited dynamic 
economies of scale. Temporary protection (by means of tariffs) allows firms to ac-
quire the competences to compete internationally.  
Owing to the continuous nature of technical change, the infant industry protection 
argument can be extended to justify support to any industry. Innovation activities 
are characterised by high costs and high risks, translating in under-investments in 
R&D and financial losses especially for new entrants (Soete, 2007). Pack and 
Westphal (1986) distinguish between intensive and extensive technological change. 
The former is featured by prevalently incremental technological change, while the 
latter produces new capabilities. Based on the experience of Korea and other East 
Asian countries, the authors suggest a dual industrial strategy that selectively targets 
few areas of extensive technological changes and leaves markets forces to use ex-
isting capabilities in areas of intensive technological change. In line with this idea 
of tailoring policies to industry characteristics, Lee and Lim (2001) analysed how 
policies change according to the technological regime of the targeted industry, i.e. 
according to the degree of predictability, frequency, and cumulativeness of techni-
cal change. 
The most fundamental question in the debate on industrial policy is whether indus-
trial policy should comply or defeat countries’ comparative advantages. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, Latin American structuralists advocate for selective industrial 
policies that can redirect structural change away from specialisation in comparative 
advantage compliant industries. This would hurt economic growth by locking de-
                                                     
12 Backward and forward linkages are intended as inter-industry linkages in production. The former is 
the inducement by any non-primary economic activity to seek its own input through domestic pro-
duction. The latter is the inducement by any activity that does not cater exclusively final demand to 
offer its output as input for new economic activities. 
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veloping countries in industries characterised by price disadvantages (Prebisch, 
1950). Defiance of the comparative advantage is also at the base of the infant in-
dustry protection argument.  
Lin and Chang (2009) dispute whether comparative-advantage-following or comparative-
advantage-defying industrial policies are more effective. According to Lin, govern-
ments should initially focus on labour and resource-intensive industries and, only 
once they have accumulated physical and human capital, they should aim at up-
grading their industrial structures. According to Chang, by following comparative 
advantage, policies neglect that factor mobility is limited -that is, the physical capi-
tal accumulated in the textile industry cannot be utilized in the automobile indus-
try- and that firms need to acquire industry-specific technological capabilities to 
operate in an industry.  
In this debate, several authors took an intermediate position. Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003) interpret structural change as a process of self-discovery in which 
innovative firms help to discover where a country has a competitive edge. Policies 
should then aim at supporting these firms, because they bear more risks and costs 
than their followers do. Lin and Monga (2011) advise to identify latent comparative 
advantages by comparing industrial structures of similar countries at different 
stages of development. Among these industries, those where some domestic firms 
have already entered the market should be favoured. If domestic firms are not pre-
sent, governments can attract FDI from world industry leaders by leveraging on 
lower labour costs or by creating export processing zones and industrial parks, or 
by offering temporary financial and fiscal incentives.  
3.2.4 Industrial policy domains: trade, investment, and science, 
technology and innovation 
Industrial policy can be classified according to their domain of intervention into 
trade, investment, science, technology and innovation policies. 
Trade policy 
Trade policies are a central component of any development strategy. The debate 
on trade policy focused on the merits and demerits of inward-oriented and out-
ward-oriented strategies. Inward-oriented strategies, also referred to as import-
substitution industrialisation strategies (ISI), are characterised by policies that en-
courage production for the domestic market and protect indigenous firms against 
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foreign competition. Outward strategies are of two sorts: export promotion and 
trade liberalisation. Export promotion is defined as the trade regime that entails 
positive but equal incentives to production for export and substitution of imports. 
Trade liberalisation gives negligible incentives to import substituting or exporting 
activities, so it is considered a neutral strategy. Import substitution and export 
promotion share the same ultimate objectives: avoiding balance of payment con-
straints, achieving economies of scale, and providing firms with learning opportu-
nities. By focusing on external markets, export promotion represents a more viable 
option for small countries and has the extra-benefit of exposing domestic firms to 
foreign (higher-standard) markets and world technologies.  
Since the 1970s, neoclassical economists produced a series of studies showing a 
positive relationship between outward orientation and economic growth (among 
the most influential, Little et al., 1970; Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978; Balassa, 
1982). These studies almost exclusively explained the East Asian success by well-
designed and well-managed trade strategies, built on the theory of comparative ad-
vantage. These created “virtually free” trade regimes that offered equal incentives 
to all exporters. The East Asian trade strategy was presented as one that simulta-
neously achieved export promotion and import liberalisation (e.g. Balassa, 1971, 
1990; Corbo et al., 1985; Hong and Krueger, 1975; World Bank, 1987; Krueger, 
1997; Edwards, 1992).  
In this literature, Latin American trade policies were strictly associated with import 
substitution. Import substitution was blamed for introducing biases against ex-
ports, maintaining unproductive industries, and directing countries towards a pat-
tern of specialisation inconsistent with comparative advantage. Latin American 
countries were also criticised for not abandoning ISI when opportunities for sub-
stitution exhausted (e.g. Balassa, 1979, 1983, 1990; Krueger, 1990). Studies in this 
strand of literature acknowledged that East Asian countries started their industriali-
sation race with ISI, but argued that domestic market protection was growth-
reducing (e.g. Lee, 1996).13 
This interpretation of East Asian and Latin American trade policies fortified the 
conviction that outward orientation is the universal key to industrial success. The 
Washington Consensus emerged in this context and redirected the Latin American 
                                                     
13 For a review of the literature on the impact of industrial policies, especially trade and investment 
policies, in Korea and Taiwan, see Noland and Pack (2003). 
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policy agendas towards trade liberalisation. This interpretation, however, has been 
fiercely contested.  
In the theory of infant industry protection and the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis 
(Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1950), import substitution is compatible with export pro-
motion (e.g. Amsden, 2001; Ho, 2012).14 Indeed, the opposition between ISI and 
export promotion is spurious insomuch as it was Prebisch himself who encouraged 
governments to combine import substitution with export promotion (Prebisch, 
1950, 1963, 1987).  
On an empirical ground, various studies showed that the East Asian degrees of 
trade protection were higher than accounted for by neoclassical economists (e.g. 
Wade, 1990; Luedde-Neurath, 1986). Shin and Lee (2012) also proved that these 
measures were indeed growth-enhancing. When East Asian countries opened their 
economy to foreign goods, their liberalisation processes did not reach the level of 
trade liberalisation of Latin American countries, and trade liberalisation was 
achieved very gradually as compared to Latin America (Rodrik, 1995). Moreover, it 
was argued that trade liberalisation was not an important step towards the imple-
mentation of export promotion (Westphal, 1990). Some scholars even objected 
that East Asian export promotion instruments were selective (e.g. Westphal, 1990; 
Wade, 1990). The rigorousness of the empirical evidence on the role of export 
promotion for economic growth and structural change was also questioned: while 
it is undisputed that export promotion was accompanied by structural change, it 
was noted that evidence on the mechanisms through which export push spurred 
growth was not compelling enough (e.g. Rodrik, 1994a and b; Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 2000).15  
Finally, it was argued that successful firms could also emerge out of protectionism 
-e.g. Embraer in Brazil or POSCO in Korea (Rodrik, 2007; di Maio, 2009). Firm-
                                                     
14 According to the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis, developing countries’ terms of trade would decline if 
their structural change makes them specialise in primary commodities and resource-intensive indus-
tries, goods for which developing countries have comparative advantages. This is why developing 
countries must encourage domestic production of nondurable consumer and intermediate goods. 
15 Rodrik (1994a) argues that cross-country regressions on growth and TFP say nothing about the 
causal mechanism behind the relationship between exports and technological spillovers, and that in 
cross-country regressions on trade openness and growth, inappropriate indicators on trade openness 
are used. In another contribution, Rodrik (1994b) also shows that in Korea and Taiwan export spurts 
were not associated with increases in the relative profitability of  exports and concludes that the ex-
port boom was not due to the removal of  bias against manufacturing exports (as orthodox econo-
mists argued), but rather with investment boom. 
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level studies documented the engineering efforts and the learning dynamics 
spurred by ISI in Latin America (Katz, 1976, 1987). Historical studies showed that 
protection of domestic industries was (and in some cases still is) widely practiced 
by developing and developed countries alike (Wade, 1990; Chang, 2002, 2009; di 
Maio, 2009). 
To conclude, in the neoclassical literature export promotion is often used as a 
synonym for free trade. This confusion seems to be associated with the under-
standing of the East Asian trade regime as one where export promotion was non-
discriminatory and simultaneous with trade liberalisation. Hence, the orthodox ar-
gument in favour of free trade heavily relies on the empirical question of whether 
domestic market protection was low and export promotion was not selective. This, 
however, is what industrial strategists contested. According to their studies, in East 
Asia, domestic market protection was high until the 1990s and export promotion 
strategies benefited few strategic industries. This shows that getting empirics right 
is essential to solve the dispute on the role of trade policies in East Asia and Latin 
America. 
Investment policy 
Investment policies are policies aimed at spurring firms’ investments. These poli-
cies can be formulated in a functional or selective way. Functional investment poli-
cies include fiscal incentives and policies to support SMEs (if available to all indus-
tries). Selective investment policies range from direct government production via 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to incentives to private production in strategic in-
dustries (via subsidies, grants, discretionary and preferential credits, public pro-
curement, tax exemptions and other fiscal incentives). Among these instruments, 
some have attracted particular attention.  
A lively debate emerged on the role of preferential credits and subsidies. Neoclas-
sical economists tended to deny, or downsize, the role of credits, subsidies, and 
other selective investment policies in East Asia. When the use of selective credits 
and subsidies is recognised, their impact is estimated to be growth-reducing (e.g. 
Kim, 1990).16 For example, according to the World Bank (1993), “the implicit sub-
sidy of directed-credit programs in the HPAEs was generally small, especially in 
                                                     
16 Refer to Noland and Pack (2003) for a review on the effects of these policies on growth and indus-
trialisation. 
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comparison to other developing economies” (ibid., p. 20).17 Latin American coun-
tries, instead, were blamed for their excessive and discretionary subsidies (e.g. 
Balassa, 1979, 1983). 
According to industrial strategists, instead, subsidies were crucial in both East Asia 
and Latin America: “the subsidy serves as a symbol of late industrialisation, not 
just in Korea and Taiwan but also in Japan, the Latin American countries, and so 
on. (…) The allocation of subsidies has rendered the government not merely a 
banker (…), but an entrepreneur, using the subsidy to decide what, when, and how 
much to produce” (Amsden, 2001, p. 143-144). In all countries but Argentina, de-
velopment banks were the state’s agent for financing industrial investments. 
The role of SOEs is also very much debated. The literature brought plenty of an-
ecdotal evidence pro and against SOEs. On the one hand, sceptics argued that the 
societal costs of maintaining SOEs (and repairing their financial deficits) are not 
compensated by their contribution to investments and economic growth (Galal et 
al., 1994; Megginson et al., 1994; World Bank, 1995; Shirley, 1999). On the other 
hand, cases such as the Korean POSCO showed that there is nothing about SOEs 
per se that makes them inefficient (and so nothing about picking winners that makes 
it unfeasible). In the international arena, the first view dominated and SOEs’ re-
forms and privatisations were implemented in several countries. 18 
Since the 1990s, SMEs were recognised as significant contributors to economic 
and export growth, employment, regional development, and innovation. Because 
of their limited financial resources and their obstacles to access capital markets, 
even successful SMEs face extraordinary difficulties to grow. For these reasons, 
SMEs became a target of industrial policy: development banks created dedicated 
credit lines and governments offered various fiscal incentives to spur SMEs’ in-
vestments. Some of these programs were tailored to innovative SMEs or SMEs in 
strategic high-tech industries. For example, because in Taiwan most industrial 
firms are SMEs, they became an early target of Taiwanese industrial policy (Hou 
and Gee, 1992; Lall, 2004; Mathews and Hu, 2007). In Latin American countries, 
SMEs policies were the main component of competitiveness policies, i.e. the set of 
functional policies implemented as part of the political reforms of the 1990s (Melo, 
                                                     
17 The acronym HPAEs refers to High-performing Asian economies. 
18 For a review of the literature on state ownership, see Shirley (1999).  
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2001). At that time, the emphasis on SMEs was seen as a discontinuity with ISI 
that had favoured large enterprises (Peres and Stumpo, 2000).  
Science, technology, and innovation policy 
Science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies permeated the debate on East 
Asia and Latin America (e.g. Dodgson, 2000; Lee, 2000; Katz, 2000a; Lall, 2004; di 
Maio, 2009).19 It is now widely accepted that technological change was a key driver 
of industrialisation in the East Asian countries. Since the 1960s, STI policies have 
spurred technological change in Korea and Taiwan (e.g. Lee, 1997; Dodgson, 2000; 
Lall, 2000). In Latin America, evaluations of STI policies reached ambiguous con-
clusions. STI policies and institutions were in place already in the 1960s and 1970s 
and observers of the processes of technical change in Latin America positively 
evaluated the learning dynamics created by the ISI regime (e.g. Katz, 1976; 1987; 
Katz and Kosacoff, 1998; Suzigan and Furtado, 2006). Nevertheless, the industrial 
apparatus originated from ISI did not become an engine of innovation and eco-
nomic growth, because of their excessive reliance on FDI, weak knowledge trans-
fer mechanisms between the public and private sector, lack of discipline, and ex-
cessive trade protection (Di Maio, 2009; Katz, 2000a). 
In the literature on national innovation systems (NIS), the Korean and Taiwanese 
systems are described as systems where at first research institutes were the sole ac-
tors in charge of research and innovation. In a later stage, these research institutes 
spun off high-tech new enterprises that became international market leaders. In 
this way, these NIS evolved into fairly integrated systems where national firms be-
came vital components of the NIS (Lall, 2000; Kim, 1992; Hou and Gee, 1992). 
Latin American NIS, instead, gravitated around public universities. Low R&D in-
vestments in the private sector and weak linkages between public research agencies 
and private firms further weakened Latin America innovation systems (Dalhman 
and Frischtak, 1992; Katz and Bercovich, 1992). 
Successful adoption of foreign technologies proved to be an essential ingredient of 
catch up in East Asia (e.g. Pack, 2001; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; Lall and Teubal, 
1998; Lee and Lim, 2001). Foreign knowledge and technologies can be transferred 
                                                     
19 Science policies are policies aimed at creating a knowledge base (e.g. support to universities and 
research centres). Technology policies address generic technologies, like ICTs, and facilitate devel-
opment of technological capabilities. Innovation policies relate to the microeconomics of innovation, 
i.e. production of new products and services by firms (Lundvall and Borras, 2005). 
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through several mechanisms: FDI, licensing, consultancy, technical agreements, 
and turnkey plant and project contracts, as well as trade in capital goods, joint ven-
tures, subcontracting, exports, labour mobility, and technical developmental assis-
tance (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1985). Among these, the most debated is FDI. 
FDI can generate employment and stimulate structural change. If foreign invest-
ments are concentrated in industries or activities with low learning opportunities, 
or if incentives and duties of knowledge transfer are limited, FDI might be detri-
mental to industrialisation. Foreign firms might simply take advantage of incentives 
provided by the host country to exploit local low-cost low-skilled labour or natural 
resources. With respect to the channels of acquisition of foreign technologies, East 
Asia favoured licensing, joint ventures, and trade in capital goods. Latin American 
countries relied more on FDI. These strategies ultimately affected the patterns of 
structural and technological change and firms’ learning dynamics in the two re-
gions (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1985; Amsden, 2001; Chan, 2000). 
Since the mid-1980s, scholars and policy-makers have acknowledged the advan-
tages of cooperation and networking for knowledge creation. Especially in East 
Asia, governments promoted collaborative research projects (Shakibara and Cho, 
2002; Mathews, 2002), clusters and science parks (e.g. Melo, 2001; Hu et al., 2005; 
Bianchi et al., 2006). Sharing risks especially in risky innovation projects was crucial 
to catch up in several industries (Lee and Lim, 2001). 
Finally, learning and accumulation of technological capabilities also depend on re-
gimes of intellectual property rights (IPR). Strong IPR regimes give established 
firms additional incentives to invest in innovation and facilitate diffusion of the 
technical knowledge behind a patented invention. By guaranteeing the rights of in-
novators, strong IPRs can also increase learning opportunities from market leaders 
via technology licensing agreements and FDI. This leads to higher rates of innova-
tion and an orderly development of its applications. However, strong IPR regimes 
also represent a societal cost. Stronger protection is not beneficial in cumulative sys-
tems technologies like automobiles, semiconductors, or computers, where the indus-
trial and innovative process allows for relatively easy entry of new firms, especially 
from industrialising countries (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan could benefit from relaxed IPR regimes that allowed 
firms to accumulate re-engineering and production capabilities. Especially in the 
 57 
case of Korea and Taiwan, these capabilities proved to be essential to move from 
imitation to innovation (e.g. Kim, 1997; Wu et al., 2010).20 
3.3 A synthesis of industrial policies in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea, and Taiwan 
This section summarises the main industrial policy instruments implemented in the 
five countries under analysis. Its aim is not to discuss the merits and demerits of 
any of these, nor to produce new evidence. Rather, it intends to provide a snapshot 
of the heterogeneous experiences of these five countries with a list of all policy in-
struments employed over time.  
Policies considered prominent in a certain period are indicated in bold. A policy is 
firstly mentioned when introduced and it is not re-mentioned unless it becomes 
more important, or is reformed or abandoned. Given the broad definition of in-
dustrial policy adopted here and the variety of technical arrangements employed in 
our five country cases, the number of policy instruments that could be covered is 
very high. For this reason, we focus on the most discussed policy instruments. Be-
cause these instruments are considered the most prominent in the literature, we are 
confident that, despite not exhaustive, our list satisfactorily represents the indus-
trial policy choices of these five countries.  
Table 3.1-3.3 lists policy instruments in the domain of trade, investment, and STI 
in place from the 1940s to 2005.21 Table 3.4 details most targeted industries of 
these policies. 
 
                                                     
20 Today, TRIPS agreements and the recent global trend towards stronger IPRs are not good news 
for firms in industrialising countries. 
21 For a review of modern industrial policy in Latin America, see Crespi et al. (2014).  
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Table 3.1. A summary of trade policies, 1940-2005 
 
Argentina Brazil Mexico Korea Taiwan 
40s Tariffs & NTB 
Import restric-
tions 
Tariffs & import 
controls 
 
Tariffs & NTB 
(quotas, LCRs) 
50-55 
   
Tariffs and NTB 
Export fiscal 
incentives 
55-60 
 
Tariffs & NTB 
(LCR); export 
promotion (ex-
change rate) 
NTB (LCR); 
export incen-
tives 
 
Export financial 
incentives  
60-65 
Tariffs & 
NTBs (li-
censes); export 
incentives 
Export fiscal 
incentives  
Export incen-
tives 
Export promo-
tion (quality 
controls, 
awards) 
65-70 Tariff reduction 
Tariff liberalisa-
tion  
 
Export promo-
tion (SEZs) 
70-75 Tariff increase 
Tariffs & NTB; 
export incen-
tives  
 
Reduction of 
NTB; export 
promotion 
(business ser-
vices) 
75-80 
Trade liberalisa-
tion   
  
80-85 
Tariff & import 
licenses  
Trade liberali-
sation; elimina-
tion of export 
subsidies 
 
Elimination of 
NTB and reduc-
tion of tariffs 
85-90 
Tariffs reduction 
and elimination 
of some NTB; 
export incen-
tives  
Trade liberali-
sation; export 
incentives re-
forms 
 
Reduction of 
import quotas 
Trade liberali-
sation; export 
incentives re-
forms 
90-95 
  
Export incen-
tives 
Trade liberalisa-
tion 
 
95-00 
   
  
00-05 
   
Export promo-
tion (SEZs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on: Argentina: Vaccarezza (2012), Katz and Kosacoff (1989), 
Katz and Bercovich (1992), Lucangeli (1989), and Melo (2001). Brazil: Dahlman and Frischtak (1992), 
Suzigan and Villela (1997), and Melo (2001). Mexico: CEPAL (1979), Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), 
and Melo (2001). Korea: SaKong and Koh (2010) and Kim (1992, 1997). Taiwan: Wade (1990), Smith 
(2000), and Hsu and Chiang (2001).  
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Table 3.2. A summary of investment policies, 1940-2005 
 
Argentina Brazil Mexico Korea Taiwan 
40s 
Directed credit; 
SOEs; BND  
Fiscal incentives  
New plants’ li-
censing; SOEs 
50-55 FDI attraction 
BNDES; FDI 
restrictions 
Financial incen-
tives 
KDB; SOEs 
Directed credit; 
FDI attraction 
55-60 
 
Fiscal incentives; 
regional policy 
SOEs  
Licensing’s 
abandonment 
60-65 
SOEs; FDI at-
traction; selec-
tive incentives 
SOEs 
 
 SMEs’ support 
65-70 
 
Financial incen-
tives; SMEs 
support; relaxed 
FDI regulations 
Regional policy 
Sectoral promo-
tion (credits & 
subsidies) 
 
70-75 
SMEs’ support; 
fiscal incentives; 
regional policies 
Fiscal incentives 
 
Directed credits; 
FDI regulation 
Directed credit; 
SOEs; selective 
FDI attraction 
75-80 
Abolition of 
credit schemes   
  
80-85 
 
Regulation of 
SOEs 
Elimination of 
production sub-
sidies; fiscal re-
form; privatisa-
tions 
Industrial re-
structuring; 
SMEs’ support 
 
85-90 
Regional & sec-
toral policies 
Reforms of fis-
cal & financial 
incentives 
FDI liberalisa-
tion; competi-
tion policy 
Abolishment of 
sectoral incen-
tives; privatisa-
tions; regulation 
of chaebols; selec-
tive FDI liberali-
sation 
 
90-95 
Privatisations; 
SMEs support; 
financial incen-
tives (subsidies) 
Privatisations; 
FDI liberalisa-
tion; abandon-
ment of incen-
tives 
 
FDI liberalisa-
tion 
Privatisations; 
fiscal incentives’ 
reforms 
95-00 
 
Sectoral & re-
gional incentives 
SMEs support FDI attraction  
00-05 
Sectoral promo-
tion   
SMEs’ support; 
regional policy 
 
Source: see Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.3. A summary of STI policies, 1940-2005 
 
Argentina Brazil Mexico Korea Taiwan 
40s 
   
  
50-55 
 
Research insti-
tutes 
 
  
55-60 
Research insti-
tutes 
  
  
60-65 
   
Research insti-
tutes 
 
65-70 
 
R&D financial 
incentives 
Research insti-
tutes 
  
70-75 
   
R&D incen-
tives (subsi-
dies, directed 
credit, tax in-
centives) 
Research insti-
tutes 
75-80 
   
Training pro-
grams 
Programs for 
quality control 
standards; IPRs 
80-85 
   
Fiscal & fi-
nancial R&D 
incentives 
Technology 
parks; R&D 
incentives 
85-90 
 
R&D fiscal 
incentives 
 
 
Promotion of 
collaborative 
R&D projects 
90-95 
  
R&D incen-
tives 
  
95-00 
R&D incen-
tives 
Support to 
high-tech 
SMEs; training 
programs 
Cluster policies; 
IPRs; training 
programs 
 
Support to 
high-tech 
SMEs 
00-05 
 
Technology 
parks 
 
Technology 
parks 
 
Source: see Table 3.1. 
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3.4 A taxonomy of industrial policy 
Based on the literature reviewed so far, in this section we construct a comprehen-
sive and theory-grounded taxonomy of industrial policy instruments (Table 3.5). 
Our list of policy instruments comes from the tables in Section 3.3.  
Building a taxonomy of industrial policy implies ordering a list of policy instru-
ments according to a set of attributes of these instruments. An ideal taxonomy is 
characterised by sharp discontinuities across classes and high homogeneity within 
classes (McKinley, 1982). The characteristics of our object of analysis (industrial 
policies) complicate the construction of an ideal taxonomy at least for two reasons. 
Firstly, policy instruments rarely serve only one objective at a time. This decreases 
the degree of sharpness across classes. Secondly, policy instruments are often 
named differently when not functionally different and different levels of generality 
can be mistaken for different instruments, i.e. two instruments might be taken as 
two separate mechanisms when they are just two variations of the same instru-
ment. This can result in long lists of policy instruments that should not be enumer-
ated as distinct entities (Linder and Peters, 1989). 
Several taxonomies of industrial policy already exist (Chenery, 1958; Kellick, 1981; 
Roth well and Ziegfeld, 1981; Haggbaldee et al., 1990; Szirmai and Lapperre, 2001; 
Cimoli et al., 2009; Naudé, 2010; Weiss, 2011; Warwick, 2013). These taxonomies 
differ in the attributes used for the classification, in how much attributes reflect the 
debate on industrial policy (e.g. functional versus selective policies, import substitu-
tion versus export promotion, etc.), and in the level of detail with which policy in-
struments are described.22  
Our taxonomy intends to contribute to the debate on which kind of policies were 
employed in East Asia and Latin America. Given this objective, the sole attribute 
adopted to define instrument classes is the coverage of industrial policy, i.e. if poli-
                                                     
22 Among these, Szirmai and Lapperre (2001) and Weiss (2011) included a large number of policy 
tools. The former distinguished by area of intervention, the latter by coverage. Warwick (2013), in-
stead, combined policy domains and policy. A different approach is adopted by Rothwell and 
Zegveld (1981), who distinguished between supply-side policy instruments and demand-side policy 
instruments. Others, such as Cimoli et al. (2009), focused on specific domains of industrial policies 
(e.g. policies for capabilities’ accumulation). 
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cies are functional or selective. This attribute serves the purpose of our taxonomy 
and respects the indications outlined in the literature on policy taxonomies.23  
Given the broad definition of industrial policy adopted here, in our taxonomy in-
dustrial policies are loosely grouped according to their domain of intervention into 
framework conditions, trade, investment, and science, technology, and innovation 
policies. Borrowing the expression from the literature on European industrial pol-
icy (Pelkmans, 2006), we refer to framework conditions as those policies that en-
sure basic conditions for economic activity (infrastructures, human capital and 
competition). Because these domains are not mutually exclusive, the last part of 
the table lists policies that cannot be categorized ex-ante as trade, investment, or 
STI policies, but require a case-by-case evaluation. Hence, we should see the classi-
fication according to domains of intervention as a practical one, rather than a theo-
retical one. 
  
                                                     
23 The attributes of policy instruments identified by Linder and Peters (1989) are: complexity of oper-
ation, level of public visibility, adaptability across users, level of intrusiveness, relative costliness, reli-
ance on market, chances of failure, and precision of targeting. We argue that the concepts of func-
tional and selective policies involve all these attributes, so this is a valid attribute to construct a classi-
fication of industrial policies.  
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Table 3.5. Taxonomy of industrial policies 
Domain Goal Policy Coverage Policy instruments 
Framework 
conditions 
Ensuring basic business 
conditions 
Infrastructure 
provision 
Functional 
Preferential credit, tax 
incentives, procurement, 
public-private partner-
ships, direct provision 
Education  
policy 
Functional 
Funding, study abroad 
programs, repatriation 
packages 
Competition 
policy 
Functional 
Privatisations and anti-
trust law 
Trade 
Avoiding BOP con-
straints; realizing 
economies of scale and 
learning effects  
Domestic 
market pro-
tection 
Selective 
High tariffs and non-
tariff measures (quantita-
tive restrictions, local 
content requirements, 
licenses, etc.) 
Export  
promotion 
Functional 
Support services, tax in-
centives subsidised loans, 
credit schemes 
Selective 
Directed credit, tax in-
centives, subsidised loans, 
credit schemes to tar-
geted sectors 
Investment 
Spurring firms’ invest-
ments 
Industrial 
support 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Tax incentives 
Selective 
Direct production, di-
rected credit, subsidies, 
loan guarantees 
STI 
Creating opportunities 
for science and techno-
logical innovation 
Support to 
public R&D 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Financing of universities 
and research institutes; 
training programs 
Fostering capabilities 
accumulation in firms 
Support to 
private R&D 
Functional IPRs’ regulations 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Subsidies, grants, tax in-
centives, risk-sharing in-
struments 
Support to 
cooperative 
R&D 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Government-supported 
consortia, public-private 
partnerships 
Technology 
transfer 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Regulations and negotia-
tions of technical agree-
ments, licensing, subcon-
tracting; turnkey plants 
and project contracts; 
support to capital goods’ 
imports and JVs 
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Investment 
/STI 
Spurring  
investment/innovation 
Support to 
R&D/ indus-
trial support 
Selective Public procurement 
Spurring investment/ 
technology transfer 
FDIs attrac-
tion 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Liberalisation of invest-
ment, tax incentives, in-
frastructure provision 
Spurring innova-
tion/creating employ-
ment/industrial restruc-
turing 
Spatial IP 
(region, clus-
ter, technol-
ogy park) 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Fiscal incentives, grants, 
infrastructure provision, 
Special Economic Zones 
Support 
SMEs/innovative SMEs 
SMEs pro-
motion pro-
grams 
Functional/ 
Selective 
Tax incentives, grants, 
preferential credit, train-
ing, advisory, support 
services 
 
As the table shows, in each policy domain, policy goals can be achieved via differ-
ent industrial policy instruments. In other words, there are multiple ways to get the 
job done: governments can choose from a number of policy instruments to im-
plement a certain policy and achieve a certain policy goal.  
Some of these instruments can be classified as functional or selective without 
knowing much about their technicalities; others could be designed as functional or 
selective. In these cases, details are necessary to assess their coverage. For instance, 
in the domain of trade policies, goals include avoiding balance of payment con-
straints and realizing economies of scale and learning effects. The main policies to 
achieve these goals are domestic market protection and export promotion. Domes-
tic market protection is generally a selective industrial policy, while export promo-
tion can be functional (if only support services are provided or if all industries and 
firms face the same fiscal or financial incentives), or selective if only particular 
firms or industries can benefit from incentives.  
Finally, goals are not always specific to a single policy area, so the same instrument 
can be grouped under multiple domains. Following the example above, realizing 
learning effects is also an objective of STI policies and so domestic market protec-
tion or export promotion could be also classified as STI policies. This, however, 
does not invalidate our taxonomy because, as mentioned, domains are used solely 
to restrict the vast range of policies that go under the umbrella of industrial policy.  
3.5 Indicators of industrial policy 
The next sections review each of the policy domains in the taxonomy and discuss 
semi-quantitative indicators for each of them. The historical-comparative literature 
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on East Asia and Latin America used several indicators of industrial policy instru-
ments. Our ideal indicators have three characteristics. First, they represent actual 
disbursements: while expenditures are not comprehensive of all possible forms of 
government intervention, they are the least ambiguous indicator of commit-
ments.24 Secondly, our ideal indicators are sectorally disaggregated, which allows 
classifying policy instruments as functional or selective. By showing which indus-
tries are the most supported, sectoral data also indicate if comparative-advantage-
following or comparative-advantage-defying policies were most successful. Finally, 
while we acknowledge that it is not always possible to find cross-country compara-
ble indicators, we concentrate on indicators that allow comparisons across the five 
countries under scrutiny. 
3.5.1 Indicators of framework conditions 
In the domain of framework conditions, we focus on infrastructure development, 
human capital formation, and competition policy. 
In the literature, investments in infrastructures have been captured in two ways: by 
accounting for development banks’ disbursements in infrastructure building (Ams-
den, 2001) and by accounting for differences in paved roads, electricity capacity, 
and ICTs (World Bank, 1993). Because the second indicator represents an output 
rather than an input measure, we present data only for the first indicator. This in-
dicator was originally used to show the role of development banks in infrastructure 
building, so it should be seen as a sub-optimal indicator. An ideal indicator would 
capture all investments in infrastructures (i.e. via public procurement, private-
public partnerships, and investments by SOEs). Unfortunately, these data are not 
available. 
Following the World Bank (1993), we use public expenditures in education as a 
share of GNP to account for investments in human capital formation and public 
expenditure on tertiary education as percentage of total education expenditures to 
account for investments in technical education (World Bank, 1993). Even if the 
World Bank (1993) acknowledges that these indicators do not fully account for 
human capital accumulation in East Asia, there are no better cross-country compa-
rable indicators of governments’ commitments to human capital formation. 
                                                     
24 This is not only intuitive when reading the comparative-historical literature on East Asian and Latin 
American industrial policy, but it is also acknowledged in political science literature (e.g. Mosher; 
1980; Hood, 1984; Linder and Peters, 1989; Schneider and Jacoby, 2011). 
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Governments can increase domestic competition by means of antitrust policy, pri-
vatisations, and abolishment of controls over foreign investments. Because it is dif-
ficult to compare indicators of antitrust regulations in a cross-country analysis, we 
limit our analysis to privatisations. Following Shirley (1999), we collect data on the 
value of privatisations. Foreign investments will be discussed in Section 3.5.5. 
3.5.2 Indicators of trade policy 
The literature on trade policy used several indicators, namely trade profiles, average 
tariffs (simple and weighted), distortion indexes (nominal or effective rates of pro-
tection and effective rate of assistance), and import liberalisation ratios. Our ideal 
measure of trade protection takes into account the degree of domestic markets’ 
protection and the direction of selectivity, i.e. which industries were protected the 
most. 
Trade profiles (the share of exports in GDP or rate of export growth) are easy to 
construct, but account only for revealed trade strategies. This means that if a coun-
try tries to implement an outward oriented strategy but fails, these indicators do 
not reflect this attempt. Analysing trade orientations by looking only at average tar-
iffs (simple or weighted by the importance of each item in the country’s import 
profile) ignores that tariffs are not enough to gauge the full extent of protection. 
Indexes of the degree of trade distortions, i.e. nominal and effective rates of pro-
tection (e.g. Westphal and Kim, 1977; Nam, 1990; World Bank, 1993; Pack, 2000), 
are useful measures, but are extremely difficult to construct because they require 
data on the specific protection systems, including tax exceptions and ad-hoc subsi-
dies. These indexes are also criticised because they are based on biased definitions 
of inward and outward orientations (Chang, 2003).25 Import liberalisation ratios 
capture the effects of liberalisation programs by showing the evolution of the 
number of freely imported items. These indicators, however, are hardly ever disag-
gregated by industry. 
The empirical literature on our five country cases shows great variety in terms of 
indicators of trade policy. For example, Smith (2000) provides substantial empirical 
evidence on the industrial policies implemented in Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s. 
However, in the case of Korea trade policies are measured by rates of assistance 
                                                     
25 Nominal and effective rates of assistance are similar to rates of protection, but include also non-
border interventions. 
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and in the case of Taiwan by rates of protection. Approaches like this clearly hin-
der cross-country comparisons.  
In order to keep the analysis objective and preserve cross-country comparability, 
we collect available data on average and sectoral legal tariffs and import liberalisa-
tion ratios. Together with these measures of trade protection, we account for ex-
port promotion schemes with data on disbursements for fiscal and financial incen-
tives. 
3.5.3 Indicators of investment policy 
In the domain of investment policies, the thesis concentrates on the role of SOEs 
and development banks, and gathers estimations of financial and fiscal incentives 
to investments. We collect data on the share of SOEs’ value added in GDP, the 
share of SOEs in gross fixed capital formation, and the budgetary burden of SOEs 
(Short, 1984).26 Following Amsden (2001), we use development banks’ disburse-
ments to manufacturing and disaggregated data on loans to the manufacturing in-
dustry. These data indicate if governments stuck to announced priorities and how 
priorities changed over time. Finally, we collect data on financial and fiscal incen-
tives (amounts of tax reductions and tax revenue losses due to industrial promo-
tion schemes) as percentages of GDP.  
The level of heterogeneity of existing data in the area of fiscal and financial incen-
tives is considerable. This reflects the complexity of the regimes in place and their 
variability, but also the different reporting practices adopted by governments and 
the preferences of researchers. For example, Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican 
data rarely distinguish between fiscal and financial incentives and data on approved 
investments are often collected instead of actual disbursements (e.g. Ferrucci, 
1986; Aspiazu, 1986; NAFINSA, 1984).  
We keep financial and fiscal incentives separate in order to distinguish between 
more and less entrepreneurial states. However, we do not distinguish between 
loans and subsidies. While this is an important difference, data often do not allow 
to make such a distinction and the high rates of non-performing loans both in East 
Asia and Latin America do not make this distinction necessary (CEPAL, 1979; 
Smith, 2000). Finally, because data on fiscal incentives are often not sectorally dis-
                                                     
26 Budgetary burden is defined as the sum of central government subsidies, transfers and net lending 
to public enterprises less dividends and interest payments to central governments. 
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aggregated, we gather and summarise information on objectives, targeted indus-
tries, and conditions to obtain fiscal incentives in the countries where these incen-
tives were present (namely, Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico). 
3.5.4 Indicators of science, technology, and innovation policy 
Innovation studies traditionally measured innovative efforts by indicators like 
R&D expenditures, number of patents, and number of scientific publications. Be-
cause we are interested in government commitments, rather than policy outcomes, 
we restrict our analysis to input measures.  
We measure science policies by budgets (or expenditures) of most important na-
tional research institutes.27 In Latin America, research councils and universities had 
a much larger role than research centres, so we collect data on the budgets of re-
search councils. Support to firms R&D (i.e. innovation policy) is measured by the 
amount of R&D subsidies and tax incentives, as percentages of R&D expenditures 
and GDP. Because sectorally disaggregated data are scarce, we rely on policy 
documents and existing literature to summarise the main beneficiaries of these 
policies.  
With respect to technology policy, we focus on technology transfer through FDI, 
licensing agreements, and capital goods’ imports. Technology transfer requires 
conscious efforts from the two parts involved, so it could be encouraged but not 
guaranteed by law. Consequently, quantifying policies for technology transfer is 
practically impossible. As proxy, we use data on royalties and license fees, capital 
goods’ imports, and total and sectoral FDI inflows. FDI attraction can be classified 
as an investment or a technology policy, depending on the existence and nature of 
industry-specific regulations (restrictions or incentives). For this reason, it will be 
discussed in Section 3.5.5.  
Finally, despite acknowledging the role of the Taiwanese and Korean governments 
in establishing joint ventures with foreign firms and in regulating subcontracting, 
we do not attempt at quantifying these instruments. 
                                                     
27 In this regard, it is important to consider that high budgets or large numbers of professionals do 
not necessarily translate in positive S&T outcomes, as the case of the Brazilian telecom research unit 
CPqD of Telebras shows (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1992). 
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3.5.5 Country-specific and unquantifiable instruments of industrial 
policy 
Finding comparable quantitative indicators for industrial policy is not straightfor-
ward: some policies are country-specific and many aspects of industrial policy are 
unquantifiable. Industrial policies are often idiosyncratic to the history of the coun-
try and the evolution of its institutions. For instance, the Korean chaebol repre-
sented the major engine of growth of the economy during the Korean catch up 
process, leading the process of structural change and industrial upgrading. It is dif-
ficult to find an equivalent of chaebol in the other four country cases. Moreover, 
given their intricate relationships with the Korean government, the role of the chae-
bol can only be qualitatively described. 
As mentioned, some industrial policies could be classified differently in different 
countries. This is, for example, the case of FDI attraction policies, public pro-
curement, spatial industrial policy, and SMEs support. All these policy instruments 
could be designed as investment policies -when they simply aim at spurring in-
vestments- or as innovation policies -if beneficiaries are innovative industries or 
firms. Therefore, the analysis of these policies requires a case-by-case evaluation. 
In the case of FDI attraction, one way to address this issue is to look at sectoral 
distributions of FDI inflows: depending on which industries received foreign in-
vestments, it is possible to have an idea of how governments used FDI attraction 
instruments. Data on public procurement, spatial industrial policy, and SMEs sup-
port are virtually inexistent, so we omit them from our analysis.  
We also indicate some of the unquantifiable policy instruments used and require-
ments for support. For instance, in Taiwan, firms had to pass strict quality controls 
in order to have permission to export (Wade, 1990). 
3.6 Conclusions 
As a first step towards the quantification of industrial policies in East Asia and 
Latin America, this chapter critically reviewed the debate on industrial policy. At 
the centre of this debate is the interpretation of the so-called East Asian miracle, in 
comparison with the less successful industrialisation of Latin America. According 
to neoclassical economists, the East Asian catch up was the result of functional in-
dustrial policies and export promotion strategies. Neoclassical economists denied, 
or downsized the role of selective policies and did not sufficiently emphasise the 
role of the state in fostering technological change via science, technology, and in-
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novation policies. By contrast, Latin American selective industrial policies drove 
structural change towards comparative-advantage inconsistent industries, main-
tained inefficient firms, and diffused corruption. Selective industrial policies, part 
of import substitution strategies, were not abandoned in time, i.e. when import 
substitution possibilities were exhausted.  
Industrial strategists contended that Latin American industrial policies spurred 
manufacturing growth during the period of import substitution. However, exces-
sive reliance on FDI, weak knowledge transfer mechanisms between the public 
and private sector, lack of discipline, and excessive trade protection hampered fur-
ther manufacturing growth in Latin America.  
According to industrial strategists, selective industrial policies did play a crucial role 
also in East Asia. The East Asian model was described as a combination of import 
substitution and export promotion, where firms received subsidies for investments 
and capabilities’ accumulation. According to this interpretation, industrial policies 
in East Asia were comparative-advantage-defying: selective industrial policies cre-
ated the preconditions for the success of strategic industries and directed structural 
and technological change towards increasingly sophisticated goods (mainly ICTs 
and electronics). These processes, it was argued, were made possible by high gov-
ernment expenditures aimed at promoting capabilities’ accumulation within public 
research centres and domestic firms. 
The policy implication from the neoclassical interpretation is that functional indus-
trial policies are growth-enhancing, while selective industrial policies are growth-
reducing. The policy implication from the industrial strategists’ interpretation is 
that the problem of industrial policy is not selectivity per se: by creating rather than 
picking winners, entrepreneurial states can become important engines of industri-
alisation. The success of an industrial strategy depends, instead, on policy imple-
mentation and economic conditions. 
Building on this literature, this chapter sets the ground for a quantification of in-
dustrial policies in five of the most studied countries in East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, namely Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan. Firstly, we schematised 
industrial policy instruments and sectoral targets of these five countries. This list of 
policy instruments was then ordered by means of a detailed taxonomy. The taxon-
omy distinguished policy instruments that are naturally functional or selective from 
policy instruments that can be either functional or selective depending on how 
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they are designed. Given the multiple domains of intervention of industrial poli-
cies, the taxonomy distinguishes instruments according to whether they affect 
framework conditions, trade, investments, or science, technology and innovation. 
As a final step, indicators of industrial policy instruments for each of these do-
mains are presented and discussed. This discussion allowed identifying suitable in-
dicators that can systematically describe the nature of industrial policy in these five 
countries. Preferred indicators are actual government disbursements by industrial 
policy instrument. Sectorally disaggregated data allow assessing the degree of selec-
tivity of industrial policy instruments and checking to what extent governments’ 
expenditures were consistent with the priorities declared in official plans. 
The review of policy indicators evidenced that data on policy inputs are much 
more limited than data on policy outputs. Moreover, because governments and 
scholars do not adopt the same criteria for reporting and estimating policy incen-
tives, cross-country comparisons are difficult. This issue is further exacerbated by 
country-specific elements of industrial policies. Finally, it is important to keep in 
mind that measuring industrial policies only with quantitative indicators is impos-
sible (and not even desirable). Expenditures are the least ambiguous indicator of 
government commitments, but are not entirely comprehensive of the whole range 
of government interventions and do not capture many aspects of industrial policy-
making. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4  
Quantifying Industrial Policy in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Korea, and Taiwan 
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4.1 Introduction 
It is often underemphasised that in the 1970s it was commonly believed that Bra-
zil, Mexico, and Argentina were going to be the next countries to industrialise (Le-
ontief, 1977). This is not surprising if we consider that after the Second World 
War, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil enjoyed higher GDP per capita and larger 
manufacturing industries than Korea and Taiwan did.  
Today, East Asia and Latin America can be considered exemplar cases of diver-
gence in economic growth. In a span of two decades, East Asian countries man-
aged to catch up and change their production structure, replacing traditional with 
increasingly sophisticated manufacturing goods. In the same two decades, Latin 
American countries failed to sustain their growth and industrialisation rates. This 
resulted in stagnation and premature deindustrialisation. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature has extensively studied how such diver-
gent outcomes came about and agreed that catch up was fuelled by structural and 
technological change. What is disputed is the role of the state in these processes. 
Two alternative interpretations emerged. According neoclassical economists, the 
success of East Asia vis a vis Latin America was the result of functional industrial 
policies that only guaranteed macroeconomic stability, favourable business condi-
tions, and free trade (Wolf, 1988; Edwards, 1988; Krueger, 1997). According to in-
dustrial strategists, instead, East Asian governments selectively intervened in mar-
ket functioning by promoting individual industries and firms (Pack and Westphal, 
1986; Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990; Chang, 2002).  
In this chapter, we build upon the historical-comparative literature on East Asia 
and Latin America reviewed in the previous chapter and present systematic empiri-
cal evidence on the extent and nature of industrial policy in the most studied and 
exemplar cases of successful and less successful industrialisation, namely Argen-
tina, Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan.  
Focusing on industrial policy as a determinant of industrialisation is not to deny 
the complexity of this dynamic phenomenon. Industrialisation depends on multi-
ple and interrelated economic, historical, institutional, and cultural causes whose 
individual effects cannot be disentangled. The evidence brought in this chapter 
should be read keeping this idea in mind.  
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The next sections present data on industrial policies, as categorized in Chapter 3. 
Section 4.3 briefly concludes. 
4.2 The context 
This section tries to understand the context in which industrial policies were im-
plemented in the five countries under analysis. In order to do so, we present data 
on GDP trends and its composition, investments, exports and export structures, 
and R&D expenditures. These (outcome) indicators are used as denominators of 
many of the indicators of industrial policies presented in this chapter.  
Figure 4.1 shows GDP per capita trends from 1950 to 2005.  
Figure 4.1. GDP per capita, 1950-2005 
 
Source: Total Economy Database. 
Notes: GDP per capita, 2009 US$ converted to 2009 price level with updated 2005 EKS 
PPPs. 
 
As the figure shows, before the 1980s, GDP per capita was smaller in the East 
Asian than in the Latin American countries. In roughly two decades, Korea and 
Taiwan (together with the other East Asian Tigers) caught up and overcame first 
Brazil, then Argentina and Mexico.  
Table 4.1 presents data on the composition of manufacturing value-added by in-
dustry in Korea and Taiwan, and Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
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In Latin America, the shares of traditional manufacturing industries, such as food 
processing, remained high. By contrast, in East Asia traditional industries were 
gradually replaced by modern industries, such as electrical and optical equipment. 
This structural change pattern spurred economic growth, thanks to the properties 
of the ICTs industry as the new radical technological innovation of the time 
(Freeman and Soete, 1997; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). 
It is commonplace to cite investment rates and exports as the main ingredients of 
the East Asian catch up. Figure 4.2 presents data on gross fixed capital formation 
as percentage of GDP. 
Figure 4.2. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, 1960-2005 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea: WDI. Taiwan: DGBAS Statistical Yearbook 
online. 
 
This figure resembles the one of GDP per capita: while Korea and Taiwan started 
at lower levels of investments, they quickly caught up and overcame Latin Ameri-
can economies. This pattern is clear in the case of Korea whose investment share 
in GDP was less than 15% in the early 1960s and reached almost 40% by the early 
1990s.  
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show manufacturing export as percentage of merchan-
dise exports and GDP respectively. 
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Figure 4.3. Manufacturing exports, as % of merchandise exports, 5-year averages, 
1960-2005 
 
Source: Lavopa and Szirmai (2011). 
 
Figure 4.4. Manufacturing exports, as% of GDP; 5-year averages, 1960-2005 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea: Lavopa and Szirmai (2011) and WDI. Tai-
wan: Lavopa and Szirmai (2011), WTO statistics database online, and DGBAS Statistical 
Yearbook online. 
 
While GDP and investment trends diverged in later stages, data on manufacturing 
exports were polarised already in the mid-1960s (early 1970s if we look at manufac-
turing exports as percentage of GDP). Latin American manufacturing exports in-
creased over time, but did not reach the East Asian levels. There are two non-
mutually exclusive explanations for this. First, Latin American domestic markets 
were larger, which made them less dependent on exports. Second, abundant natu-
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ral resources tended to appreciate the exchange rate and so penalised manufactur-
ing exports (Bresser-Pereira, 2008).  
The nature of the East Asian process of structural change is also reflected in the 
composition of exports. Table 4.2 shows data on exports’ composition by industry. 
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Since the 1960s, in Korea and Taiwan the composition of manufacturing exports 
changed in favour of increasingly sophisticated goods: from export structures 
dominated by traditional manufacturing industries -food processing, beverages, to-
bacco, and textiles- Korea and Taiwan managed to improve their export profiles by 
increasing their exports of machinery. While the shares of machinery increased also 
in Brazil and Mexico, they never reached the levels of the East Asian countries. By 
contrast, until the early 2000s Argentine exports were still concentrated in food, 
beverages, and tobacco. 
The move towards increasingly sophisticated goods of East Asian countries was 
enabled by high R&D expenditures. Figure 4.5 shows data on R&D expenditures 
as percentage of GDP.  
Figure 4.5. R&D expenditures as % of GDP, 5-year averages, 1965-2005 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on: Argentina: UNESCO (various issues) and RICYT. 
Brazil: UNESCO, CEPAL, and Guimaraes et al. (1985), p. 69. Korea: Lim (1995) table 5 and 
OECD. Taiwan: Smith (2000), table 2.12 and National Science Council (2003). 
 
Until the 1980s, Latin American and East Asian investments in R&D were very 
low. From the 1980s, Korea and Taiwan expenditures increased and reached the 
levels of world leading economies. By contrast, R&D expenditures in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico stagnated or only marginally increased (in Brazil). 
4.3 Framework conditions 
As explained in Section 3.4, framework conditions refer to policies that ensure fair 
and favourable business conditions. These include infrastructure development, 
education policy, and competition policy.  
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Table 4.3 shows disbursements of national development banks to infrastructure as 
percentages of total lending. This data might underestimate the levels of invest-
ments in infrastructures because ministries or other government bodies might have 
directly financed infrastructure projects. Time series of government investments in 
infrastructures do not exist. 
Table 4.3. Disbursements in infrastructures by development banks, as % of total 
lending, 10-year averages, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea, 1960-90 
 60s 70s 80s 90s 
Argentina 6.9 6.7  -- 
Brazil 25.0 27.0 31.0 31.0 
Mexico 40.0 33.9 27.5 13.8 
Korea 17.9 23.9 11.0  
Source: Amsden (2001), table 6.1; Brazil for the 1990s: BNDES (various 
issues). 
 
As the table shows, Mexico was the most committed to infrastructure develop-
ment. Indeed, in the 1970s, Mexico had among the highest shares of paved roads 
(World Bank, 1993). 
Human capital is an essential element in most of the neoclassical explanations of 
the divergence between East Asia and Latin America (e.g. World Bank, 1991, 
1993). Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show data on public expenditures in education 
and tertiary education respectively. 
Figure 4.6. Public expenditures in education, as % of GNP, 5-year averages, 1970-05 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea: WDI. Taiwan: MOE Education Statistical Indi-
cators. 
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Figure 4.7. Public current expenditure on tertiary education, as % of expenditure on 
education, 5-year averages, 1970-05 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (various is-
sues). Taiwan: MOE Educational Statistical Indicators. 
 
In line with World Bank (1993), data on public expenditures in education do not 
seem to show any clear pattern. With respect to expenditures on tertiary education, 
Korean shares of public expenditures in tertiary education are lower than the Latin 
American ones, while the Taiwanese shares are usually higher than the Latin 
American ones, at least from the 1980s. This at least partly contradicts the analysis 
of the World Bank (1993) according to which East Asian countries invested more 
in basic than in higher education compared to Latin American countries. 
Data on the value of privatisations for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Taiwan (Fig-
ure 4.8) start in the mid-1980s, when waves of privatisation started all over the 
world.28 These data confirm that privatisations were much slower and less invasive 
in East Asia than in Latin America. 
  
                                                     
28 Data for Korea are not available. 
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Figure 4.8. Value of privatisations (in US dollars), 5-year averages, Argentina, Bra-
zil, Mexico, and Taiwan, 1985-2005 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: Privatisation Database. 29 Taiwan: Parker (1999), ta-
ble 3. 
 
4.4 Trade policy 
4.4.1 Import substitution 
In the literature, there is broad consensus that all five countries started their indus-
trialisation race with import substitution industrialisation. What is disputed is the 
timing, pace, and extent of trade liberalisation in East Asia. In order to check 
whether our data cover the major phases of reforms, Table 4.4 summarises tariff 
reforms by specifying the year of reform and whether tariffs increased (+) or de-
creased (-). 
  
                                                     
29 http://go.worldbank.org/W1ET8RG1Q0 (Last accessed: November 2014). 
Argentina Argentina
Brazil Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico MexicoTaiwan
Taiwan
Taiwan
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05
 87 
Table 4.4. Summary of tariff reforms 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Argentina 1958 1967 (-) 
1977 (-); 1978 
(-) 
1988 (-) 1992 (-) 
Brazil  
1967 (-); 1968 
(+) 
1973 (-) 1988 (-) 
 
Mexico   1973 (+) 
1984 (-); 1985 
(-) 
 
Korea 
1950 (+); 1957 
(+) 
 1974 (-) 1984 (-) 
 
Taiwan    1983 (-)  
Sources: Argentina: Sourrouille and Lucangeli (1983). Brazil: World Bank (1990) and Suzigan and 
Villela (1997). Mexico: Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009). Korea: Corbo and Suh (1992). Taiwan: Tu and 
Wang (1988) and Smith (2000). 
 
For Argentina, data cover the 1967 and 1977 regimes, so we do not have data for 
the 1958 reform. We do not provide data for the first half of the 1980s, because 
the 1978 program to reform gradually the tariff system was not honoured. Instead, 
frequent reforms decreased tariff levels by more than programmed and considera-
bly reduced their sectoral dispersion (Sourrouille and Lucangeli, 1983). These re-
forms continued until the mid-1990s.  
For Brazil, data capture the major reforms from 1950s to the 2000s, but these legal 
tariffs were not always effective, due to special import regimes that allowed cir-
cumventing tariffs. These special regimes were largely reformed in 1988 (World 
Bank, 1990; Suzigan and Villela, 1997).  
In Mexico, domestic protection was achieved via a mix of policy instruments, with 
tariffs playing only a minor role. The system of protection, in place since the 
1940s, was substantially reformed in 1984 when the number and dispersion of tar-
iffs was reduced (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2009). Because we have data for 1960 and 
the 1980s and tariffs were not as important as other non-tariff barriers, data cover-
age can be considered satisfactory. 
Moving to East Asia, the Korean multiple tariff system replaced the system of sin-
gle tariff in the 1950s. Since then, Korean tariffs were high and selective. Attempts 
to reforming this system started in the early 1970s, but the actual process of tariff 
reduction began in 1984 (Corbo and Suh, 1992). Because our data start in the mid-
1950s, data coverage for Korea is very satisfactory.  
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The same cannot be said about Taiwan, where data on average tariffs are available 
from the 1950s but data on tariff dispersion start in the mid-1980s. In Taiwan, 
domestic market protection was achieved by a system of tariffs, import controls, 
and licenses. A program of gradual decrease of tariffs and import controls started 
in 1983 and ended at the end of the 1990s (Tu and Wang, 1986; Smith, 2000). This 
means that we cannot assess how selective tariffs were in the period in which tar-
iffs were higher. 
Table 4.5 presents data on average tariffs and tariff dispersion. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.2, these are good indicators of the degree of domestic market protection 
and its selectivity. 
Table 4.5. Average tariffs and tariff dispersion (in parenthesis), 1955-2005 
 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 
Argentina 
      27 14 14 14 
      (14) (7) (7) (7) 
Brazil 
 54 39 49  51 45 22 14 14 
     (26) (18) (14) (7) (7) 
Mexico 
 22    25 16 14 15 18 
     (24) (10) (4) (11) (15) 
Korea 
30 40 39 31 27 22 17 13 11 12 
(21) (31) (28) (22) (18) (13) (8) (7) (7) (53) 
Taiwan 
38 17 17 13 11 8 8 9 8 8 
      (11) (10) (11) (15) 
Sources: Average tariffs: Argentina: Damill and Keifman (1992), table 4 and WITS. Brazil: von Doel-
linger et al. (1974), table VI.13, Suzigan and Villela (1997), table 5.1, and WITS. Mexico: UNIDO 
(1979), table 10, Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), table 7.4, and WITS. Korea: Kim (1988), table 1 and 
WITS. Taiwan: Tu and Wang (1988), table 2 and WITS. Dispersion: Argentina: Damill and Keifman 
(1992), table 4, Porta and Lugones (2011), table 1, and WITS. Brazil: Suzigan and Villela (1997), table 
5.1 and WITS. Mexico: Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), table 7.4 and WITS. Korea: Kim (1988), table 1 
and WITS. 
Notes: Argentina: for 1985-89 average tariff and tariff dispersion refer to 1988-89. Tariff dispersion 
for 1990-94 refers to 1990-92. Mexico: average tariff for 1960-65 refers to 1960. Korea: average tariff 
for 1985-90 refers to 1985 and tariff dispersion in 1975-80 refers to 1978 and in 1980-85 to 1982. 
 
As the table shows, East Asian average tariffs were generally lower than Latin 
American tariffs, but in few periods, Korea had equal average tariffs than Brazil. 
Data on tariff dispersion are scant but if we look at the beginning of the 1980s 
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(where most data are available), Brazilian and Mexican tariffs were roughly twice as 
dispersed as Korean tariffs.  
In order to identify the most protected industries within manufacturing, Table 4.6 
shows sectoral legal tariffs. Two caveats apply. First, industries’ definition might be 
too broad, meaning that these averages might still disguise differences in products’ 
tariff rates. Second, nominal legal tariffs might not tell the whole story, or might 
not be representative at least for two reasons. The first is associated with the pres-
ence of other non-tariff barriers (see Table 4.7 and Table 4.9): if a certain product 
cannot be imported due to import restrictions, its effective tariff is infinite. More-
over, firms or industries could be subject to special import regimes which implies 
that firms could import free of duties. 
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If we compare data for the period of most active intervention (1965-1980), the 
most protected industry is textiles.30 Huge differences in degrees of protection ap-
ply to transport equipment, a strategic industry for industrialising countries. Trans-
port equipment was highly protected in Argentina and Brazil (tariffs were as high 
as 127% and 116% respectively) and much less so in Korea (the peak was 23% in 
the early 1970s). Finally, while in Korea there were large differences between more 
and less protected industries, these differences were not as large as in Latin Amer-
ica. 
Tariffs are often only a small element of the commercial strategy of a country. In 
order to evaluate the degree of trade protection of these five countries, quantitative 
import restrictions are analysed. Table 4.7 reports import liberalisation ratios for all 
countries and periods where data are found. The import liberalisation ratio is com-
puted as the proportion of importable trade items over total tradable items.31  
Table 4.7. Import liberalisation ratio, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan, 1950-90 
 50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 
Brazil        84.7 
Mexico  28.0 52.0 63.0 61.5 77.7 79.6  
Korea  4.4 3.4 56.1 51.2 55.5 77.9 92.6 
Taiwan 55.2 48.1 53.7 55.1 79.0 97.5 97.0 97.8 
Sources: Brazil: Braga and Tyler (1992), table 17.1. Mexico: World Bank (1986), table 
VIII.2. Korea: Kim (1988), table 5 and Smith (2000), table 3.1. Taiwan: Smith (2000), 
table 2.4. 
Notes: Brazil: for 1985-90, data refer to 1989.  
 
In the mid-1960s, Mexico, Taiwan, and Korea imposed similar levels of trade re-
strictions. From the mid-1970s, Taiwan relaxed its import restrictions. The same 
process took more time in Korea where in the first half of the 1980s, shares of re-
stricted items were still similar to those of Mexico.  
In order to check the degree of selectivity of import restrictions and whether the 
processes of relaxation were biased in favour of targeted industries, Table 4.8 
                                                     
30 Brazilian tariffs include import surcharges. So, higher tariff rates might be partly explained by im-
port surcharges. 
31 Import liberalisation ratios are imperfect measures of domestic market protection. If many items 
are subject to licenses but licenses are issued rapidly and more or less automatically, liberalisation ra-
tios might not reflect true degrees of restrictiveness. 
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shows sectoral import liberalisation ratios for Brazil, Mexico, and Korea (the only 
countries for which sectoral data were found). 
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Table 4.8. Import liberalisation ratios, by industry, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, 1955-90 
  55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 
Brazil 
Metallurgy      53.9 72.6 
Food      94.3 90.3 
Textiles      94.9 37.0 
Paper      71.4 85.9 
Chemicals      19.2 97.7 
Machinery      61.6 90.0 
Electrical eq.      90.5 69.2 
Transport eq.      60.6 66.9 
Mexico 
Metallurgy        
Food 28.9 57.7      
Textiles        
Paper        
Chemicals 40.8 51.0      
Machinery 35.8 54.1      
Electrical eq.        
Transport eq.        
Korea 
Metallurgy  94.5 91.8 42.1 42.1 76.3 99.0 
Food  100.0 85.5 86.6 77.6 67.9 80.3 
Textiles  98.8 98.8 84.9 79.9 67.6 96.9 
Paper  97.1 97.1 60.0 80.0 36.8 99.6 
Chemicals  86.4 86.4 59.1 56.7 86.7 97.8 
Machinery  100.0 90.0 34.0 67.1 67.0 93.1 
Electrical eq.  100.0 100.0 77.0 82.8 54.8 91.3 
Transport eq.  100.0 100.0 21.3 28.1 27.9  
Sources: Brazil: Suzigan and Villela (1997), table 23, and Braga and Tyler (1992), table 17.1. Mexico: 
King (1970), table 4.4. Korea: Lee (1996), table A6, Leipziger et al. (1987) table 3.2, and Moreira 
(1995), table 13. 
Notes: Brazil: it refers to 1984 and 1989. Korea: For the 1980s, food includes beverages. 
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In the 1960s, Mexico imposed higher import restrictions than Korea. For example, 
in the chemical industry, 51% of tradable items were allowed to enter the Mexican 
territory, while in Korea 86%. However, when the Korean government imple-
mented the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) investment plan, import restric-
tions increased and became more selective. For example, in the transport equip-
ment industry, only between 21% and 28% of total tradable items were importable 
from the 1970s.32 Finally, a comparison of Brazil and Korea in the only periods 
when data are available for both countries shows that at the beginning of the 
1980s, restrictions were high and selective in both countries, while by the end of 
the 1980s, the process of trade liberalisation was more advanced in Korea than 
Brazil. 
Table 4.9 provides a summary of all the other policy instruments of domestic mar-
ket protection implemented in the five countries from the 1950s to the 1980s.  
  
                                                     
32 In the early 1970s, the Korean Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) investment plan imposed high 
import restrictions in the metallurgical, machinery, and chemical industries. 
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Table 4.9. Other policies to protect the domestic market, 1950-1980 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
Argentina  
Licenses; sur-
charges; official 
prices 
Licenses; sur-
charges; official 
prices 
Licenses; sur-
charges; official 
prices 
Brazil 
Multiple exchange 
rates; LCRs; simi-
larity test 
Unified exchange 
rate; LCRs; import 
reference prices; 15 
margin for national 
firms in tenders; 
similarity test; spe-
cial import regimes 
Licenses; import 
surcharges; LCRs; 
import reference 
prices; system of 
advance deposits 
for imports; direct 
controls on import 
purchases by 
SOEs; margins for 
national firms in 
tenders; similarity 
test 
Licenses; import 
surcharges; tempo-
rary suspension for 
license issues; im-
port financing re-
quirements; foreign 
exchange controls; 
import negotia-
tions 
Mexico Import licenses 
Import licenses; 
LCRs 
Import licenses; 
LCRs 
Import licenses; 
import reference 
prices 
Korea 
Multiple exchange 
rates; Foreign ex-
change tax 
Tariffs on inessen-
tial commodities; 
import licenses; 
link system; foreign 
exchange allocation 
ceiling; special laws 
for some indus-
tries; LCRs 
Tariffs on inessen-
tial commodities; 
import licenses; 
link system; foreign 
exchange allocation 
ceiling; special laws 
for some indus-
tries; LCRs  
Special laws for 
some industries; 
import licenses 
Taiwan 
Multiple exchange 
rates; preferential 
allocation of  for-
eign exchange; li-
censes; import sur-
charges; LCRs 
Unified exchange 
rate; foreign ex-
change controls; 
licenses; import 
surcharges; LCRs; 
quality standards 
Licenses; foreign 
exchange controls; 
LCRs 
Foreign exchange 
controls; LCRs 
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on: Argentina: Berlinski (1992) and Nogues (1988). Brazil: Suzi-
gan and Villela (1997) and Braga and Tyler (1992). Mexico: Page (1992). Korea: Hong (1992). Taiwan: 
Tu and Wang (1988) and Wade (1990). 
 
As the table shows, the most common non-tariff measures (apart from quantitative 
restrictions) are multiple exchange rates, licenses, and local content requirements 
(LCRs).  
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4.4.2 Export promotion 
Export promotion measures consist of export financial and fiscal incentives, and 
business support services.33 Financial incentives are directed credit and subsidised 
loans provided to exporting firms. Fiscal incentives include tax refunds, tax deduc-
tions, and tax holidays. In terms of data, some studies estimated the extent of ex-
port subsidies by putting together all (or the most important) policy instruments 
(Baumann, 1989; Pinheiro et al., 1993; Moreira and Panariello, 2005; Bisang and 
Kosacoff, 1990; Kim, 1991). Others gathered data on financial and fiscal schemes 
separately. Table 4.10 summarises the type of data available. 
 
                                                     
33 While here we focus on fiscal and financial incentives, it is important to acknowledge the role of 
KOTRA and CETRA, the agencies for export promotion services in Korea and Taiwan. 
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For Argentina, Brazil, and Korea estimations of gross subsidies are available. In the 
Argentina, the coverage is quite low.34 In Brazil, our data do not capture the 1960s, 
but cover the 1970s, when export promotion was considered a cornerstone of the 
Brazilian development strategy. In Korea, estimations of gross subsidies are avail-
able from 1960 (when export promotion began) to 1980. After 1980, only data on 
export loans are available. These data, however, are still satisfactory. According to 
estimations of gross subsidies, tariff exemptions were the strongest export incen-
tive, implying that the degree of export promotion after the 1980s might be under-
estimated by our data. Nevertheless, we still think that our data are good proxies of 
the degree of export promotion in Korea because the reforms of import liberalisa-
tion of the 1980s reduced the level of tariffs, and so of the export incentives in-
duced by them. 
For Mexico and Taiwan, estimations of gross subsidies are not available. For Mex-
ico, data on the principal financial and fiscal incentive schemes are available from 
1965 to 1985. Starting from the mid-1980s, neoliberal reforms affected the man-
agement of export incentives: export promotion was centralized and trade liberali-
sation decreased the impact of tariff exemptions. This means that for 1965-1985 
and 1990-1996 our data capture the main instruments of export promotion. For 
Taiwan, data on tax incentives are available from 1960 to 1998 and data on loan 
subsidies from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. We believe that these data are 
representative of the degree of export promotion: tax incentives were used more 
than financial incentives and from the mid-1980s, both fiscal and financial incen-
tives were wound back. Hence, even if for the 1990s data cover just tax incentives, 
they might only slightly underestimate the extent of export promotion.  
In the literature, export subsidies are often shown as percentages of manufacturing 
exports. This measure directly relates export incentives with their performance. 
This, however, overestimates the extent of export promotion when manufacturing 
exports are low -Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico- and underestimate it when manu-
facturing exports are high -Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, the extent of export in-
centives is computed as a percentage of both manufacturing exports and GDP 
(Table 4.11). 
                                                     
34 Even if it would be interesting to compare also the levels of export promotion in the 1960s -when 
export promotion incentives were first introduced- and in the 1990s -when neoliberal reforms were 
implemented, it should be mentioned that export promotion became effective only at the beginning 
of the 1970s (World Bank, 1979). 
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Computed as percentages of manufacturing exports, export incentives in Brazil 
were the highest: in the 1970s, approximately 60% of Brazilian manufacturing ex-
ports received some forms of government support. By contrast, less than 20% of 
Korean manufacturing exports received support. In terms of percentages of GDP, 
only in few periods Brazil and Mexico came close to the high levels of export pro-
motion of Taiwan and Korea, and did so much later. In the 1970s, Korea and Tai-
wan reached peaks of 3.9% and 3.7% respectively; Brazil reached 2.3% in the 
1980s, and Mexico 2.6% in the beginning of the 1990s.  
This discrepancy between export incentives as percentage of manufacturing export 
and GDP is explained by the lower shares of manufacturing exports that character-
ise Latin American countries (Figure 4.3).35 For example, in Brazil, the largest ex-
port incentives were tax reductions. This means that, had Brazilian manufacturing 
exports been more competitive, the state would have disbursed more and this 
would have translated into a higher share of export incentives in GDP. It could be 
argued that, in these circumstances, subsidised long-term loans and directed credits 
could have been more effective in turning Brazilian manufacturing firms into ex-
porters. Compared to fiscal incentives, these instruments could have allowed ac-
cumulation of exporting capabilities, and so could have increased the number of 
exporting firms in the country. 
Data for Taiwan show that export promotion incentives decreased already in the 
1980s. Because loan subsidies were much lower that tax refunds (data not reported 
here), the lack of data on loan subsidies does not excessively damage the estima-
tion of export promotion. Hence, it is credible that export promotion incentives 
decreased already in the 1980s.  
In Korea, the highest level of export promotion was registered in the 1970s. While 
the level of export promotion might be slightly underestimated in the 1980s, the 
difference between general and subsidised export interest rates decreased in the 
1980s (Sakong and Koh, 2010). Hence, although our indicator is slightly underes-
timating the degree of export promotion of Korea at least in the first half of the 
1980s, the decrease in export promotion was real. 
Sectoral data on export promotion in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Taiwan are 
shown in Table 4.12. 
                                                     
35 In Latin America, manufacturing exports are not competitive also because abundance of natural 
resources appreciates the exchange rate (Bresser-Pereira, 2008). 
 102 
Table 4.12. Export promotion by industry, as % of total, 5-year averages, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Taiwan, 1965-2005 
  65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 
Argentina 
Metallurgy    12.1 20.6    
Food         
Textiles         
Paper    5.8 3.1    
Chemicals         
Machinery    14.8 8.8    
Subtotal    29.2 31.5    
Brazil 
Metallurgy    11.5 9.8 12.4 10.6 9.2 
Food    11.1 7.9 8.3 9.6 9.1 
Textiles    10.9 9.1 3.0 1.9 1.7 
Paper    2.2 2.4 3.9 4.1 3.3 
Chemicals    11.5 11.3 6.9 6.7 7.4 
Machinery    40.2 48.3 25.4 27.0 28.8 
of which: electrical eq.    9.4 11.4 1.7 1.8 1.7 
of which: transport eq.    22.2 28.7 14.3 16.3 17.5 
Subtotal    87.5 88.8 59.9 60.0 59.5 
Mexico 
Metallurgy         
Food 22.6        
Textiles 16.8        
Paper         
Chemicals 17.5        
Machinery 9.8        
of which: transport eq. 4.4        
Subtotal 66.7        
Taiwan 
Metallurgy    6.2     
Food    20.5     
Textiles    31.8     
Paper         
Chemicals    2.9     
Machinery         
of which: electrical eq.    6.1     
Subtotal    67.5     
Sources: Argentina: Bisang and Kosacoff (1990), table 22. Brazil: Moreira and Panariello (2005), table II 
and XXVI, and Pinheiro et al. (1993), table 3. Mexico: NAFINSA (1971), table 95. Taiwan: Smith 
(2000), table 4.3. 
Notes: Brazil: Food includes beverages from 1990 to 2004. Textiles include apparel. Taiwan: data refer 
to 1981. Metallurgy includes machinery. 
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Because of limited comparative data, our analysis is restricted to few observations. 
In the early 1980s, 40% of Brazilian export incentives went to machinery, with 
transport equipment absorbing more than half of them. In Taiwan, most promoted 
industries were textiles and food that together accounted for over 50% of total ex-
port incentives. After the 1990s reforms, the Brazilian shares of export incentives 
to manufacturing decreased and also the machinery and transport equipment in-
dustries received a much smaller share of total export incentives. 
Eligibility criteria for export promotion schemes were present in several countries. 
In Argentina, export incentives were larger for (and in some periods, restricted to) 
capital and durable goods (World Bank, 1979; Bisang and Kosacoff, 1990). In 
Mexico, there were local content requirements of 50% in the 1960s (King, 1970) 
and 30% in the 1970s (United States International Trade Commission, 1985). In 
Taiwan, rather than local content requirements, quality inspections and quality con-
trol systems reduced the chances that one low-quality producer would penalise 
other producers. In particular, textiles, electronics and electrical appliances, and 
food companies were required to apply for a grading of their quality control system 
in order to have permission to export (Wade, 1990). 
4.5 Investment policy 
A key area of industrial policy aims at spurring firms’ investments. Investment 
policies include direct production via state-owned enterprises (SOEs), loans by na-
tional development banks, and financial and fiscal incentives in the form of prefer-
ential credits, tax reductions, tax holidays, tax credits, and tax deferrals. 
4.5.1 State-owned enterprises 
SOEs played an important role in all five countries under analysis. The data col-
lected to quantify the role of SOEs is quite satisfactory, ranging from the 1950s-
60s to the mid-1980s and 1990s. Since the mid-1980s, waves of privatisations af-
fected all five countries, leading to a smaller role of SOEs. Figure 4.9 and Figure 
4.10 present data on the share of SOEs’ value added in GDP and SOE’s share in 
total gross fixed capital formation respectively. 
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Figure 4.9. SOEs’ value added, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, 1975-95 
 
Source: World Bank (1995), table A1. 
 
Figure 4.10. SOEs’ share in gross fixed capital formation, 5-year averages, 1950-85 
 
Sources: Argentina, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan: Short (1984), table 2. Brazil: Moreira 
(1995), table A.34. 
 
Data on SOEs’ value added in GDP do not show any dramatic polarisation be-
tween Latin America and East Asia. Instead, if we look at SOEs’ share in value 
added, two groups can be identified. In Mexico and Korea, SOEs’ value added 
shares were around 10-12% of GDP from the 1980s to mid-1990s, in Taiwan and 
Argentina between 7% and 3%. In the first half of the 1980s, Brazil shifted from 
levels similar to Argentina and Taiwan to levels similar to Mexico and Korea.  
Taiwanese SOEs, whose value added shares in GDP were smaller than the Kore-
ans and Mexicans, invested the most: roughly 30% of total investments in the 
country were made by SOEs. While in the 1960s, Korean SOEs were investing as 
much as Taiwanese SOEs (in percentage of total investments), since the 1970s 
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Korea
Taiwan
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Korea
Taiwan
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85
 105 
their investments became similar to those of Latin American SOEs, in the range of 
20-25% of gross fixed capital formation. 
Table 4.13 presents data on SOEs’ budgetary burden, defined as subsidies, trans-
fers, and loans to public firms less dividends and interest payment. 
Table 4.13. Budgetary burden, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Korea, 1970-95 
 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 
Argentina 1.8 1.9 3.0 2.8 
 
Brazil 
 
-0.5 1.3 1.8 0.2 
Mexico 
 
1.9 -3.2 -2.4 -3.2 
Korea 0.1 0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.1 
Sources: Argentina, Mexico, and Korea: Short (1984), table 7 and 
World Bank (1995), table A.7. Brazil: World Bank (1995), table A.7 and 
Pinheiro and Giambiagi (1997), table 3. 
Notes: Brazil: 1980-93 data refer to Treasure’s resources to SOEs. Ar-
gentina: 1985-90 data refer to 1985-87. Mexico and Korea: 1990-95 fig-
ure refers to the average of 1990-91. 
 
With the exception of Brazil in the mid-1970s, Latin American SOEs’ burdens on 
the state were much larger than the East Asian ones. As seen in Figure 4.8, privati-
sations were much more abrupt in Latin America than East Asia, possibly also be-
cause maintaining SOEs was more costly. 
4.5.2 National development banks 
Particularly important to industrial development were (and are) development 
banks, the state’s agent for financing of industrial investments (Amsden, 2001). 
Brazil, Mexico, and Korea had national development banks, namely BNDES 
(Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social), NAFINSA (Nacional 
Financiera), and KDB (Korean Development Bank). In Argentina, the national de-
velopment bank, Banco Nacional de Desarrollo (BND), was established in 1944 
but from the mid-1970s, it was slowly dismantled. In Taiwan, a system of special-
ised development banks existed.  
Data on national development banks are satisfactory for all countries but Taiwan 
for which data are only available for the 1980s. The role of development banks is 
captured by several indicators. Figure 4.11 shows the share of development banks’ 
lending in GDP.  
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Figure 4.11. Development banks’ lending, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, 1960-2000 
 
Sources: Argentina: BND (various issues). Brazil: IBGE (various issues). Mexico: NAFINSA 
(various issues). Korea: Bank of Korea (various issues). Taiwan: Smith (2000), table 4.4(a) and 
(b). 
Notes: Taiwan: it refers to the Bank of Communications in 1982 and 1989. 
 
Apart from Mexico whose values from the mid-1980s are exceptional, the Korean 
and Taiwanese development banks lent roughly 5 times more than the Argentine 
and Brazilian banks, with the latter approaching East Asian levels only sporadically.  
Table 4.14 shows the share of manufacturing lending in total lending. 
Table 4.14. Development banks’ lending to the manufacturing industry, as % of to-
tal lending, 5-year averages, 1950-2000 
 50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 
Argentina     67.8 63.7 80.4    
Brazil 14.4 58.3 60.8 63.0 67.5 80.9 50.7 54.2 55.4 43.5 
Mexico 27.3 39.3 31.1 24.4 23.9 38.3 25.6 9.3  5.0 
Korea 29.2 36.8       65.3 59.6 
Taiwan       38.6 53.4   
Sources: Argentina: BND (various issues). Brazil: IBGE (various issues), World Bank (1983), table 
2.16, and Suzigan and Villela (1997), table 14. Mexico: NAFINSA (various issues). Korea: Bank of 
Korea (various issues). Taiwan: Smith (2000), tables 4.4 (a) and (b). 
Notes: Taiwan: it refers to 1982 and 1989. 
 
Given the scarcity of data for Korea and Taiwan, comparisons are hard. Neverthe-
less, data seem to suggest that at least the Brazilian, Argentine, and Taiwanese 
banks were allocating more than half of their loans to the manufacturing industry. 
Instead, the percentages of the Mexican NAFINSA were much lower because 
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manufacturing financing was undertaken primarily by domestic private banks, 
while NAFINSA was mostly engaged in infrastructure investments (as seen in Sec-
tion 4.3).  
Table 4.15 shows the sectoral distribution of loans to manufacturing. For the sake 
of simplicity, the table displays five major industries, namely metallurgy, food 
processing, textiles, paper, chemicals, and machinery and equipment (as in previous 
tables, wherever possible we report also data for transport equipment). 
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In most of the countries and periods, lending is concentrated in machinery and 
equipment (and in particular transport equipment), metallurgy, and chemicals. This 
is not surprising because these were priority industries in all five countries. Brazil is 
probably the most selective country in this respect, with almost 50% of loans de-
voted to the metallurgical industry. This tendency reduced from the mid-1980s 
when less strategic industries (e.g. paper) took over and the share of loans to the 
metallurgical industry decreased to 28% in the mid-1980s and roughly 12% in the 
1990s. 
4.5.3 Financial and fiscal incentives to investments 
Table 4.16 compares government expenditures in programs that granted long-term 
loans for the acquisition of domestic capital goods in Brazil, Mexico, and Korea -
the three countries where this type of programs existed. These programs were FI-
NAME (Fund for the acquisition of machinery and equipment) in Brazil, FONEI 
(Fund for industrial development) in Mexico and NIF (National Investment Fund) 
in Korea. FINAME was established in 1964 and was the “most important official 
source of financing of machinery and equipment production” (World Bank, 1990, 
p. 56). Because our data start in 1965 and end in the mid-1990s, data coverage for 
Brazil is very satisfactory. In Mexico, FONEI was established in 1971. As part of 
the reforms of the early 1990s, FONEI was absorbed within the programs run by 
the development bank NAFINSA. Hence, data cover the whole period of imple-
mentation of FONEI. The Korean NIF was among the instruments used to im-
plement the HCI drive. Because the HCI was implemented in the early 1970s, our 
data cover the entire history of the NIF. 
Table 4.16. Financial incentives, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Korea, 1965-2005 
 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 
Brazil 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.3   
Mexico  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0    
Korea  0.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Sources: Brazil: World Bank (1983), table 9.14, IBGE (1984), table 21, and Villela (1995), table 
7. Mexico: Banco de Mexico (various issues). Korea: Bank of Korea online36. 
Notes: Brazil: FINAME disbursements. Mexico: FONEI authorized credits. Korea: NIF loans. 
                                                     
36 Available at: http://ecos.bok.or.kr (Last Accessed: November 2014). 
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As the table shows, similar levels of support were provided by the Brazilian and 
Korean programs. As for Mexico, low disbursements might reflect low state capac-
ity to allocate sufficient resources or might be because this program did not consti-
tute the main source of financing for firms. 37 
Table 4.17 shows fiscal incentives (where possible only to the manufacturing in-
dustry) as percentages of GDP. In Taiwan, fiscal incentives were part both of the 
Statute for the Encouragement of Investment (SEI), in place from the 1960s to the 
1990s and the Statute for the Upgrading of Industry (SUI) that substituted the SEI 
in the 1990s. The regimes of fiscal incentives of the SEI and SUI differed in their 
level of selectivity. In the SEI, fiscal incentives were given only to targeted indus-
tries; in the SUI, it was given in a more functional way, i.e. in favour of more gen-
eral objectives like R&D, training, and environmental causes (Smith, 2000). Simi-
larly to Taiwan, in Korea tax incentives were firstly designed for the HCI drive 
and, at the beginning of the 1980s, were re-modelled to encourage R&D invest-
ments (Leipziger et al., 1987).  
Among the Latin American countries under analysis, similar tax schemes were pre-
sent only in Mexico. Mexican tax schemes discriminated between industries and 
types of firms (benefiting mostly nationally owned firms). These schemes were dis-
continued in the 1990s. In Brazil, there were no fiscal incentives to promote in-
vestments. In Argentina, fiscal incentives were introduced and cyclically removed, 
so data are not available.  
                                                     
37 In terms of most benefited industries, FONEI credits were allocated mostly to metallurgical prod-
ucts, machinery, chemical and petrochemical industry, plastics and coal (Banco de Mexico, 1988). 
FINAME subsidies were not selective, in the sense that there were no specific requirements on the 
sectors that could be supported. However, according to data on sectoral distribution of FINAME 
disbursements for the 1970s, most benefitted sectors were steel, machinery and transport equipment, 
petrochemicals, textiles, railroads, energy generation and transmission (IBGE Anuario Estatistico do 
Brasil, various issues; World Bank, 1986). NIF loans were mostly supplied to the steel, petrochemical, 
electric power, and shipbuilding industries (Cho and Kim, 1995). 
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Table 4.17. Fiscal incentives, as % of GDP, 5-year averages, Mexico, Korea, and 
Taiwan, 1960-2000 
 60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 
Mexico 0.1 0.1  0.3 0.1 0.0   
Korea 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4    
Taiwan 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.1 
Sources: Mexico: NAFINSA (1971), CEPAL (1979), table 18, World Bank (1986), table 2, and 
Feltestein and Shah (1992), table A6 and table A9. Korea: Lee and Yamazawa (1990), table 2.3. 
Taiwan: Jenkins et al. (2003), table 4.3. 
Notes: Mexico: For 1976, data refer to tax subsidies of annual agreements and incentives under 
the Law for the Development of New and Necessary Industries. For 1977-79, it refers to total 
fiscal incentives. For 1979-89, it refers to fiscal revenue loss under CEPROFIS. For 1983-85, it 
includes also agreements of annual validity to the automobile industry. Taiwan: Data refer to tax 
reductions under SEI. 
 
As for financial incentives, the Korean and Taiwanese fiscal schemes provided 
much more support than the Mexican scheme. That fiscal incentives were particu-
larly important in Taiwan is not surprising because the Taiwanese industrial policy 
strategy was generally more oriented towards fiscal rather than financial incentives.  
Table 4.18 summarises objectives, targeted industries, and conditions to obtain fis-
cal incentives in Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1990s.38 
                                                     
38 The table (intentionally) does not capture the level of complexity of these regimes. We list only 
main eligibility criteria. These, however, were often more complex and involved aspects like quantity 
and quality of employment generated, lists of eligible products, technical efficiency, etc. (e.g. King, 
1970; Wade, 1990). 
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Table 4.18. Targeted industries and conditions of fiscal incentives, Mexico, Korea, 
and Taiwan, 1960-1990 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Mexico 
Objectives Import-substitution 
Channel invest-
ments in strategic 
areas 
 
Industries   
Automobiles; 
chemicals and 
petroleum deriva-
tives; basic metals 
and metallic prod-
ucts; machinery 
and equipment 
 
Conditions Necessary and new industries; LCRs LCRs  
Korea 
Objectives Promote HCIs 
Channel invest-
ments in strategic 
areas 
Spur R&D and 
facilitate industrial 
rationalization 
Industries HCIs 
Naphtha cracking; 
steel; machinery; 
electronics; ship-
building; aviation 
None 
Conditions -- -- -- -- 
Taiwan 
Objectives 
Channel invest-
ments in strategic 
areas 
Encourage capital-
intensive indus-
tries 
Encourage tech-
nology-intensive 
industries 
Encourage R&D, 
training, and pro-
mote anti-
pollution measures 
Industries 
Textiles and foot-
wear 
Basic Metals; pet-
rochemicals; ma-
chinery; electron-
ics 
Basic Metals; pet-
rochemicals; ma-
chinery; electron-
ics 
All industries 
Conditions 
Newly established enterprises; economies of scale; upgrading 
equipment; LCRs; export targets 
None 
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on: Mexico: King (1970), CEPAL (1979), Feltestein and Shah 
(1992), and OECD (1992). Korea: Smith (2000). Taiwan: Smith (2000) and Jenkins et al. (2003). 
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4.6 Science, technology, and innovation policy 
4.6.1 Science policy 
Research was organized differently in the East Asian and Latin American coun-
tries. In Korea and Taiwan, research institutes directly received funds to conduct 
their research projects. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico governments transferred 
resources to research councils (CONICET in Argentina, CONACYT in Mexico, 
and CNPq in Brazil) that distributed grants and scholarships to researchers.39 In 
order to account for this, we separately account for research financing to research 
councils (Table 4.19) and to main research institutes (Table 4.20). In Korea, Lee et 
al. (1991) describe the role of KIST, the Korea Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy, since its establishment in 1966. In Taiwan, ITRI, Industrial Technology Re-
search Institute, was the most important research centre and the beneficiary of the 
largest government transfers (Hsu and Chiang, 2001). The closest equivalent to 
ITRI and KIST in Brazil is the Institute of Technological Research (IPT). This in-
stitute had the closest linkages with the industrial sector. However, its role in the 
Brazilian national innovation system was much smaller (Dahlman and Frischtak, 
1992). In Argentina, Katz and Bercovich (1992) evidence the role of CNEA 
(Atomic Energy Commission).40 Finally, Wionczek and Marquez (1993) highlight 
the role of the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP) for the creation of domestic 
technological capabilities in the most important industry of the Mexican economy. 
                                                     
39 In Mexico, CONACYT also distributes funds to public research institutes (Dutrenit et al., 2011). 
40 Argentina has an institute similar to the KIST, the INTI (National Institute for Industrial Technol-
ogy), but its role is very limited (Lopez, 2002). 
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Data show that the Brazilian government transferred at most 0.3% of the Brazilian 
GDP to its research council, but 0.00003% to IPT, the institute that conducted the 
most applied research and the closest linkages to the private sector. By contrast, 
the Taiwanese government transferred between 0.03% and 0.16% of its GDP to 
ITRI, the most important research institute in the country. This institute con-
ducted basic and applied research and intensively cooperated with the private sec-
tor.  
This shows that East Asian and Latin American policies did not necessarily differ 
in amounts of financial resources spent, but rather in their implementation. 
Whether universities or research institutes are financed makes a difference: by fi-
nancing research institutes, Korean and Taiwanese science policies proved to be 
more industry-oriented and (indirectly) more selective than those of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico. 
4.6.2 Innovation policy 
Private R&D is promoted through R&D subsidies and tax incentives. The pioneers 
of R&D incentives were Brazil and Korea. In Brazil, the Agency for the Financing 
of Studies and Projects (FINEP) grants subsidised loans and offers risk-sharing in-
struments and equity participation since 1965. After FINEP, financial incentives 
for training of engineers of national firms (FUNTEC) and fiscal incentives 
(PADCT) were put in place. For Brazil, data are satisfactory because they cover all 
these programs for a long period (for details, see the notes of Table 4.21). Korea 
grants financial and fiscal incentives since the mid-1960s (Sakakibara and Cho, 
2002). Among the various incentive schemes, preferential financing, in the form of 
loans by state-controlled banks and public funds (namely, the National Research 
Projects, NRP, and the Industrial Base Technology Development Programs, 
IBTDP), was the major form of R&D financing (Kim, 1992). Therefore, even if 
data on fiscal incentives are not available, we are confident that preferential financ-
ing satisfactorily approximates innovation policies in Korea.  
Taiwan implemented a more gradual strategy by which firms were directly financed 
only after a period in which they only commercialized research that had been fi-
nanced and executed by research institutes (ITRI in primis). In this second stage, 
financing was given for joint-R&D development projects between firms and re-
search institutes, procurements, and R&D projects with matching grants (Hsu and 
 118 
Chiang, 2001). For Taiwan, we have data on both fiscal and financial incentives but 
the time coverage is limited to the 1990s.  
In Argentina, incentives to private R&D were available only from mid-1990s via 
the program FONTAR that grants credits, subsidies, and tax incentives. In Mex-
ico, innovation policies were implemented at the end of the 1990s. So Mexico is 
excluded from this analysis. Data on R&D financial and fiscal incentives are pre-
sented in Table 4.21. 
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Data confirm that R&D incentives were much larger in East Asia than Latin 
America. While Korea spent between 0.2% and 0.4% of its GDP on incentives for 
private R&D, Brazil and Argentina spent at most 0.04%. This might (at least 
partly) explain why the private sector occupied a more prominent role in the Ko-
rean and Taiwanese NSI than in the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican NSI. In 
Appendix B, we provide data on financial and fiscal incentives separately. Data 
show that the Korean model of financing was different from the Taiwanese one at 
least in two aspects: the preference for credits over tax incentives and the entrust-
ment of private firms. This demonstrates the exceptionally entrepreneurial attitude 
of the Korean government. 
Table 4.22 summarises targeted or most benefited industries by innovation policies 
in Argentina, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. These data come from figures on dis-
bursements, policy documents, or existing literature. 
Table 4.22. Targeted/benefited industries of financial and fiscal R&D incentives 
 Industries targeted 
Argentina 
Chemical industry, food and beverages, leather and plastics; machinery and 
equipment 
Brazil Electronics, electric machinery, communications, machinery, and metallurgy 
Korea Machinery, new materials development, semiconductor design, super-mini com-
puters, energy conservation, nuclear energy fuel, chemicals, biotechnology 
Taiwan Electronics and telecommunications 
Sources: Argentina: CEP (2009). Brazil: Erber (1980) and Ferreira (1980). Korea: Kim (1992). Tai-
wan: Hsu et al. (2009). 
  
In Taiwan, data show that subsidies targeted electronics and telecommunications 
and benefited mostly large firms (Hsu et al., 2009). According to data for the mid-
1970s, Brazilian funds were allocated mainly to private large firms and most bene-
fited industries were electronics, electric machinery, communications, machinery, 
and metallurgy (Erber, 1980). In Argentina, R&D incentives were directed mainly 
to traditional industries.  
4.6.3 Technology policy 
In the area of technology policies, we limit the analysis to policies for technology 
transfer. Figure 4.12 captures the extent of countries’ reliance on technology licens-
ing by the share of royalty and license fees as a percentage of GDP. Figure 4.13 
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shows data on capital goods’ imports as a percentage of gross domestic invest-
ments. 
Figure 4.12. Royalty and license fees, as % of GDP; 5-year averages, 1975-2005 
 
Sources: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Korea: WDI. Taiwan: Amsden and Chu (2003), ta-
ble 2.14.  
 
Figure 4.13. Capital goods’ imports, as % of gross domestic investments, 5-year 
averages, 1960-2005 
 
Sources: WITS online. 
 
The two figures clearly show the preference of Korea for technology licensing and 
Taiwan for capital goods’ imports as channels of technology transfer. In Latin 
America, choices of technology acquisitions were driven by foreign exchange con-
siderations and governments were regulating the amount of royalties that national 
firms could pay (Dalhman and Frischtak, 1992). That Latin American countries re-
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lied less on capital goods’ imports should not surprise because capital goods’ im-
ports were largely restricted under ISI.42 
FDI are generally attracted via fiscal and financial incentives (in the form of tariff 
exemptions and preferential access to foreign exchange) or localisation advantages 
(such as good quality infrastructures). As discussed in Section 3.5.5, countries at-
tract FDI to get additional investments and benefit from technology transfers.  
In order to achieve both objectives, East Asian governments often imposed local 
content requirements and duties of knowledge transfers and discouraged or re-
stricted entry of foreign firms in industries where the chances and returns of tech-
nology transfer were lower (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Sakakibara and Cho, 
2002). In Argentina, attraction and regulation of FDI were cyclical: some govern-
ments strove to attract them, and some others restricted them. The Brazilian atti-
tude towards FDI was much more stable. FDI faced virtually no limitations apart 
from few strategic industries in which foreign firms were required to cooperate 
with local firms. At the beginning of the 1980s, more restrictions were introduced 
(in some strategic industries, such as ICTs, foreign ownership was not allowed). 
This trend was reverted in the 1990s, when neoliberal reforms lifted virtually all 
restrictions (da Motta-Veiga, 2004). In Mexico, FDI inflows were heavily regulated 
until the 1980s when restrictions were gradually relaxed starting from capital and 
technology-intensive industries (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005). Even if FDI were regu-
lated in Mexico, empirical estimates point at roughly 40% of manufacturing sales 
originating from affiliates of international firms in 1979 (Weiss, 1990). 
Figure 4.14 shows the trend of FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation from 1970 to 2005. 
  
                                                     
42 With respect to capital goods’ imports, it has been argued that higher imports might also be detri-
mental to industrial development, if imported capital goods are of very low quality. This was the case 
in some small and medium firms in Latin America (Katz, 1987). 
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Figure 4.14. FDI inflows, as % of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 5-year averages, 
1970-05 
 
Source: UNCTAD online. 
 
Also in this case, data clearly differentiate between Latin American and East Asian 
countries, where Latin American countries made a much more intensive use of 
FDI than East Asian countries did. This became even more evident from the mid-
1980s. In East Asia, domestic investments were generally larger and foreign in-
vestments in some strategic industries were restricted until the 1990s (Amsden, 
2001; Chan, 2000). 
Table 4.23 reports FDI inflows disaggregated by industry within manufacturing. 
Data are aggregated into five industries: metal industries, food processing, textiles, 
chemical industries, and machinery and equipment. In Argentina, the two periods 
of major FDI expansion were in the 1960s and 1970s. Because data start in the 
mid-1970s, only the latest phase of FDI expansion is captured. For Brazil, data 
cover the entire period from 1960 to 2000, so it is possible to observe the entire 
evolution of FDI inflows. Sectoral data of Mexican FDI inflows start in the 1990s, 
so it captures only the period of FDI liberalisation. Data for Korea are quite com-
plete and range from 1960 to 2000. Data for Taiwan are complete but are com-
puted as 10-year averages rather than 5-year averages. 
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In Korea and Taiwan, FDI inflows concentrated in chemicals, and machinery and 
equipment. The latter also absorbed the largest inflows of FDI in Brazil. In Argen-
tina (and in Brazil since the 1990s), the bulk of FDI inflows went to utilities and 
mining, rather than manufacturing. A similar trend is observable also in Korea 
where since the 1990s foreign capital was allowed in more industries and so in-
flows to manufacturing decreased. It is plausible to expect fewer opportunities for 
investment spawning and technology transfer in primary and tertiary rather than 
manufacturing activities. This pattern of inflows might be attributed to FDI liber-
alisation reforms.  
What is also interesting to note is the role of FDI in transport equipment, a key 
industry in ISI strategies. In Brazil, at the beginning of the development of the in-
dustry, the share of FDI in the transport equipment industry was very large (65%). 
In Korea, instead, FDI inflows were restricted until the mid-1980s. Inflows in-
creased, from 8% at the end of the 1970s to 27% in the first half of the 1980s.  
4.7 Conclusions  
A large body of literature investigated the factors behind the divergence between 
the East Asian and Latin American industrial development and catch up trajecto-
ries. A great deal of the discussion focused on the role of industrial policies. As 
Chapter 3 showed, the debate is trapped into an unfruitful confrontation between 
advocates of functional and advocates of selective industrial policies. This impedes 
a neutral interpretation of the historical experiences of East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica and biases evidence-based policy recommendations for newly industrialising 
countries. This paper contributes to this long debate by constructing systematic 
empirical evidence on the extent and nature of industrial policy in five of the most 
studied countries in East Asia and Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, Korea, and Taiwan.  
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter confirms most of the accepted 
stylized facts about the divergence of East Asia and Latin America. Data confirm 
that Latin American countries more strongly protected their domestic markets, and 
above all the industries involved in the import substitution strategy (transport 
equipment and capital goods). However, that East Asian degrees of protection of 
domestic industries were lower does not mean that East Asian countries did not 
protect their industries at all. In Korea (where more data are available), especially 
non-tariff barriers were high until the mid-1980s. Moreover, significant differences 
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existed among industries, with heavy and chemical industries enjoying the highest 
protection. 
Our data also confirm that efforts towards export promotion were more intense in 
East Asia than Latin America. This, again, does not mean that Latin American 
countries did not try to spur their exports. For example, in the 1970s, roughly 60% 
of the Brazilian manufacturing exports benefited from some form of export incen-
tives. Manufacturing exports, however, represented roughly 55% of total exports 
and negligible percentages of GDP. Therefore, the meagre success of export pro-
motion in Brazil can be partly explained by the low competitiveness of Brazilian 
manufacturing exports. 
The divergence between East Asian and Latin American investment rates widened 
from the mid-1960s. Substantially higher investment rates of East Asian SOEs 
might have contributed to this. Publicly owned firms are often blamed for not in-
vesting enough and being inefficient. Data, however, demonstrate that state own-
ership does not necessarily imply high budgetary burdens and low investment 
rates. In trying to account for investment rate differentials, we also analyse the role 
of financial and fiscal incentives. Our data confirm the role of East Asian govern-
ments in directing finance to priority industries. According to available data, fiscal 
and financial incentives were higher in Korea and Taiwan than in any other Latin 
American country. Strategic finance allocation was not only achieved via develop-
ment banks’ subsidised loans, but also via tax incentives. Tax incentives are nor-
mally considered functional industrial policies, but in the countries under analysis, 
they were often restricted to specific industries.  
Differences between East Asian and Latin American industrial policies existed also 
in the domain of science, technology, and innovation policies. In Latin America, 
state intervention was geared more towards human capital formation than firms’ 
innovation. East Asian policies, instead, were more balanced between science and 
innovation and involved more interactions between these two. The magnitude of 
the difference between Latin American and East Asian countries is evident in the 
data. Moreover, while it is commonly believed that science polices are horizontal, 
research financing in East Asia was more strategically oriented and more selective 
than in Latin America. Finally, in East Asia, technological change has also been 
sustained by wise strategies of technology transfer, based more on licensing and 
capital goods’ imports than FDI.  
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This chapter accounted for the nature and extent of industrial policy in East Asia 
and Latin America. It could be argued that it is of greater interest to analyse how 
states intervened -types of interventions (Evans, 1995) and processes of industrial 
policy-making (e.g. Rodrik, 2007; Szirmai et al., 2013). Despite our analysis does 
not explicitly address these issues, our data illustrate some of the characteristics of 
industrial policy-making in the two regions. 
First, targeted industries were different in East Asia and Latin America: high tech-
nology industries (mainly electronics and ICTs) were supported more in East Asia 
than in Latin America. These industries were part of the new wave of radical inno-
vations that drove economic growth in the last decades. Hence, both the amounts 
of public spending and the kinds of intervention differed. Moreover, by combining 
financial and fiscal incentives, East Asian governments proved to be much more 
entrepreneurial than Latin American governments.  
Second, especially in Argentina and to a lesser extent Brazil, industrial policies 
changed drastically with every new government. This created uncertainty and un-
dermined the relationship between the state and the private sector. This was an 
important difference with the East Asian approach towards industrial policies and 
industrial development.  
Latin America’s slow return to industrial policy, documented by Peres (2009), calls 
for a careful analysis of what did not work in the past and can be done under the 
current global trading order. While it is clear that old-days trade policies, such as 
import restrictions, export subsidies, and FDI restrictions are less viable options 
today; other areas of industrial policies also contribute to structural change. When 
export promotion absorbed up to 3.9% of GDP in East Asia, loans of the Korean 
Development Bank, fiscal and financial incentives to investments, and STI policies 
together represented roughly 8% of the Korean GDP. In Brazil, the same indica-
tors sum up to roughly 2.5% of GDP, and in Argentina and Mexico, even less. 
This suggests that some industrial policies were underfinanced in the past and 
there is some space for industrial policies today.  
To conclude, this chapter confirms parts of the interpretation of neoclassical 
economists and parts of the interpretations of industrial strategists. By using sec-
toral data, we try to assess the level of selectivity of industrial policy, but also to 
check whether industrial policies are ultimately serving their purpose. Industrial 
policies should foster productive activities and facilitate the process of structural 
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change towards dynamic industrial sectors. If industrial policies reinforce industrial 
structures that lack the potential to lift the economy to higher levels of productivity 
and income, results in terms of industrialisation and economic growth are likely to 
be poor. 
Despite the effort to construct systematic comparative empirical evidence, this 
subject matter bears evident limitations in terms of comparability and measurabil-
ity. Especially with respect to the latter, our data refer to official programs and so 
could potentially underestimate the degree of assistance. Policy-making is subject 
to lobbying activities and non-transparent financing. Therefore, our indicators are 
to be considered proxies of state intervention. Even if these are only proxy of in-
dustrial policy, it would be interesting to expand this analysis to other countries. 
Comparative studies would help to understand how much intervention is enough, 
too little, or too much. Comparisons would also shed more light on the impact of 
different types of industrial policies in different contexts.  
While it would be interesting to expand the analysis to more countries, this type of 
exercises requires considerable preparatory work. Collecting data requires knowing 
what exactly to look for, i.e. building a taxonomy of policies implemented in the 
countries and period under analysis. It is crucial to ensure that data are capturing 
the essence of industrial policy in a certain country and period. All these issues in-
dicate why it was not possible at this stage to include more countries in our analysis 
and why we believe that it would be valuable to pursue more of these studies in the 
future. 
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Chapter 5  
The Role of Macroeconomic 
Policies in Firms’ Investments 
in Manufacturing 
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5.1 Introduction 
Low investment rates are the key problem of development. Adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions are often identified as the main determinants of low investments 
in developing countries. Different policy approaches historically tried to neutralize 
them. Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, several developing countries were 
pressured to adopt neoliberal policy agendas. Under the Washington Consensus, 
markets were freed from distortive government interventions and governments 
were only required to achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability and fiscal dis-
cipline. Together with inflation targeting and fiscal discipline, Washington Consen-
sus prescribed trade and financial liberalisations, privatisations, deregulations, price 
and tax reforms. In the neoliberal view, these reforms would create favourable 
conditions for private investments. 
In the literature, there is little agreement on the impact of these policies. Much of 
the criticism came from structuralist economists who in turn had been heavily 
criticised by the neoliberals during the period of state-led industrialisation. The 
mixed evidence on the effects of Washington Consensus type of policies, together 
with the current adoption of austerity measures in Europe and countercyclical 
policies in emerging countries, kept the debate on the role of macroeconomic poli-
cies hot and burning. This paper contributes to this debate and investigates how 
firms adjust their investment decisions in response to macroeconomic factors. In 
particular, the paper tries to understand if macroeconomic conditions matter for 
firms’ investment behaviours as structural factors. 
Our approach is novel in several aspects. First, it uses firm-level data, rather than 
data on national aggregate investments. Micro data allow exploring the micro-
macro interdependencies that shape aggregate investments and so contribute to a 
better understanding of the micro-foundations of investment patterns. Secondly, 
this study covers the period 2002-2010.44 During this period, structural adjustment 
programs imposed by international organizations, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank, had ended and developing countries were applying novel macroeconomic 
approaches. Finally, by estimating a multilevel Heckman section model, this paper 
takes into account country heterogeneities and explores the role of within and be-
tween countries variations in firms’ investment behaviours. 
                                                     
44 Only for Sri Lanka, the last survey refers to 2011. 
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The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews the 
neoliberal and structuralist views on the role of macroeconomic policies in eco-
nomic growth and investments. Section 5.3 sets the scene by describing the data 
and methodology. In Section 5.4, we show some descriptive statistics and discuss 
the results of our econometric exercise. In Section 5.5, we check the robustness of 
our results. Section 5.6 draws some brief conclusions. 
5.2 Literature review 
There is little agreement about the effects of neoliberal macroeconomic policies on 
investments and economic growth. After the wave of neoliberal reforms and struc-
tural adjustment programs of the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, empirical studies 
evaluating their effects mushroomed. Some of these studies analysed the joint ef-
fect of several policies, while others focused on one particular aspect of the neolib-
eral agenda.  
A series of papers measured the extent of economic reforms in Latin America by 
developing indexes of structural reforms (Lora, 1997, 2001; Morley et al., 1999; 
Lora and Panizza, 2002). These indexes comprise trade and financial policy, priva-
tisations, tax and labour reforms. Eicher and Schreiber (2010) developed a similar 
index to explain economic growth in 26 transition economies during the 1990s. 
According to their results, a 10% increase in their index is associated with 2.7% in-
crease in economic growth. Other empirical studies investigated the effect of vari-
ables such as fiscal budget surpluses, exchange rates, interest rates, inflation, and 
debt on private investments (Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Serven and Solimano, 
1991; Fischer, 1993), GDP growth (Bleaney, 1996; Easterly et al. 1997), or both 
(Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Among non-econometric studies, the World Bank 
(1991, 1994) and Edwards (1996) described East Asian, African, and Latin Ameri-
can macroeconomic conditions and experiences with neoliberal reforms. All these 
studies concluded that macroeconomic stability and Washington Consensus type 
of policies spurred investments and economic growth. 
Other studies focused only on one or few aspects of the neoliberal agenda, such as 
inflation targeting (Bruno and Easterly, 1998; de Gregorio, 1993; Dornbusch and 
Fischer, 1993) and trade liberalisation (Edwards, 1992, 1993; Pritchett, 1996; Wac-
ziarg and Welch, 2007). Since the pioneering work by Gurley and Shaw (1955), 
Shaw (1973), and McKinnon (1973), a large literature on financial deepening 
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emerged. 45 Some of these studies (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1993; King and Levine, 
1993a, 1993b; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al. 2000; Beck et al., 2000) 
found a strong and positive relationship between financial deepening and eco-
nomic growth. After witnessing the consequences of financial reforms, some au-
thors began to question their effects, especially in Latin America (Diaz-Alejandro, 
1985; De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995). A vanishing effect of financial deepening, 
meaning that after a certain level more financial depth is detrimental to growth, 
was found (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Khar-
roubi, 2012).46  
Comprehensive indexes of financial reforms were recently developed (Laeven, 
2003; Chinn and Ito, 2008; Abiad et al., 2009). These indexes incorporate elimina-
tion of credit controls, reserve requirements, interest rates controls, restrictions to 
the banking sector and international financial transactions, and reforms to develop 
security markets. Using these indexes, some empirical studies confirmed the posi-
tive effect of financial reforms on economic growth (e.g. Galindo et al., 2007; 
Christiansen et al., 2013). 
The strongest critiques to neoliberal policies are attributable to structuralists. Neo-
liberal policies have been criticised for being too pro-cyclical and short-termed 
(ECLAC, 1998; Nayyar, 2008, 2011; Stiglitz et al., 2006). Despite acknowledging 
the desirability of macroeconomic stability, structuralists claim that this goal should 
not be pursued at the cost of economic recession (Taylor, 1993; Ocampo, 2002, 
2003; Moreno-Bid et al., 2005). Moreover, inflation is considered harmful only 
when it is too high (hyperinflation). Low to moderate levels of inflation, instead, 
can increase economic growth to levels that would not be attainable otherwise and 
efforts to further decrease it might bring higher costs than benefits (Taylor, 1993). 
Finally, in the structuralist view, inflation might be tolerated as a by-product of 
economic growth (e.g. Lustig and Ros, 1993). 
                                                     
45 According to this literature, the main constraint on private investments in developing countries is 
the quantity rather than the cost of financial resources. Limited financial resources would be the re-
sults of distortive policies that direct credit and push interest rates down. When real interest rates be-
come negative (a situation called financial repression), a rise in real interest rates increases financial 
savings, and so investment funds available to firms. This theory served as a justification to the finan-
cial reforms adopted in developing countries. These reforms eliminated “distortive” policies and 
raised real interest rates. Early empirical studies could not prove a positive effect of real interest rates 
on private investments, but credit availability was found to be a big constraint on private investments 
in developing countries (e.g. Blejer and Khan, 1984; de Melo and Tybout, 1986). 
46 See Levine (2005) for a comprehensive review of this strand of literature. 
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The most fundamental critiques to neoliberal policies, however, concern the inter-
pretation of -and consequent approach towards- macroeconomic instability and its 
effects on structural and technological change and income distribution.47 First, 
structuralists question the neoliberal understanding of macroeconomic instability. 
The argument is as follows. In developing countries, macroeconomic instability is 
the result of a variety of mechanisms that essentially depend on production struc-
tures. Abundance of natural resources makes developing countries specialise in 
primary commodities. This has two effects. Unbalanced production structures 
emerge. These are constituted by a (more productive) resource-based and an (less 
productive) industrial sector. These productive dualities generate a situation by 
which the industry most in need of foreign currency (manufacturing) depends on 
the export-oriented resource-based sector. The divergence between these two sec-
tors is responsible for balance of payment crisis (Diamand, 1972).  
Dependence on natural resources makes these countries vulnerable to (volatile) 
commodity prices and causes cyclical overvaluations of the exchange rate that pe-
nalise the manufacturing industry (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, 2012).48 Exchange rates’ 
movements and commodity prices also affect inflation. Given this, inflation cannot 
be seen as a mere consequence of monetary expansion, but rather as a structural 
phenomenon (Noyola, 1956; Sunkel, 1958; Olivera, 1964; Pinto, 1968; Prebisch, 
1981). Because of these interrelations, coordinated macroeconomic -exchange rate, 
monetary, and fiscal- policies are necessary (Frenkel, 2008; Rapetti, 2013). 
These mechanisms affect each other and have long lasting and reinforcing effects 
on investments. In the old days of state-led industrialisation, these forces were off-
set by policy tools like multiple exchange rates, foreign exchange and capital con-
trols, import duties and quantitative restrictions, taxes on traditional exports, and 
incentives to non-traditional exports. The abandonment of these instruments and 
the adoption of neoliberal policies aggravated the tendency of the exchange rate to 
appreciate (Ocampo, 2011; Bresser-Pereira, 2008, 2012). 
Latin American hostile macroeconomic conditions generated permanent mutations 
in firms’ investment behaviours. These induced firms to prefer flexibility and low-
                                                     
47 In this section we will focus on the first two aspects. For a discussion of the latter, see Ocampo 
(2002, 2004). 
48 In the structuralist interpretation, investments are discouraged by cyclical overvaluation of the ex-
change rate. These overvaluations are caused by two structural factors: the Dutch disease and exces-
sive capital inflows. 
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risk high-returns investments (e.g. Fanelli and Frenkel, 1996; Katz, 1996, 2001; 
Cimoli and Katz, 2003). What is more, the elimination of these mechanisms and 
the unsuccessful attempts at macroeconomic stabilisation perpetuated and rein-
forced the adaptive defensive behaviours described above. In so doing, they redi-
rected structural and technological change in Latin America towards natural re-
source-based industries. Firms in natural-resource based industries reacted better 
to the reforms, while firms in knowledge-intensive industries were the most hit 
(Cimoli and Katz, 2003). By removing protection and incentive mechanisms to the 
development of national engineering-intensive industries, neoliberal policies halted 
processes of capability accumulation in Latin American R&D and engineering-
intensive firms (Katz, 2000b, 2001; Cimoli and Katz, 2003; Cimoli and Correa, 
2005). 
In all industries, trade liberalisation pushed imports up and macroeconomic stabili-
sation contracted domestic demand. Consequently, many Latin American firms 
were forced out of the market. Evidence of these dynamics is based on a long se-
ries of case studies (e.g. Katz, 1986; Mizala, 1992; Bercovich and Katz, 1997). 
In light of all this, structuralists conclude that the lack of recognition of macroeco-
nomic instability as a structural phenomenon explains why neoliberal policies failed 
to generate truly stable and favourable macroeconomic conditions. 
5.3 Methodology and approach 
Methodology 
This paper explores the determinants of firms’ investments in manufacturing using 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The World Bank ran comparable surveys 
from 2002 to 2013 in several developed and developing countries. Details on the 
countries and years covered by this study can be found in Table C.1 (Appendix C). 
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of firms’ investments over sales, where 
investment is defined as expenditure for the acquisition of machinery and equip-
ment.49 In the dataset, 52% of the firms report zero investments. Any regression 
                                                     
49 In the literature, firms’ investments were also introduced as the logarithm of the ratio of invest-
ment over sales (Farla, 2014) and the ratio of investments over capital stock or value added (Bigsten 
et al., 1999, 2005). 
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that ignores these zeros and non-randomness of this selection would produce bi-
ased results. In these cases, Heckman selection models should be estimated.50  
Heckman selection models correct for the selection bias by estimating two separate 
equations: a selection and an outcome equation. The selection equation models the 
choice of whether to invest or not and is estimated by a probit model. The out-
come equation models firms’ investment levels. In Heckman selection models, the 
two equations are linked by the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ) that corrects for the selec-
tion bias. Given that these two equations are separately estimated, the Heckman 
selection model allows for investment choices and investment levels to be ex-
plained by different factors. Having different variables in the two equations also 
limits the collinearity caused by the insertion of λ.51 
This study postulates that firms’ investment behaviours are determined by firms 
and countries’ characteristics. Because firms are nested within countries, data pre-
sent a hierarchical structure. Single-level models are not suitable because the as-
sumption that observations are independent is violated. Therefore, we estimate 
multilevel models, also referred to as mixed effects models (because they contain 
fixed and random effects). The random component is made of the random country 
effects that are added to the fixed effect model, so that: 
 =	 +		 +	 +  
Where  and 	 are the fixed effect parameters to be estimated,  are the coun-
try effects, and  is the error term. Because country effects are modelled as ran-
dom effects, they are not directly estimated. Instead, 

,  the variance of the coun-
try effects, is estimated and reported. 
Multilevel models have been mostly used in behavioural economics, sociology, ge-
ography, and biology. However, because it is reasonable to assume that several 
economic data present hierarchical structures, scholars have recently started to use 
multilevel analysis to explain firms’ innovation (Srholec, 2011), entrepreneurship 
(Sanditov and Verspagen, 2011), and firms’ investments (Farla, 2014). 
                                                     
50 Another way to handle selection problems in panel data models like ours is discussed in 
Wooldridge (1995). 
51 In order to check for collinearity, we regress λ against the explanatory variables and check the R2. 
High R2 is a symptom of high collinearity. 
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In order to test whether firms’ investment behaviours are associated with structural 
macroeconomic conditions, we estimate regressions with country means and 
within transformations of the country variables. This is feasible because during 
2002-2010, the Enterprise Surveys covered some countries more than once. Esti-
mating a model with macroeconomic variables transformed into country means 
corresponds to estimating a between-effects model, common in panel data analy-
sis. This model is generally used to look at cross-country differences. Estimating a 
model using within transformations of macroeconomic variables corresponds to 
estimating a within, or fixed effect, model. In contrast to between-effects models, 
these models are designed to analyse variations within countries over time.52 
Approach 
Macroeconomic variables 
This paper investigates the effect of macroeconomic policies on firms’ investment 
decisions. Policy areas of interest can be summarised under the following headings: 
macroeconomic stability, financial reforms, trade reforms -which include trade lib-
eralisation and exchange rate management-, and tax reforms. 
In the empirical literature, efforts towards macroeconomic stabilisation are cap-
tured by fiscal balance and external debt as percentages of GDP, and inflation (e.g. 
Serven and Solimano, 1991; Bleaney, 1996).53 According to neoliberals, fiscal bal-
ances are expected to have a positive effect on investments, while a negative sign is 
expected on the coefficient of external debt and inflation. 
The average ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP is a common measure of financial 
deepening and is expected to have a positive and significant impact on invest-
ments. Following neoclassical theory, a negative coefficient of real interest rates is 
expected.54 
Trade liberalisation entails the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to import and 
a competitive exchange rate that promotes exports. We use two indicators of do-
mestic trade protection: average tariffs and an index of selectivity of tariffs (the 
                                                     
52 It is worth mentioning that despite estimating a fixed effect model, our estimations do include 
country fixed effects because multilevel models include country effects. 
53 Alternatively, government consumption in GDP has also been used in the literature (e.g. Easterly et 
al., 1997; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003). 
54 Most developing countries cannot be considered financially repressed anymore. Moreover, already 
in early studies (e.g. Greene and Villanueva, 1991), negative relationship between investments and 
interest rates was found. 
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share of tariff lines with international peaks).55 Negative coefficients of these indi-
cators would be in line with Washington Consensus prescriptions. For the ex-
change rate, we rely on the undervaluation index developed by Rodrik (2008). The 
expected sign of the undervaluation index is uncertain. In the tradable sector, un-
dervalued exchange rates push exports; this stimulates investments and generates 
foreign exchange to acquire imported goods. This would justify a positive coeffi-
cient of the undervaluation index. In the non-tradable sector or in cases of high 
dependence on imported capital goods, the cost of new imported goods is higher 
than the benefit in terms of exports. This would justify a negative coefficient of the 
undervaluation index. 
In the literature (e.g. Dincecco, 2011; Besley and Persson, 2008), tax revenues are 
used as a proxy of state capacity. Following this interpretation, a positive sign on 
tax revenues is expected. 
As mentioned, structuralists advocate for countercyclical fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. Because the years under analysis comprise the international financial crisis, 
fiscal and monetary expansionary policies can be seen as counter-cyclical. This 
would justify a negative coefficient of fiscal balance and a positive coefficient of 
external debt. Because few countries in our sample have an inflation rate higher 
than 20 or 30%, a significant negative impact of inflation on investments is not ex-
pected. With respect to financial deepening, a negative sign of M2 to GDP would 
be explained in light of the negative effects that excessive capital inflow exerts on 
investments in manufacturing by worsening the tendency of the exchange rate to 
appreciate. As for trade policies, positive and significant coefficients of average tar-
iffs and tariff selectivity are justified because tariffs ensure protection of the do-
mestic market and so guarantee returns on investments and because import restric-
tions can be used to neutralize the Dutch disease. 
Firm-level variables 
The choice of whether to invest or not also depends on some firms’ characteristics. 
In particular, we assume that established large firms are more likely to invest than 
small and young firms are. Firms’ size and age also affect firms’ investment levels: 
established larger firms are expected to invest more than small and young firms 
(e.g. Bigsten et al., 1999). We also hypothesise that exporting firms are more likely 
                                                     
55 In the literature trade openness indexes, like the ratio of manufactured exports in GDP or total 
exports, or the ratio of import plus exports over GDP have also been used. 
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to invest than non-exporting firms are and that their export shares in sales do not 
affect current investment levels (even though they might affect future investment 
levels). This means that the variable export is a selection variable and will be only 
included in the selection equation. 
The literature on firms’ investments (e.g. Chirinko, 1993; Abel and Eberly, 1995; 
Barnett and Sakellaris, 1998) evidences the role of adjustment costs, intended as 
the costs that firms incur to acquire new capital goods (search costs, time to organ-
ise finances, and so on) and adjust production after the acquisition of new capital 
goods (licenses, installation, training of personnel, and so on). The World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys do not contain information to account for firms’ adjustment 
costs. These, however, are at least partially captured by firms’ sizes, because larger 
firms are expected to face lower adjustment costs than smaller firms. 
Previous studies also identified labour costs and financial constraints as important 
determinants of firms’ investments. The inclusion of variables that account for la-
bour costs (wages as percentage of sales) and financial obstacles would reduce the 
number of observations by 16% and 69% respectively. For this reason, these vari-
ables are not included in the base model, but robustness checks are conducted to 
verify that their exclusion does not affect the main results of the study. 
Control variables  
In all specifications, we control for GDP per capita, GDP growth, and terms of 
trade. We expect firms in countries with higher GDP and higher GDP growth to 
be more prone to invest. Firms’ investment levels, however, are not expected to be 
larger if the country where the firm operates is richer, or grows faster. We include 
terms of trade to control for issues related to the Dutch disease, assuming that 
high terms of trade in developing countries are a sign of high dependence on natu-
ral resources. Manufacturers in resource-dependent countries are expected to have 
lower propensities to invest. We also assume that terms of trade do not affect the 
size of investments, which are more related to industry characteristics. Hence, 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and terms of trade are included only as selection 
variables.  
We account for sectoral heterogeneities and industry differences in the cost of 
capital goods by including industry dummies in all models. Industries are defined 
in the following way: 1) leather, garments, and textiles; 2) agroindustry, food, and 
beverages; 3) metals and machinery; 4) electronics; 5) auto, auto components, and 
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other transport equipment; 6) chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 7) wood and furni-
ture, non-metallic and plastic materials, paper and other manufacturing. 
5.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 present basic descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Details on 
the definition and sources of our variables are in Table C.2 (Appendix C). 
Table 5.1. Basic descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Overall Between Within 
Micro-variables 
Investment to sales (ln) 27507 -4.21 2.56   
Investment to capital (ln) 23274 -1.69 1.93   
Age (ln) 76997 2.72 0.85   
Size (ln) 77154 3.62 1.52   
Export (% of sales) 77684 16.99 32.13   
Indicators of macroeconomic policies 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) 64914 -1.50 3.50 4.39 1.56 
External debt (% of GDP) 70292 42.58 28.66 33.34 14.03 
Inflation (ln)56 76885 1.74 0.77 0.73 0.42 
M2 (% of GDP) 76164 59.70 38.61 39.10 6.65 
Interest rate 67496 7.53 9.92 7.60 3.43 
Undervaluation index 69565 0.15 0.43 0.39 0.17 
Tax revenues (% of GDP) 66103 15.10 5.81 6.20 1.11 
Average tariff 52285 10.24 4.16 3.90 1.05 
Tariff selectivity 52285 1.56 3.48 3.17 0.87 
Country-level control variables 
GDP per capita (ln) 77249 8.47 0.91 1.10 0.14 
GDP per capita growth 77725 3.68 3.89 3.85 2.58 
Terms of trade (ln) 77598 4.67 0.26 0.25 0.11 
 
                                                     
56 Following Easterly et al. (1997), we include inflation as the logarithm of 1 plus inflation. 
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The average firm is small and young and exports a small share of its production. 
With respect to macroeconomic variables, small fiscal deficits prevail, average in-
flation is low, and average external debt is around 40% of GDP. Average tariffs are 
roughly 10%, with a maximum value of 21%. Given the time span of this study, 
these numbers are no surprising. After the Washington Consensus, several coun-
tries have kept their macroeconomics in order. Moreover, also because of WTO’s 
regulations, the room for trade protection and export-based subsidies is at best re-
duced. Finally, when we look at within and between countries variations in coun-
try-level variables, we notice that between countries variations are larger than 
within variations for all variables. 
By taking only the subsample of firms for which all explanatory variables are avail-
able, the sample shrinks to 37333 firms. Sample means for the subsample of inves-
tors and non-investors and for the pooled sample are reported in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2. Sample means: investors, non-investors, and pooled sample 
Variable Investors Non-investors Pooled 
Micro-variables 
Age 2.78 2.70 2.74 
Employees 4.13 3.41 3.78 
Export 0.20 0.15 0.17 
Indicators of macroeconomic policies 
Fiscal balance -1.23 -1.34 -1.28 
External debt 39.03 40.70 39.83 
Inflation 1.71 1.82 1.77 
M2 58.72 57.47 58.12 
Interest rate 9.21 7.33 8.31 
Undervaluation index 0.15 0.33 0.24 
Tax revenue 16.11 15.09 15.67 
Average tariffs 10.27 10.99 10.58 
Selectivity index 0.75 1.18 0.93 
Country-level control variables 
GDP per capita 8.49 8.34 8.42 
GDP per capita growth 3.84 4.61 4.21 
Terms of trade 4.69 4.65 4.67 
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Sample means by and large support our hypotheses. Investors are older and larger 
and export more than non-investors. Investors face slightly smaller fiscal deficits 
and external debts, lower inflation, and lower and less selective import tariffs. In-
vesting firms are in countries with higher GDP per capita and tax revenues, and 
more developed financial systems (higher ratios of broad money as percentage of 
GDP). Surprisingly, investing firms face lower GDP growth and higher interest 
rates than non-investors. 
Several country-level macroeconomic variables included in the analysis are likely to 
be highly correlated. Table C.3 in Appendix C reports the correlation table for the 
macroeconomic variables and the country random effects. Few variables show par-
ticularly high correlations. As it could be expected, the correlation between M2 and 
inflation is -0.6166. Because of the higher fiscal capacity of richer countries, GDP 
per capita and tax revenues are also highly correlated (0.629). Country random ef-
fects show a particularly high correlation with interest rates (-0.705). 
Results 
Table 5.3 reports the results of the probit selection and outcome models for two 
specifications of our base model. In the first specification (Colums 1 and 2), we 
include all explanatory variables, except for average tariffs and the index of tariff 
selectivity. In the second specification (Columns 3 and 4), average tariffs and tariff 
selectivity are added. This is because of the high number of missing values for 
these two variables.  
The output of the multilevel Heckman selection model is divided in two parts: a 
fixed and random part. The first part includes all the β of the explanatory variables. 
The second part refers to the country unobserved effects. For these effects, the 
standard deviations συ are estimated and reported. In the table, we also report rho, 
the intraclass correlation coefficient. Rho is the ratio of the level 2 variance over 
total residual variance ( = 	
συ
συ+σe
)	. Rho accounts for how the variance divides 
among levels. Therefore, in cases of 2-levels models like ours, rho represents the 
percentage of variance at the country level. 
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Table 5.3. Base model 
 
Selection – Model 1 Outcome – Model 1 Selection – Model 2 Outcome – Model 2 
 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.089 0.010 *** -0.171 0.023 *** -0.115 0.013 *** -0.226 0.027 *** 
size 0.237 0.006 *** -0.122 0.013 *** 0.235 0.008 *** -0.108 0.016 *** 
export 0.029 0.027 
    
0.054 0.035 
    
balance -0.196 0.012 *** -0.413 0.013 *** -0.170 0.017 *** -0.345 0.016 *** 
debt 0.006 0.001 *** 0.012 0.002 *** 0.026 0.002 *** 0.078 0.004 *** 
inflation -0.314 0.027 *** -0.178 0.051 *** 0.721 0.127 *** -0.145 0.178 
 
M2 -0.020 0.004 *** -0.003 0.005 
 
0.008 0.006 
 
-0.006 0.009 
 
interest rate 0.011 0.007 
 
0.053 0.009 *** 0.064 0.011 *** 0.158 0.016 *** 
underval -4.079 0.172 *** -3.293 0.174 *** -5.092 0.226 *** -7.117 0.309 *** 
tax revenue 0.235 0.021 *** 0.244 0.018 *** 0.102 0.035 ** 0.486 0.033 *** 
tariff 
      
-0.121 0.015 *** -0.251 0.028 *** 
selectivity 
      
0.001 0.054 
 
0.028 0.076 
 
GDP 3.894 0.280 *** 
   
2.062 0.421 *** 
   
growth -0.307 0.010 *** 
   
-0.057 0.013 *** 
   
tot -1.247 0.146 *** 
   
1.006 0.262 *** 
   
λ 
   
0.182 0.037 *** 
   
0.464 0.085 *** 
ind1 -0.149 0.024 *** -0.180 0.053 *** -0.201 0.030 *** -0.152 0.061 * 
ind2 -0.034 0.025 
 
-0.023 0.054 
 
-0.077 0.030 * 0.003 0.061 
 
ind3 -0.097 0.030 ** 0.147 0.063 * -0.101 0.039 ** 0.146 0.073 * 
ind4 0.063 0.039 
 
-0.032 0.088 
 
-0.013 0.054 
 
-0.085 0.116 
 
ind5 0.105 0.046 * 0.088 0.104 
 
0.131 0.071 + 0.083 0.145 
 
ind6 0.045 0.031 
 
-0.323 0.066 *** 0.026 0.038 
 
-0.256 0.073 *** 
συ 4.595 1.000 *** 2.123 0.231 *** 2.822 0.783 *** 5.155 0.591 *** 
firms 36992 18694 25881 14151 
countries 55 53 45 44 
rho 0.955 0.453 0.888 0.829 
LR -17881.947 -42532.48 -11626.751 -32307.592 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: The constant is included in the estimations, but is not reported. 
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Results suggest that macroeconomic factors are important determinants of firms’ 
investments. Fiscal deficits and external debts are associated with higher invest-
ments. The impact of inflation is difficult to assess. In the base model, inflation 
negatively affects investment choices and levels. In the second specification, infla-
tion becomes positive and significant in the probit model and negative and insig-
nificant in the outcome equation. When we move to financial reforms, the coeffi-
cient of the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2) is significant only in the probit 
equation of the base model. Its negative sign supports the view against financial 
deepening reforms. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of interest rates is 
positive and significant in almost all equations.  
With respect to trade policies, the consistently negative sign of the undervaluation 
index can be justified in light of the high dependence of developing countries on 
imported capital goods and the low shares of export over sales of the firms in our 
sample. The coefficient of average tariff is negative and highly significant in both 
equations, while the tariff selectivity index is positive, but not significant.  
With respect to firm level variables, results suggest that younger and larger firms 
are more likely to invest. However, smaller firms are those that invest more. Firms’ 
exports, instead, do not affect the choice of whether to invest or not. As a final 
remark, the high values of rho, the intraclass correlation coefficient, show that in-
cluding country effects is necessary, owing to the high degree of cross-country het-
erogeneity in the data.57 
Because macroeconomic factors are important determinant of firms’ investments, 
we continue our analysis by investigating how these macroeconomic factors influ-
ence investment behaviours. In particular, we are interested in understanding if the 
structural component of macroeconomic factors is associated with firms’ invest-
ments; that is, if macroeconomic conditions affect investments because they are 
structurally adverse or favourable. We distinguish two forms by which macroeco-
nomic factors can affect investments: by acting as structural conditions or as busi-
ness cycles. Methodologically, we account for the structural component by taking 
country means and for business cycles by looking at within country variations of 
macroeconomic factors.  
                                                     
57 These results are by and large robust to the exclusion of highly correlated variables (Table C.4 and 
Table C.5) and inclusion of time dummies (Table C.6). 
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In Table 5.4, we report the results of our base model expressed in terms of within 
variations (columns 1 and 2) and country averages (columns 3 and 4). In our third 
model (columns 5 and 6), we include both within variations and country means. 
Within transformations are denoted by the prefix w and country means by av. 
Country means also represent the Mundlak (1978) covariates, which act as controls 
for possible endogenous variables.  
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Despite descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 showed that variation in the data is 
mainly between countries rather than within countries, results of the econometric 
analysis demonstrate that within country variations explain investment behaviours 
more than their structural component. In model 1 and 3, coefficients of variables 
taken as within country variations are always significant, while in model 2 and 3 
very few coefficients of country means are significant. This occurs although de-
scriptive statistics showed that the higher variation in the data is between rather 
than within countries.  
If we look at within country variations, previous results are largely confirmed: fiscal 
deficits and external debts are positively associated with investments, while the un-
dervaluation index is negatively associated with investments. Compared to previ-
ous estimations, more stable results are found on inflation, ratio of broad money 
to GDP (M2), and terms of trade. The coefficient of inflation is always significant 
and negative. The coefficient of M2 to GDP is always negative and significant, 
which seems to corroborate the interpretation of negative effects of financial deep-
ening. Finally, the negative sign of the terms of trade’s coefficient seems to support 
structuralist theories on the consequences of the Dutch disease. According to 
structuralists, in resource-abundant developing countries higher terms of trade 
have two undesirable effects: they hinder export diversification and appreciate the 
exchange rate. However, given the negative sign of the coefficient of the under-
valuation index, our results only partially confirm the structuralist story. 
When we look at country means, few variables are significant. In the selection 
equation, the coefficients of external debt, the undervaluation index, tax revenues, 
and GDP per capita are significant. In the outcome equation, only the coefficients 
of interest rates and tax revenues are significant. Both sets of results are largely 
confirmed when we include within and between country variations simultaneously 
(model 3 in Table 5.4).  
We now investigate if firms within the same region react similarly to macroeco-
nomic conditions. The literature suggests that they might not. As mentioned in 
Section 5.2, structuralists argue that in Latin America chronic macroeconomic in-
stability permanently changed firms’ investment behaviours and induced them to 
adopt defensive investment strategies. These micro behaviours would explain low 
aggregate investment rates in Latin America. We check if this is the case by looking 
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at country effects by region (Table 5.5). These country effects are obtained from 
the base outcome model in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.5. Random country effects by region 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
sub-Saharan Africa -0.436 2.142 -6.376 3.006 
Latin America -0.334 1.230 -2.683 3.673 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
-0.029 2.325 -4.577 2.942 
Asia 1.912 0.920 -0.269 4.046 
Overall 0.516 1.812 -6.376 4.046 
 
Data show that country effects differ among regions and among countries within 
regions. Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa invest the least, which confirms previous 
empirical findings (e.g. Bigsten et al., 2005).58 In order to further investigate if (and 
how) our explanatory variables affect investment behaviours in different regions 
we run separate regressions for Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These regressions 
allow checking how different is the effect of macroeconomic factors in Latin 
America vis a vis Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 5.6 reports results of the se-
lection model for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia respectively. 
  
                                                     
58 Also, there is more heterogeneity among sub-Saharan countries that among Asian or Latin Ameri-
can countries. 
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Table 5.6. Selection equations, by region 
Latin America59 sub-Saharan Africa Asia 
 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.097 0.016 *** -0.062 0.025 * -0.092 0.020 *** 
size 0.207 0.011 *** 0.224 0.017 *** 0.255 0.010 *** 
export 0.148 0.053 ** 0.147 0.093 
 
0.032 0.039 
 
fiscal balance -0.320 0.024 *** -0.331 0.069 *** -0.381 0.173 * 
external debt 0.057 0.005 *** 0.002 0.004 
 
0.002 0.025 
 
inflation -0.840 0.210 *** 1.698 0.271 *** -0.522 0.076 *** 
M2 0.128 0.007 *** -0.015 0.021 
 
0.000 0.023 
 
interest rate -0.082 0.015 *** 0.010 0.017 
 
0.034 0.057 
 
undervaluation 2.796 0.362 *** -6.886 1.042 *** -4.522 1.920 * 
tax revenues 0.726 0.038 *** -0.103 0.058 + -0.135 0.094 
 
GDP per capita 11.070 0.772 *** 2.888 0.736 *** 1.227 1.381 
 
GDP growth -0.130 0.024 *** -0.138 0.035 *** -0.060 0.085 
 
terms of trade 2.289 0.318 *** -3.101 1.031 ** -1.916 0.740 ** 
ind1 -0.195 0.037 *** -0.172 0.061 ** -0.004 0.054 
 
ind2 -0.031 0.038 
 
-0.067 0.052 
 
0.097 0.060 
 
ind3 -0.080 0.050 
 
-0.060 0.066 
 
0.085 0.064 
 
ind4 -0.307 0.106 ** -0.053 0.216 
 
0.247 0.061 *** 
ind5 0.004 0.118 
    
0.253 0.066 *** 
ind6 -0.028 0.045 
 
0.115 0.084 
 
0.200 0.069 ** 
constant -126.319 6.864 *** -8.459 7.427 
 
1.869 8.865 
 
συ 6.214 0.609 *** 1.937 1.028 * 1.353 0.729 
 
firms 14401 5420 11863 
countries 15 14 11 
rho 0.975 0.79 0.647 
LR -6659.789 -2913.234 -6107.686 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Few results vary by region: those that vary the most are precisely those of interest 
to structuralists. According to these estimations, Latin American firms react to in-
                                                     
59 Results are robust to the exclusion of Argentina and Venezuela, the only two Latin American coun-
tries that were implementing heterodox macroeconomic policies in the period under analysis.  
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flation more like Asian firms than like sub-Saharan African firms. The coefficient 
of inflation is highly significant in all three regressions. Nevertheless, for Latin 
America and Asia, it is negative, while for Sub-Saharan Africa it is positive. Infla-
tion is generally lower in Asia than in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. This 
means that while it is more likely that Asian firms are sensitive to inflation, Latin 
American firms should be more used to it.  
The coefficient of undervaluation index, negative in all previous estimations, is still 
negative and significant in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but positive in Latin 
America. The positive sign of the undervaluation index indicates that firms invest 
more in the manufacturing industry if the exchange rate is undervalued. This result 
is interesting and confirms the view that for Latin America the tendency of the ex-
change rate to appreciate plays an important role in firms’ decisions to invest in the 
manufacturing industry.60  
The third interesting variable is terms of trade. The coefficient of terms of trade is 
significant in all three regressions and is positive for Latin America and negative 
for sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. This result is partly unexpected. Following the 
structuralist literature, we would have expected that favourable terms of trade di-
vert investments away from manufacturing (because Latin America exports mainly 
commodities). However, our results show the opposite and support the argument 
that high terms of trade allowed Latin America to alleviate the impact of the inter-
national financial crisis of the second half of the 2000s (e.g. De Gregorio, 2013).  
Finally, it is interesting to note that in the electronics industry (industry 4) the 
probability of investing is negative for firms in Latin America and positive for 
firms in Asia. Coefficients of the dummies of less traditional industries (transport, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals) are positive and significant only in the Asian case. 
This is consistent with the literature on sectoral catching up (e.g. Malerba and Nel-
son, 2012). 
Table 5.7 reports regression results of the outcome equations for Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. 
  
                                                     
60 Interestingly, the positive sign of the undervaluation index coincides with a positive and significant 
coefficient of firms’ export, indicating than undervaluation is crucial when firms export more. 
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Table 5.7. Outcome equations, by region 
Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.159 0.040 *** -0.198 0.052 *** -0.220 0.036 *** 
size -0.189 0.024 *** -0.095 0.043 * -0.060 0.028 * 
fiscal balance -0.517 0.034 *** 0.058 0.035 + -0.482 0.116 *** 
external debt 0.016 0.010 
 
0.017 0.003 *** 0.034 0.008 *** 
inflation 2.394 0.501 *** 2.793 0.266 *** -0.492 0.083 *** 
M2 0.234 0.022 *** 0.191 0.024 *** 0.028 0.01 ** 
interest rate 0.655 0.050 *** -0.024 0.012 + 0.082 0.022 *** 
undervaluation -9.369 0.530 *** -5.473 0.794 *** -3.863 0.629 *** 
tax revenues -0.143 0.104 
 
-1.109 0.086 *** -0.171 0.078 * 
λ 0.532 0.084 *** 0.051 0.342 
 
0.259 0.201 
 
ind1 -0.345 0.088 *** -0.082 0.124 
 
-0.214 0.092 * 
ind2 -0.194 0.087 * 0.439 0.109 *** -0.249 0.104 * 
ind3 0.038 0.102 
 
0.350 0.138 * 0.071 0.113 
 
ind4 -0.645 0.272 * -0.133 0.454 
 
-0.023 0.106 
 
ind5 0.134 0.212 
    
0.068 0.122 
 
ind6 -0.598 0.102 *** 0.103 0.173 
 
0.035 0.119 
 
constant -22.465 3.147 *** -0.209 3.122 
 
-4.259 1.137 *** 
συ 10.702 2.256 *** 10.942 2.309 *** 1.487 0.404 
 
firms 8120 3105 5950 
countries 15 14 11 
rho 0.943 0.959 0.393 
LR -19447.792 -7001.375 -12157.08 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Results are largely stable across regions. Only the effect of inflation varies: the co-
efficient of inflation is always highly significant, but is negative only for Asia. By 
comparing these results with those obtained in the selection equation, we can con-
clude that firms in sub-Saharan Africa are not discouraged by inflation, probably 
because inflation is a persistent condition. In Latin America, inflation discourages 
firms’ investment, but firms who decide to invest, invest more in presence of infla-
tion. Finally, in contrast with previous estimations where the sign of M2 was most 
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of the times negative, here we find a significant and positive coefficient of M2. 
This finding casts doubts on the robustness of previous results. 
5.5 Robustness checks 
In order to check the robustness of the results obtained so far, we test our model 
using the log of investment to capital as an alternative dependent variable. Capital 
is defined as the net book value of machinery, vehicles, and equipment. In terms of 
definitions, this variable is preferable to the one used so far. However, using in-
vestment to capital further reduces the number of observations because of missing 
data. Table 5.8 below shows the results of the outcome equation of the base model 
in Table 5.3 (so these lambdas are computed with the probit results of Table 5.3).  
Table 5.8. Base model with log of investment to capital as dependent variable 
Outcome –Model 1 Outcome – Model 2 
coef se sig coef se Sig 
age -0.148 0.019 *** -0.164 0.022 *** 
size -0.197 0.011 *** -0.171 0.013 *** 
fiscal balance -0.004 0.010 -0.007 0.011 
external debt 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
inflation -0.122 0.036 *** 0.314 0.078 *** 
M2 -0.011 0.002 *** -0.006 0.003 * 
interest rate 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.007 
undervaluation  -0.658 0.105 *** -1.069 0.151 *** 
tax revenue 0.072 0.011 *** 0.063 0.014 *** 
tariff -0.005 0.016 
selectivity 0.063 0.030 * 
λ 0.008 0.024 0.057 0.052 
constant -0.705 0.255 ** -1.798 0.377 *** 
συ 0.511 0.070 *** 0.574 0.089 *** 
firms 15963 11787 
countries 51 42 
rho 0.078 0.100 
LR -31785.241 -23224.915 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Industry dummies are included in the estimations. 
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The coefficient of fiscal balances and external debts lose significance, which partly 
downsize the role of fiscal discipline. As for Table 5.3, it is difficult to assess the 
effect of inflation -significant and negative in model 1 but significant and positive 
in model 2. Findings on M2, undervaluation, and tax revenues are confirmed. Fi-
nally, the coefficient of average tariffs is negative and insignificant, while the coef-
ficient of tariff selectivity is significant and positive.  
Table 5.9 replicates the regression results of Table 5.4 with the log of investment 
to capital as the dependent variable.   
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Table 5.9. Within and between variations with log of investment to capital as de-
pendent variable 
 
Outcome – Model 1 Outcome – Model 2 Outcome – Model 3 
 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.161 0.021 *** -0.216 0.027 *** -0.165 0.021 *** 
size -0.208 0.014 *** 0.046 0.070 -0.196 0.013 *** 
w_balance 0.010 0.014 0.003 0.013 
w_debt 0.004 0.001 * 0.004 0.001 ** 
w_infl -0.114 0.041 ** -0.125 0.040 ** 
w_M2 -0.031 0.005 *** -0.033 0.005 *** 
w_intrate -0.011 0.008 -0.007 0.008 
w_lnunderval -0.920 0.259 *** -1.184 0.236 *** 
w_taxrev 0.121 0.017 *** 0.125 0.017 *** 
av_balance 0.011 0.024 -0.018 0.027 
av_debt -0.004 0.004 0.000 0.004 
av_infl -0.076 0.142 -0.050 0.173 
av_M2 -0.006 0.003 + -0.010 0.004 * 
av_intrate 0.017 0.010 + 0.005 0.011 
av_lnunderval -0.865 0.377 * -0.304 0.363 
av_taxrev 0.065 0.016 *** 0.048 0.018 ** 
λ -0.034 0.069 2.024 0.547 *** 0.059 0.065 
constant -0.366 0.151 * -2.991 0.768 *** -0.705 0.552 
συ 0.588 0.073 *** 0.411 0.062 *** 0.506 0.075 *** 
firms 13534 13534 13534 
countries 38 38 38 
rho 0.099 0.051 0.075 
LR -27030.328 -27079.202 -27041.764 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Industry dummies are included in the estimations, but are not reported. 
 
Results of Table 5.9 confirm the story emerged from Table 5.4; that is, within 
country variations are significant determinants of firms’ investments more often 
than between country variations. Signs of coefficients are also largely confirmed. 
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Table 5.10 replicates the regression results of Table 5.7 with the log of investment 
to capital as the dependent variable. 
Table 5.10. Outcome equation, by region, with log of investment to capital as de-
pendent variable 
Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia 
coef se sig coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.112 0.028 *** -0.053 0.046 
 
-0.290 0.037 *** 
size -0.245 0.016 *** -0.136 0.035 *** -0.091 0.029 ** 
fiscal balance 0.090 0.020 *** -0.081 0.026 ** -0.568 0.126 *** 
external debt 0.001 0.005 
 
-0.009 0.002 *** 0.024 0.008 ** 
inflation 0.957 0.232 *** 0.908 0.218 *** -0.445 0.086 *** 
M2 -0.059 0.009 *** 0.021 0.013 
 
0.022 0.011 * 
interest rate -0.006 0.017 
 
0.029 0.011 ** 0.052 0.023 * 
underval -2.739 0.244 *** 1.373 0.603 * -3.359 0.663 *** 
tax revenue -0.079 0.040 * 0.061 0.039 
 
-0.067 0.088 
 
λ -0.106 0.039 ** 0.633 0.248 * 0.516 0.210 * 
ind1 0.044 0.063 
 
-0.171 0.112 
 
0.176 0.095 + 
ind2 -0.010 0.062 
 
0.091 0.099 
 
0.249 0.107 * 
ind3 -0.013 0.071 
 
-0.213 0.123 + 0.310 0.115 ** 
ind4 -0.042 0.187 
 
1.039 0.382 ** 0.338 0.108 ** 
ind5 0.034 0.146 
    
0.080 0.124 
 
ind6 0.062 0.072 
 
-0.013 0.156 
 
0.145 0.123 
 
constant 2.347 0.828 ** -4.945 0.835 *** -3.419 1.291 ** 
συ 0.794 0.225 
 
1.217 0.521 
 
1.623 0.465 + 
firms 6929 2431 5575 
countries 14 14 10 
rho 0.182 0.311 0.450 
LR -13504.798 -4945.685 -11226.308 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Most stable results are obtained for Asia. As for Latin America, the only confirmed 
findings are those on inflation and exchange rates. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
Low firms’ investments are the key problem of development. Both neoclassical 
and heterodox economists argued that structural macroeconomic conditions hin-
der investments in developing countries. These strands of literature, however, do 
not agree on what structural means and how to improve or counterbalance these 
structural conditions.  
According to neoclassical economists, interventionist governments and excessive 
government spending create macroeconomic instability and so adverse structural 
macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, the solution is to limit the role of the state 
that should only aim at maintaining macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline. 
Heterodox economists, and especially structuralists, criticised this approach and 
the neoliberal policies adopted in many developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. They argue that structural macroeconomic conditions are structural because 
they are related to productive structures. In order to counterbalance these naturally 
adverse macroeconomic conditions, governments should act proactively by im-
plementing counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies, and designing mecha-
nisms that neutralise the Dutch disease.  
Despite the long debate and the variety of macroeconomic approaches experi-
mented so far, there is little agreement on which macroeconomic policies govern-
ments should implement to stimulate private investments. This chapter addressed 
this issue by empirically testing these approaches. It estimates a multilevel 
Heckman selection model of firms’ investments in developing countries from 2002 
to 2010. The analysis is novel in various aspects. One of the most important is the 
use of firm level data: while extant empirical studies used national aggregate in-
vestments, the use of micro data allows investigating the micro-macro interactions 
that shape investment patterns. In this chapter, the thesis tries to understand how 
firms react to macroeconomic factors and if these macroeconomic factors are 
structural conditions affecting firms’ investment decisions. 
With respect to the first question, our econometric exercise indicates that macro-
economic factors are important determinants of firms’ investments. In particular, 
fiscal deficits and external debts are positively related to firms’ investments. Be-
cause the period of analysis includes the recent international crisis, these policies 
might be considered counter-cyclical. These results, however, are not robust to dif-
ferent specifications. We also find unstable results for financial deepening and in-
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flation: while negative coefficients seem to prevail, the instability of the results calls 
for cautious interpretations. This instability is consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Levine and Zervos, 1993).  
According to structuralists, exchange rate management should be one of the key 
areas of macroeconomic policy-making in developing countries. Cyclical overvalua-
tions of the exchange rate restrict firms’ access to foreign markets. Our data con-
firm that exchange rate management has a clear impact on private investments and 
show that undervalued exchange rates are negatively associated with firms’ invest-
ments. As explained in Section 5.3, the effect of the exchange rate on investments 
depends on the relative importance of exports versus imports. The negative coeffi-
cient of the exchange rate indicates that firms are more sensitive to the higher 
costs of imported goods than to the easier access to international markets. In other 
words, although undervalued exchange rates could spur investments by making 
exports more competitive, undervalued exchange rates also increase the cost of 
imported capital goods. Using these data, the second effect seems to prevail. This 
might also be related to the low export shares characterising firms in this dataset. 
With respect to the second question, we estimated within and between effects 
models. In the regressions with macroeconomic variables transformed into their 
within country variations (including country fixed effects that do not vary across 
countries), macroeconomic factors are more significant than in the regressions 
with macroeconomic variables transformed into country averages. This occurs al-
though descriptive statistics showed that in the data between countries variations 
are larger than within country variations for all country-level variables. In light of 
this, we might have expected between countries variations to be more significantly 
associated with investments than within country variations.  
This finding should not surprise. It is well established that investments are volatile 
and follow business cycles. A number of studies (Dosi et al., 2005, 2008, 2010; 
Meijers et al., 2014) developed micro-founded evolutionary models of business cy-
cles where firms generate business cycles fluctuations with their investment deci-
sions. This paper contributes to this literature by providing supporting empirical 
evidence on the micro-foundations of business cycles. 
This study also tests if firms in Latin America react differently to macroeconomic 
factors, by estimating separate models for firms in Latin America, sub-Saharan Af-
rica, and Asia. Results show that firms in the three regions react similarly to almost 
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all macroeconomic variables. Dissimilar reactions are found in response to infla-
tion and exchange rates. Inflation discourages firms’ investments only in Latin 
America and Asia, even though inflation levels in Latin America are more likely to 
be similar to those of Africa than Asia. However, in Latin America and Africa 
firms that chose to invest, invest more in inflationary periods. The analysis also 
shows that undervalued exchange rates are positively related to investments only 
for firms in Latin America. These findings partly confirm structuralist theories on 
the impact of inflation and exchange rates’ overvaluations on investments in 
manufacturing. 
However, the finding that investments are associated more with business cycles 
rather than structural macroeconomic conditions partly contradicts the structuralist 
explanation of low investment rates in Latin America. Structuralists argue that in 
response to chronic macroeconomic instability, firms in Latin America adopted 
defensive investment strategies. By showing that firms’ investments follow busi-
ness cycles, this paper confirms that macroeconomic volatility is a major determi-
nant of investments.  
To conclude, this chapter shows that macroeconomic factors are important deter-
minants of firms’ investments. Firms’ investment behaviours follow business cy-
cles’ fluctuations: by influencing these fluctuations, macroeconomic policies prove 
to be significant determinants of firms’ investments. This result bears important 
policy implications as it provides empirical evidence in support of counter-cyclical 
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. Based on this evidence, macroeco-
nomic policies should therefore manage business cycles. This agenda has been 
strongly advocated for by several strands of heterodox economists, among which 
structuralist economists. 
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Appendix C 
Table C.1. Countries and number of firms 
Country year N. firms % Country year N. of firms % 
Albania_2002 61 0.16 China_2003 1,156 3.1 
Angola_2006 271 0.73 Colombia_2006 648 1.74 
Angola_2010 47 0.13 Colombia_2010 392 1.05 
Argentina_2006 741 1.98 Costa Rica_2010 185 0.5 
Argentina_2010 499 1.34 Dem. Rep. of Congo_2006 191 0.51 
Armenia_2005 227 0.61 Dem. Rep. of Congo_2010 46 0.12 
Armenia_2009 58 0.16 Dominican Republic_2005 165 0.44 
Azerbaijan_2009 52 0.14 Dominican Republic_2010 65 0.17 
Bangladesh_2002 976 2.61 Ecuador_2003 427 1.14 
Bangladesh_2007 663 1.78 Ecuador_2006 390 1.04 
Belarus_2002 42 0.11 Egypt_2004 971 2.6 
Belarus_2005 55 0.15 Ethiopia_2002 371 0.99 
Belarus_2008 58 0.16 Georgia_2002 34 0.09 
Bhutan_2009 37 0.1 Georgia_2005 49 0.13 
Bolivia_2006 404 1.08 Georgia_2008 51 0.14 
Bolivia_2010 69 0.18 Guatemala_2003 434 1.16 
Bosnia and Herzegovina_2009 81 0.22 Guatemala_2006 448 1.2 
Botswana_2006 145 0.39 Guatemala_2010 171 0.46 
Botswana_2010 53 0.14 Honduras_2003 450 1.21 
Brazil_2003 1,630 4.37 Honduras_2006 369 0.99 
Brazil_2009 881 2.36 Honduras_2010 21 0.06 
Bulgaria_2002 49 0.13 Hungary_2002 49 0.13 
Bulgaria_2004 325 0.87 Hungary_2005 359 0.96 
Bulgaria_2005 58 0.16 Hungary_2009 56 0.15 
Bulgaria_2007 577 1.55 India_2002 1,475 3.95 
Bulgaria_2009 55 0.15 India_2006 2,010 5.38 
Cape Verde_2006 37 0.1 Indonesia_2003 709 1.9 
Cape Verde_2009 25 0.07 Indonesia_2009 291 0.78 
Chile_2004 757 2.03 Jordan_2006 353 0.95 
Chile_2006 691 1.85 Kenya_2003 209 0.56 
Chile_2010 446 1.19 Kenya_2007 214 0.57 
China_2002 957 2.56 Lao PDR_2006 102 0.27 
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Table C.1. Countries and number of firms in the study (Cont.d) 
Country year N. firms % Country year N. firms % 
Lao PDR_2009 47 0.13 Romania_2005 386 1.03 
Lesotho_2003 55 0.15 Romania_2009 100 0.27 
Madagascar_2005 275 0.74 Serbia_2009 88 0.24 
Madagascar_2009 77 0.21 South Africa_2003 573 1.53 
Malaysia_2002 561 1.5 South Africa_2007 680 1.82 
Mauritius_2009 101 0.27 Sri Lanka_2004 417 1.12 
Mexico_2006 1,124 3.01 Sri Lanka_2011 86 0.23 
Mexico_2010 615 1.65 Tajikistan_2003 96 0.26 
Moldova_2003 103 0.28 Tanzania_2003 242 0.65 
Moldova_2005 207 0.55 Tanzania_2006 282 0.76 
Moldova_2009 60 0.16 Thailand_2004 1,385 3.71 
Mongolia_2009 87 0.23 Uganda_2003 256 0.69 
Mozambique_2007 341 0.91 Uganda_2006 334 0.89 
Nigeria_2007 463 1.24 Ukraine_2002 136 0.36 
Paraguay_2006 431 1.15 Ukraine_2005 180 0.48 
Paraguay_2010 83 0.22 Ukraine_2008 250 0.67 
Peru_2002 117 0.31 Uruguay_2006 391 1.05 
Peru_2006 361 0.97 Uruguay_2010 199 0.53 
Peru_2010 515 1.38 Venezuela_2006 282 0.76 
Philippines_2003 618 1.66 Zambia_2002 169 0.45 
Philippines_2009 286 0.77 Zambia_2007 304 0.81 
Romania_2002 82 0.22 Total 37,333 100 
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Table C.2. Details, source, and coverage of explanatory variables in the study 
Variable Details Source Coverage 
Indicators of macroeconomic policies 
Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) WDI 2002-12 
Interest rate Real interest rate (%) WDI 2002-12 
Undervaluation 
index 
Real exchange rate adjusted for the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (Rodrik, 2008) 
Built with data 
from PWT 
2002-11 
Government 
budget sur-
plus/GDP 
Revenue (including grants) minus expense, mi-
nus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 
WDI 2002-12 
Foreign 
debt/GDP 
Total external debt stocks to gross national in-
come. 
WDI 2002-12 
M2/GDP Ratio of broad money over GDP WDI 2002-12 
Tax reve-
nue/GDP 
Compulsory transfers to the central government WDI 2002-11 
Average tariffs 
Unweighted average of most favoured nation 
rates for all products subject to tariffs calculated 
for all traded goods 
WDI 2002-11 
Share of tariff 
lines with inter-
national peaks 
Share of lines in the tariff schedule that are set 
on a per unit basis or that combine ad valorem 
and per unit rates 
WDI 2002-11 
Country-level control variables 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP), constant 2005 prices 
WDI 2002-12 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
WDI 2002-12 
Terms of trade 
Net barter terms of trade (the ratio of the ex-
port unit value index to the import unit value 
index) 
UNCTAD and 
WDI 
2002-12 
Firm-level control variables 
Age Logarithm of years since establishment 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
2002-13 
Size 
Logarithm of number of permanent full-time 
workers 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
2002-13 
Export 
Proportion of total sales that are exported di-
rectly and indirectly 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
2002-13 
Industry Industry dummies 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
2002-13 
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Table C.4. Robustness check: selection equation without correlated variables 
Without M2 Without M2 and taxrev 
coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.089 0.010 *** -0.092 0.010 *** 
size 0.239 0.006 *** 0.237 0.006 *** 
export 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.027 
fiscal balance -0.188 0.012 *** -0.117 0.009 *** 
external debt 0.006 0.001 *** 0.008 0.001 *** 
inflation -0.329 0.026 *** -0.302 0.026 *** 
interest rate 0.026 0.007 *** 0.046 0.006 *** 
undervaluation -3.863 0.166 *** -3.970 0.165 *** 
tax revenue 0.179 0.016 *** 
GDP 3.983 0.282 *** 5.055 0.274 *** 
GDP growth -0.313 0.010 *** -0.311 0.010 *** 
tot -0.856 0.118 *** -0.438 0.111 *** 
I_industry1 -0.160 0.024 *** -0.151 0.024 *** 
I_industry2 -0.037 0.025 -0.027 0.025 
I_industry3 -0.030 0.026 -0.025 0.026 
I_industry4 0.038 0.031 0.051 0.031 + 
constant -30.773 2.493 *** -39.086 2.388 *** 
συ 4.469 0.985 *** 4.649 1.032 *** 
firms 36992 36992 
countries 55 55 
rho 0.952 0.956 
LR -17906.440 -17979.866 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C.5. Robustness check: outcome equation without correlated variables  
Without M2 Without M2 and taxrev 
coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.169 0.023 *** -0.175 0.023 *** 
size -0.125 0.013 *** -0.115 0.013 *** 
fiscal balance -0.414 0.013 *** -0.372 0.013 *** 
external debt 0.012 0.002 *** 0.010 0.002 *** 
inflation -0.180 0.051 *** 0.066 0.047 
interest rate 0.054 0.008 *** 0.079 0.009 *** 
undervaluation -3.247 0.164 *** -3.852 0.168 *** 
tax revenue 0.241 0.018 *** 
λ 0.169 0.037 *** 0.211 0.043 *** 
I_industry1 -0.170 0.053 ** -0.154 0.053 ** 
I_industry2 -0.021 0.054 -0.014 0.054 
I_industry3 0.098 0.056 + 0.114 0.057 * 
I_industry4 -0.320 0.066 *** -0.311 0.067 *** 
constant -8.263 0.435 *** -4.956 0.364 *** 
συ 2.127 0.226 *** 2.281 0.260 *** 
firms 18694 18694 
countries 53 53 
rho 0.454 0.487 
LR -42530.032 -42607.509 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C.6. Robustness check: time dummies 
Selection equation Outcome equation 
coef se sig coef se sig 
age -0.101 0.011 *** -0.157 0.022 *** 
size 0.229 0.006 *** -0.194 0.015 *** 
export 0.040 0.028 
fiscal balance -0.057 0.015 *** 0.001 0.017 
external debt 0.004 0.001 *** 0.007 0.002 *** 
inflation -0.384 0.041 *** -0.299 0.067 *** 
M2 -0.018 0.004 *** -0.002 0.004 
interest rate -0.018 0.008 * -0.025 0.010 * 
undervaluation 0.473 0.230 * -0.835 0.315 ** 
tax revenue -0.005 0.019 0.066 0.017 *** 
GDP per capita 0.067 0.234 
GDP growth -0.177 0.014 *** 
tot -1.873 0.186 *** 
λ -0.199 0.082 * 
I_period1 -1.978 0.347 *** -1.215 0.411 ** 
I_period2 -1.961 0.334 *** -0.778 0.407 + 
I_period3 -2.945 0.318 *** -1.081 0.376 ** 
I_period4 -3.168 0.399 *** -1.194 0.630 + 
I_period5 -0.762 0.320 * -3.213 0.378 *** 
I_period6 -0.183 0.315 -1.002 0.394 * 
I_period7 4.195 0.606 *** -0.958 0.818 
I_period8 0.165 0.324 -1.271 0.377 *** 
I_period9 1.829 0.312 *** -0.121 0.366 
constant 10.909 2.202 *** -1.728 0.526 ** 
συ 1.598 0.372 *** 1.072 0.156 
firms 36992 18694 
countries 55 53 
rho 0.719 0.187 
LR -16838.501 -41686.537 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Industry dummies are included in both equations, but are not reported. 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions 
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Since the Industrial Revolution, industrialisation proved to be a powerful engine of 
socio-economic development. Virtually all countries of the world have strived to 
industrialise. While few succeeded, most of them did not. In the successful cases, 
industrialisation fostered economic growth and lifted large portions of the popula-
tion out of poverty. In the less successful cases, developing countries did not reach 
high-income levels. Premature deindustrialisation slowed down economic growth 
and resulted in falling behind. Since the post-war era, successful industrialisers 
have been mainly Asian countries: the Asian Tigers, namely South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore. Today, China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam seem 
to be the next countries to industrialise. Among the premature deindustrialisers, we 
find Latin American and African countries.  
The case of Latin America is the most striking. In the 1970s, it was believed that 
Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico would have been the next countries to catch up with 
the advanced world. Latin America enjoyed higher GDP levels and possessed 
more developed industrial sectors than East Asia. The abundant historical-
comparative literature on this topic identified public policies as a crucial factor be-
hind this divergence. However, little agreement has been reached about the kind of 
policies that contributed the most to the success of East Asia and relative failure of 
Latin America.  
Neoclassical economists described the East Asian model as completely market 
based, where the state only aimed at ensuring favourable basic conditions for busi-
ness (macroeconomic stability, human capital formation, and provision of infra-
structures). According to this strand of literature, in Latin America, industrial poli-
cies distorted market incentives and paid too little attention to macroeconomic 
stability and basic business conditions. After the debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin 
American governments were pressured to implement structural policies. These 
were motivated by the idea that firms’ investments are negatively affected by struc-
tural macroeconomic conditions. Hence, structural policies aimed at restoring fa-
vourable macroeconomic conditions by ensuring macroeconomic stability and fis-
cal discipline. 
According to structuralists and industrial strategists, East Asian governments were 
at least as interventionist as the Latin Americans. In both regions, active industrial 
policies directed structural and technological change. However, adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions hindered industrialisation in Latin America and permanently mu-
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tated firms’ investment behaviours. According to the structuralist interpretation, 
Latin American macroeconomic instability depends on its production structure 
and, in particular, on its dependence on natural resources. This is what makes mac-
roeconomic conditions structural in the structuralist interpretation. Structuralists 
criticised Washington Consensus policies for being too pro-cyclical and advocated 
for a dual strategy to industrialise. This strategy encompasses selective industrial 
policies to foster innovation in industrial sectors with the strongest linkages to 
domestic production and counter-cyclical fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate poli-
cies to counterbalance the external vulnerabilities of developing economies. 
This thesis builds on the evidence that manufacturing is still a powerful engine of 
growth and poverty reduction. Consequently, industrial strategies are an important 
part of countries’ development strategies. This research topic is trapped into ide-
ologies that influence research and cannot enlighten policymakers in designing 
policies for industrialisation. Functional versus selective industrial policies, import 
substitution versus export promotion, orthodox versus heterodox macroeconomic 
policies are among the most powerful dichotomies. This thesis contributed to 
these debates by shedding light on why some countries industrialised and other did 
not. By answering this question, this thesis tries to move the debate away from 
these dichotomies. This is an important effort from an intellectual and a political 
point of view. 
In order to answer this question, the thesis empirically tested alternative theories 
about the determinants of industrialisation. Empirical studies constitute this thesis. 
Quantitative analysis, comparative-historical approaches, and macroeconomic and 
microeconomic perspectives are combined. The first empirical study applies 
econometric panel data techniques to a large sample of developing and developed 
countries. The second analyses five country cases in East Asia and Latin America, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan. The third analysis is a mi-
cro-econometric study that uses firm and country-level variables to estimate a mul-
tilevel Heckman selection model of firms’ investments in manufacturing. Given 
the underlying question motivating the thesis, cross-country comparisons were car-
ried out. Because determinants of industrialisation changed over the last decades, 
the historical dimension is also important in this thesis. The main findings of this 
thesis can be summarised as follows. 
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First, the thesis shows that while broadly defined institutions (captured by various 
indexes of democracy) are not significant determinants of industrialisation, public 
policies are. This result is clear from all our studies and robust across samples and 
methodologies. More specifically, this thesis analysed the role of industrial policies, 
intended as trade, investment, and science, technology, and innovation policies, 
and macroeconomic policies. 
The thesis explored the role of trade liberalisation, export promotion, and ex-
change rate management. In the literature, there is ample consensus on the role of 
international trade for economic growth. In Chapter 2, we find that trade open-
ness, defined as the share of exports in GDP, has a significant and positive impact 
on industrialisation. Trade openness is considered one of the key ingredients of the 
so-called East Asian miracle. In the literature, there is a debate on whether trade 
openness meant export promotion with trade liberalisation. Chapter 4 builds con-
siderable empirical evidence on the degree of import restrictions and export pro-
motion in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan. Evidence confirms that 
Latin American and East Asian countries selectively protected their domestic mar-
kets and that these policies remained in place until the 1980s in Taiwan and 1990s 
in Korea. So, rather than a “virtually free” trade regime as described by neoclassical 
economists, the East Asian trade regime was quite protective and selective. In our 
last empirical study, we test the role of average tariffs and tariff selectivity on firms’ 
investments in manufacturing in a sample of developing and developed countries. 
Our results, however, do not permit to draw firm conclusions with respect to these 
indicators.  
Data unequivocally demonstrate that East Asian governments invested considera-
bly more resources in export promotion than Latin American governments. This, 
however, does not imply that Latin American governments were not subsiding ex-
ports. Contrary to common interpretation, import substitution was never meant to 
be antithetic to export promotion. Two alternative explanations can be put forth 
with regard to export promotion policies in Latin America: either insufficient fi-
nancial resources were allocated to export promotion, or the stimuli were not 
enough or properly designed to offset the low competitiveness of Latin American 
manufacturing exports. In the structuralist literature, the second hypothesis has 
been explained by the tendency of the exchange rate to appreciate cyclically, be-
cause of the Dutch disease. 
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The thesis also explores the role of the exchange rate. Findings of our first empiri-
cal study (in Chapter 2) indicate that undervalued exchange rates have a positive 
impact on industrialisation. This confirms existing empirical evidence and struc-
turalist theories. Our last empirical study in Chapter 5, however, shows that under-
valuation is negatively associated with firms’ investments in manufacturing: when 
firms’ exports are low, higher import costs are not compensated by higher export 
revenues. 
Taken together, these results suggest that trade policies play an important role for 
industrialisation. More specifically, higher export promotion made a difference in 
the history of East Asia and Latin America. By contrast, import restrictions do not 
consistently explain differences in firms’ investment behaviours. Moreover, when 
we look at East Asia and Latin America, our findings show that the extent of do-
mestic market protection was not tremendously dissimilar between the two re-
gions. 
Nowadays, industrialising countries, especially in Asia, grow and industrialise via 
export promotion. Yet, some authors are questioning the export-led model as a vi-
able model of industrialisation. Firstly, it is a contradiction in terms that all indus-
trialising countries can industrialise by exporting. Secondly, in times of economic 
recession or slow growth in the advanced world, export-led growth might be not 
profitable enough, especially for large countries that could grow potentially more 
by targeting their large domestic markets (albeit with lower purchasing capacity). 
Governments can influence the direction of structural change also via preferential 
credits, subsides, and fiscal incentives. When these are directed towards innovative 
industries, they are referred to as innovation policies. The literature does not al-
ways acknowledge that East Asian governments directed financing towards strate-
gic industries. In Chapter 4, we measure and compare incentives to investments 
and show that East Asian governments influenced financial resources’ allocation 
towards priority industries. In addition, tax incentives, normally considered func-
tional industrial policies, were selectively used, because they were available only to 
specific industries. According to our data, these incentives were much higher in 
East Asia than in Latin America. Moreover, targeted industries in East Asia were 
mostly electronics and ICTs. These industries constituted the new technological 
revolution of the time and so represented a window of opportunities for industrial-
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ising countries. Therefore, East Asian governments not only influenced the proc-
ess of structural change, but also favoured technology-intensive strategic industries. 
With regard to technological change, the findings of this thesis show that structural 
change is increasingly related to technological change. In Chapter 2, we find that 
especially since the 1990s, industrialisation is fuelled more by technological capa-
bilities than low labour costs. This result is in line with the Schumpeterian and evo-
lutionary theoretical and empirical literature. Far from a first-world activity, inno-
vation is a key driver of catch up. Learning and adaptation of imported technolo-
gies are essential processes that allow capability accumulation in the developing 
world. This thesis shows that the state plays a great role in these processes.  
There is an ample literature on STI policies, especially in East Asia. The evidence 
in this thesis allows identifying systematic differences between East Asian and 
Latin American STI policies. First, East Asian governments heavily invested in 
human capital formation, knowledge and capabilities’ accumulation. Second, poli-
cies supported knowledge creation both in the public and in the private sector and 
stimulated interactions between these two. By contrast, Latin American STI poli-
cies absorbed much less financial resources and policies were geared more towards 
human capital formation than firms’ innovation. Finally, our data show that STI 
policies were much more selective and strategically oriented in East Asia than in 
Latin America. These findings confirm existing empirical evidence and partly ex-
plain low innovation rates among Latin American firms.  
As already mentioned, the literature has argued that, compared to Latin American 
countries, East Asian countries benefited from favourable macroeconomic condi-
tions. Macroeconomic factors play a key role in industrialisation. Our empirical 
studies, especially in Chapter 2 and 5, corroborate this statement. In Chapter 2, re-
sults show a positive relationship between inflation and industrialisation: inflation 
can be a by-product of economic growth and, as such, it can be tolerated, if mod-
erate. Our empirical analysis in Chapter 5 shows that firms’ investments are posi-
tively related to fiscal deficits and external debts.  
The main finding of this thesis concerning macroeconomic factors is that firms’ 
investments in manufacturing are related more to the variable component of mac-
roeconomic factors, than their structural component. Hence, these results suggest 
that firms’ investments follow macroeconomic business cycles’ fluctuations. This 
finding, however, is less surprising then it might seem. The theoretical and empiri-
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cal literature on business cycles has proved that investments are volatile and follow 
business cycles. Evolutionary scholars (Dosi et al., 2005, 2008, 2010; Meijers et al., 
2014) developed micro-founded evolutionary models of business cycles, in which 
firms’ investment decisions generate business cycles fluctuations. This paper pro-
vides supporting empirical evidence on the micro-foundations of business cycles.  
This result has clear policy implications because policy advising is often based on 
the hypothesis that stable macroeconomic conditions are needed for investments. 
Even today, Southern European countries are urged to implement structural poli-
cies that are causing recession and unemployment. Findings of this empirical study 
suggest that instead of focusing on structural macroeconomic conditions, macro-
economic policies should counteract the effects of business cycles via countercycli-
cal macroeconomic policy. These policies are strongly advocated for by heterodox 
economists. 
To conclude, we can summarise the main findings of this thesis as follows. First, 
public policies are important determinants of industrialisation. In particular, indus-
trial and macroeconomic policies explain divergences in industrialisation. Differ-
ences between successful and relatively less successful industrialising countries in 
amount of resources devoted to industrial policy and targeted industries are notice-
able. Macroeconomic policies affect industrialisation. Firms’ investment behav-
iours follow business cycles’ fluctuations: by influencing these fluctuations, macro-
economic policies prove to be significant determinants of firms’ investments. The 
thesis also demonstrates that technological capabilities are increasingly important 
to industrialise. This emerges from econometric evidence and from the compara-
tive analysis of the East Asian and Latin American industrialisation processes.  
This thesis contributes to structuralist and evolutionary theories. It confirms that 
macroeconomic policies should manage business cycles, and so offset macroeco-
nomic volatility by counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. With respect to evolu-
tionary theories, it brings supportive empirical evidence on the role of capabilities 
and STI policies for structural change. 
Results of this thesis contribute to policy debates in a number of ways. First, indus-
trial policies facilitate structural change towards dynamic industries. In order to 
work, these policies require sufficient funding and sufficient orientation in terms of 
targeted industries and technologies. In advanced countries, modern industrial pol-
icy is mainly innovation policy. Latin American countries and other developing re-
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gions should take advantage of this international consensus and re-focus their in-
dustrial policies towards knowledge and innovation. The findings of this thesis also 
bring empirical evidence in support of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. 
This thesis suggests at least two directions for future research. Quantitative studies 
that compare industrial policies’ indicators improve our understanding of how in-
dustrial policies affect structural and technological change and so, how these ef-
fects change in different contexts and periods. This type of studies are useful to 
establish how much intervention is enough, too little, or too much. Moreover, test-
ing the micro-foundations of macroeconomic theories is useful and is made in-
creasingly possible by the recent increase in firms’ surveys in both developed and 
developing countries. 
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dustrializacio ́n de la Región. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 202 
Rousseau, P., and Wachtel, P., (2011), What is happening to the impact of Finan-
cial deepening on economic growth?, Economic Inquiry, 49: 276–288. 
Sakakibara, M., and Cho, D.-S. (2002), Cooperative R&D in Japan and Korea: A 
comparison of industrial policy, Research Policy, 31(5): 673–692.  
SaKong, I., and Koh, Y. (2010), Six decades of growth and development, Seoul: Korea 
Development Institute. 
Sanditov, B., and Verspagen, B. (2011), Multilevel analysis of the determinants of 
innovative entrepreneurship across Europe, Paper Presented at the Final 
DIME Conference, 6-8 april 2011, Maastricht. 
Schneider, S., and Jacoby, W. (2011), A new classification of public policies in the 
American States, Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the 
American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, September 1- 4, 
2011. 
Serven, L., and Solimano, A. (1991), Adjustment policies and investment perform-
ance in developing countries. Theory, country experiences, and policy implica-
tions, Policy, Research, and External Affairs, World Bank Working Papers 606. 
Shaw, E. S. (1973), Financial deepening in economic development, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shin, H., and Lee, K. (2012), Asymmetric trade protection leading not to produc-
tivity but to export share change, Economics of Transition, 20(4): 745-785. 
Shirley, M. (1999), Bureaucrats in business: The roles of privatisations versus cor-
poratization in state-owned enterprise reform, World Development, 27(1): 115-
136. 
Short, R. P. (1984), “The role of public enterprises: An international statistical 
comparison”, in C. Gray, R. Short, and R. Floyd, Public enterprise in mixed econo-
mies: Some macroeconomic aspects, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
pp. 110-180. 
Singer, H. (1950), The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing 
countries, American Economic Review, 40: 473-485. 
Smith, H. (2000), Industry policy in Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s: Winning with the mar-
ket, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 203 
Soete, L. (2007), From industrial to innovation policy, Journal of Industry, Competition 
and Trade, 7(3-4): 273–284.  
Sourrouille, J., and Lucangeli, J. (1983), Política Económica y Procesos de Desarro-
llo: La Experiencia Argentina entre 1976 y 1981, Estudios e Informes de la 
CEPAL, Santiago: CEPAL. 
Spithoven, A. (2000), An explanation for the rising share of services in employ-
ment, International Journal of Social Economics, 27(12): 1205–1230. 
Srholec, M. (2011), A Multilevel Analysis of Innovation in Developing Countries, 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 20(6): 1539–1569. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1996), Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle, The World Bank 
Research Observer, 11(2): 151–77. 
Stiglitz, J. E., Ocampo, J. A., Spiegel, S., Ffrench-Davis, R., and Nayyar, D. (2006), 
Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalisation and Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sunkel, O. (1958), La Inflacion Chilena: Un Enfoque Heterodoxo, El trimestre 
económico, 25(100-4): 570-599. 
Suzigan, W., and Furtado, J. (2006), Política Industrial e Desenvolvimento, Revista 
de Economia Politica, 26(102): 163–185. 
Suzigan, W., and Villela, A. (1997), Industrial Policy in Brazil, Campinas, Sao Peulo: 
UNICAMP. 
Syrquin, M. (1988), ‟Patterns of structural change”, in H. Chenery and T.N. Srini-
vasan (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 1, North Holland: El-
sevier, pp. 203-273. 
Szirmai, A. (2012), Industrialisation as an Engine of Growth in Developing Coun-
tries, 1950–2005, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 23(4): 406-420. 
Szirmai, A., and Lapperre, P. (2001), The Industrial Experience of Tanzania, Hound-
mills/ Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Szirmai, A., Naude, W. A., and Alcorta, L. (2013), “Introduction and Overview: 
The Past, Present, and Future of Industrialisation”, in A. Szirmai, W. Naude, 
and L. Alcorta (eds.), Pathways to Industrialisation in the Twenty-first Century: New 
Challenges and Emerging Paradigms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-52. 
 204 
Szimai, A., and Verspagen, B. (2011), Manufacturing and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries, 1950-2005, UNU-MERIT Working Paper 2011-069. 
Taylor, L. (1993), Varieties of Stabilisation Experience: Towards Sensible Macroeconomics in 
the Third World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Timmer, M., and Vries, G. J. (2008), Structural Change and Growth Accelerations 
in Asia and Latin America: A New Sectoral Data Set, Cliometrica, 3(2): 165–190. 
Tregenna, F. (2007), Which Sectors Can be Engines of Growth and Employment 
in South Africa?: An Analysis of Manufacturing and Services, Paper presented 
at the UNU-WIDER CIBS Conference. 
Tregenna, F. (2011), Manufacturing Productivity, Deindustrialisation, and Reindus-
trialisation, UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 2011/57. 
Tu, C., and Wang, W. (1988), Trade Liberalisation in the Republic of China and the 
Economic Effects of Tariff Reduction, Papers and Discussion from the 1988 
Joint KDI/CHIER Conference, pp. 42-86. 
UN (1970), Economic Survey of Europe 1969, Part I, United Nations, New York. 
UNCTAD (2004a), World Investment Report: Argentina, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD (2004b), World Investment Report: Brazil, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
UNESCO (various issues), UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, Paris: UNESCO. 
UNIDO (1979), Industrial Priorities in Developing Countries: The Selection process in Brazil, 
India, Mexico, Republic of Korea, and Turkey, Vienna: UNIDO. 
UNIDO (2009), Industrial Development Report 2009. Breaking In and Moving Up: New 
Industrial Challenges for the Bottom Billion and the Middle-Income Countries, Vienna: 
UNIDO. 
UNIDO (2013), Industrial Development Report 2013. Sustaining Employment Growth: The 
Role of Manufacturing and Structural Change, Vienna: UNIDO. 
United States International Trade Commission (1985), Foreign industrial targeting 
and its effects on U.S. industries, phase III: Brazil, Canada, the Republic of Ko-
rea, Mexico, and Taiwan, Report to the Subcommitte on Trade, Committee on 
Ways and Means. 
 205 
Vaccarezza, F. (2012), Politicas de Desarrollo Industrial en la Argentina (1940-2001). 
Desde la Sustitucion a la Apertura, Buenos Aires: Centro Argentino de Estudios 
Internacionales (CAEI). 
Vanhanen, T. (2000), A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998, Jour-
nal of Peace Research, 37(2): 251-265. 
Villela, A. (1995), Taxa de Investimento e Desempenho do BNDES: 1985/94, Re-
vista do BNDES, 2(4): 129-142. 
Von Doellinger, C., Barros de Castro Faria, H., Caserta Cavalcanti, L. (1974), A 
Politica Brasileira de Comercio Exterior e Seus Efeitos: 1967-73, Rio de Janeiro: IPEA-
INPES. 
Von Tunzelmann, N., and Acha, V. (2005), “Innovation in ‘Low-tech’ Industries”, 
in J. Fagerberg, D. C. Mowery, and R. Nelson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of In-
novation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 407-432. 
Wacziarg, R., and Welch, K. H. (2007), Trade Liberalisation and Growth: New 
Evidence, The World Bank Economic Review, 22(2): 187–231. 
Wade, R. H. (1990), Governing the Market. Economic Theory and the Role of Government in 
East Asian Industrialisation, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Wade, R. H. (2006), How can Developing Countries Catch up? The Case for 
Open-Economy Industrial Policy, XI Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre 
la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Ciudad de Guatemala, 7-
10 Nov. 2006. 
Wade, R. H. (2010), After the Crisis: Industrial Policy and the Developmental State 
in Low-Income Countries, Global Policy, 1(2): 150–161.  
Wade, R. H. (2012), Return of Industrial Policy?, International Review of Applied Eco-
nomics, 26(2): 223–239. 
Warwick, K. (2013), Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends, 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 2, OECD Pub-
lishing. 
Weiss, J. (1990), Industry in developing countries: Theory, policy, and evidence, London: 
Routledge. 
Weiss, J. (2011), The Economics of Industrial Development, London: Routledge. 
 206 
Weiss, J. (2013), “Industrial Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges for the 
Future”, in A. Szirmai, W. Naudé, and L. Alcorta (eds.), Pathways to Industrialisa-
tion in the Twenty-First Century. New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, pp. 393-412. 
Westphal, L. E. (1990), Industrial Policy in an Export- Propelled Economy: Les-
sons from South Korea’s Experience, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(3): 
41–59. 
Westphal, L. E., and Kim, K. S. (1977), Industrial Policy and Development in Ko-
rea, Bank Staff Working Paper N. 263, World Bank. 
Williamson, J. G. (2006), Globalization, De-Industrialisation and Underdevelop-
ment in the Third World Before the Modern Era, Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American History (Revista de Historia Económica), 24(1): 9-36. 
Wionczek, M., and Márquez, M. (1993), “Mexico”, in S. Patel (ed.), Technological 
Transformation in the Third World. Volume III: Latin America, Avebury, USA: Al-
dershot and Brookfield. 
Wolf, C. (1988), Markets or Governments: Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives, Cam-
bridge, Maas: MIT Press. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (1995), Selection correlations for panel data models under con-
ditional mean independence assumptions, Journal of Econometrics, 68: 115-132. 
World Bank (1979), Argentina Structural Changes in the Industrial Sector, World 
Bank Report No. 1977a-AR. 
World Bank (1983), Brazil: Industrial Policies and Manufactured Exports, World 
Bank Country Study. 
World Bank (1986), Mexico: Trade Policy Loan, World Bank Report No. P-4366-
ME. 
World Bank (1987), World Development Report 1987, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
World Bank (1990), Trade Policy in Brazil: The Case for Reform, World Bank Re-
port No. 7765-BR. 
World Bank (1991), The Challenge of Development, New York, N.Y.: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
 207 
World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1994), Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead, New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1995), Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wu, H. L., Chiu, Y. C., and Lee, T. L. (2010), “IPRs Regime and Catch-Up: The 
Taiwanese Experience”, in H. Odagiri, A. Gotō, A. Sunami and R. Nelson 
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VALORISATION 
In accordance with Article 23 of the regulation governing the attainment of doc-
toral degrees at Maastricht University, this section discusses the valorisation oppor-
tunities of this doctoral thesis. 
This thesis investigates why some countries industrialised, while others did not. It 
takes a long-term perspective and looks at a high number of countries in all world 
regions. Understanding the determinants of industrialisation across countries and 
over time is important in a historical perspective, but also to inform present and 
future policy-makers on what has worked and has not worked in other countries. 
Countries that successfully industrialised witnessed rising GDP, flourishing em-
ployment opportunities, and shrinking poverty. All this makes a strong case for in-
dustrialisation as an interesting topic for academic discussions and as a central goal 
of development strategies.  
The focus on industrialisation and the manufacturing sector is relevant to present-
day policymaking in both developed and developing regions. The US program 
“Make it in America”, the Brazilian “Brasil Maior Plan”, the Indian “Make in In-
dia”, and the Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategy are just a few examples of 
how countries at all income levels and in all world regions strive to industrialise or 
to revive their industrial sectors. Also at the global level, the UN Sustainable De-
velopment Goals reiterate the need to reduce global poverty by promoting indus-
trialisation and fostering innovation (proposed Goal 9). 
Findings of this thesis show how determinants of industrialisation changed over 
time, with an increasingly prominent role of innovation. Today, innovation is a hot 
topic in policy discussions in both the developed and the developing world. This 
thesis analyses science, technology, and innovation policies intended as all policy 
measures aimed at stimulating knowledge creation and skill accumulation. These 
are often considered the new form of industrial policy. Their role for catch up, as 
for example in the case of the Asian Tigers, is now undisputed. 
As discussed in this thesis, the 50-year long debate on industrial policy polarised 
around two opposite views. This resulted in an unproductive confrontation that 
cannot enlighten policymakers. This thesis proposed a new methodology to analyse 
industrial policies across countries and over time and applied it to some of the 
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most debated country cases of successful and less successful industrialisation. The 
proposed methodology allows quantifying industrial policies and so differentiating 
countries by how much they invest in industrial policy instruments. This type of 
studies can be replicated in more countries and periods, or be applied to other ar-
eas of public policies or to specific industries. This could potentially lead to the 
creation of a new database of industrial policy indicators. This database could im-
prove our understanding of how industrial policies affect structural and techno-
logical change and how these effects vary across countries, periods, and industries. 
It could be also useful to have a sense of how much intervention is enough, too 
little, or too much.  
The policy relevance of this new methodology is evident. New measures of indus-
trial policies are increasingly important in a context in which countries at different 
income levels are experimenting with industrial policies and governments are held 
more and more accountable for how they spend public resources. Moreover, indi-
cators of industrial policies could help countries monitoring and benchmarking 
their industrial efforts and potentially find role models (without assuming that 
recipes can be copied and pasted from one context to another). 
The thesis also contributes to discussions on the role of macroeconomic policies 
for investments. Investments are key to economic growth. Understanding why 
firms decide to invest or not, and how macroeconomic policies can influence in-
vestment behaviours, is more than an interesting academic question. Various inter-
national organisations propose recipes for development and economic growth, but 
all these recipes must be empirically tested: evidence-based policy cannot be a mere 
buzzword, given the challenges of budget-constrained governments all over the 
world. 
As shown so far, this thesis has clear economic and social relevance, especially for 
the developing world. It speaks to policymakers who want to improve the indus-
trial performance of their countries and to international organisations engaged in 
research and policy dialogues to promote industrialisation. The thesis also contrib-
utes to public debates on industrial and macroeconomic policies. These are very 
hot topics in these times of economic recession in various countries in the global 
North and rise of new powers from emerging countries. 
The chapters of this thesis were presented in international conferences in different 
parts of the world. Chapter 2 was presented at the 14th International Schumpeter 
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Society Conference, held in Brisbane (Australia) in June 2012. Chapter 3 was pre-
sented at the 25th EAEPE (European Association for Evolutionary Political Econ-
omy) Conference in Paris (France) in November 2013. Chapter 4 was presented at 
the 12th Globelics Conference held in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia) in October 2014. 
Chapter 5 was presented at the UNU-MERIT international conference held in 
Maastricht in November 2014. Chapter 3 and 4 were the result of interesting dis-
cussions with economists from UN-ECLAC (the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean), and professors and participants to the Fifth 
Latin American Advanced Programme on Rethinking Macro and Development 
Economics (LAPORDE), held in São Paulo (Brasil) in January 2014. Chapters 2, 4, 
and 5 will be readapted to be published in international peer-reviewed journals. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Landen evolueren in hun ontwikkelingsproces van agrarische naar industriële 
economieën: maak-industrie biedt werk aan een groter deel van de bevolking en 
draagt meer bij aan het BBP. Empirisch onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat dat struc-
turele verandering richting fabricage consequent wordt geassocieerd met een 
snellere economische groei. Vandaar dat fabricage al sinds de vroege economische 
ontwikkelingstheorieën wordt beschouwd als een motor van economische groei. 
Gezien de rol van industrialisatie in ontwikkeling, is het zeer belangrijk om te be-
grijpen waarom sommige landen met succes geïndustrialiseerd zijn, terwijl dat voor 
anderen niet het geval is. 
Sinds de industriële revolutie hebben alle landen geprobeerd te industrialiseren: 
sommigen zijn hierin geslaagd, maar de meesten niet. In de periode na de oorlog 
waren vooral Aziatische landen succesvol in het industrialiseren, met name Zuid-
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong en Singapore. Latijns-Amerikaanse en Afrikaanse 
landen begonnen al in de jaren '80 van de 20e eeuw vroegtijdig te de-
industrialiseren. Het geval van Latijns-Amerika is hierin zeker het meest opvallend. 
In de jaren '70 van de 20e eeuw werd gedacht dat Brazilië, Argentinië en Mexico de 
volgende landen zouden zijn die zich bij de geavanceerde wereld zouden voegen. 
De waargenomen onverwachte divergentie in de industriële prestaties van Latijns-
Amerika en Oost-Azië heeft de aandacht van academici en beleidsmakers 
aangetrokken. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan deze literatuur en onderzoekt de 
determinanten van de industrialisatie in een historisch-comparatieve setting. Het 
bestaat uit empirische onderzoeken die kwantitatieve en semi-kwalitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden en macro-economische en micro-economische 
perspectieven combineren. 
Het eerste onderzoek van dit proefschrift gaat terug naar het fabricagemodel als 
motor van groei, ontwikkeld door John Cornwall in 1977. De vergelijking van 
industriële productiegroei wordt geschat door moderne econometrische 
datatechnieken toe te passen op een dataset met daarin ongeveer 70 ontwikkelde en 
ontwikkelingslanden tussen 1960 en 2005. Hierdoor plaatst dit onderzoek de 
industrialisatie in de kern van de analyse en identificeert het de determinanten en hun 
ontwikkeling in de tijd. De resultaten geven aan dat landen met relatief 
onderontwikkelde industriële sectoren, grote binnenlandse markten, sterke 
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exportprestaties en ondergewaardeerde wisselkoersen sneller industrialiseren. Hoewel 
arbeidskosten in deze analyse geen significante determinanten van industrialisatie zijn, 
speelt innovatie een belangrijke rol bij industrialisatie, met name in het midden van de 
jaren '90 van de 20e eeuw. Deze bevinding is in lijn met de evolutionaire literatuur 
over innovatie en ontwikkeling en bevestigt dat innovatie een belangrijke motor is van 
de inhaalslag. 
Industrieel beleid en de macro-economische omstandigheden worden vaak 
aangehaald als belangrijke determinanten van de industrialisatie, vooral in het geval 
van Oost-Azië en Latijns-Amerika. Het debat over het industriebeleid is 
gepolariseerd rond twee tegengestelde interpretaties. Volgens de neoklassieke 
economen hebben Oost-Aziatische overheden markt vriendelijk beleid 
geïmplementeerd dat alleen gericht is op het waarborgen van gunstige 
randvoorwaarden voor het bedrijfsleven. Het selectieve industriële beleid in 
Latijns-Amerika heeft daarentegen te maken met vervormde marktprikkels, 
aanhoudende inefficiënte industrieën en diffuse corruptie. Volgens structuralisten 
en industriële strategen waren Oost-Aziatische overheden tenminste net zo 
interventionistisch als die in Latijns-Amerika. In beide regio’s bepaalde selectief 
industrieel beleid de richting van structurele verandering. 
Niet alleen de aard van het beleid wordt in de literatuur besproken, maar ook de 
empirische gegevens -hoeveel interventie er geweest is- worden fel betwist. Dit 
proefschrift draagt bij aan deze literatuur door het kwantificeren van industrieel beleid 
in een aantal van de meest bestudeerde situaties, namelijk Argentinië, Brazilië, Mexico, 
Zuid-Korea en Taiwan. Dit proefschrift evalueert op kritische wijze de historisch-
vergelijkende literatuur over het industriebeleid in Oost-Azië en Latijns-Amerika. Op 
basis hiervan bouwt het aan een gedetailleerde taxonomie van industriële 
beleidsinstrumenten en bespreekt de indicatoren die in de literatuur gebruikt worden 
om ze te kwantificeren. In een tweede fase van dit proefschrift wordt stevig empirisch 
bewijs met betrekking tot het bereik en de aard van overheidsingrijpen in de 
geselecteerde gevallen opgebouwd en gepresenteerd. De nieuwigheid van dit 
onderzoek zit juist in het kwantificeren van industriële beleidsinstrumenten. Dit is van 
essentieel belang om wat een onvruchtbare confrontatie over de voordelen (en 
nadelen) van industrieel beleid geworden is te overwinnen. 
Het empirische bewijs dat in dit proefschrift gepresenteerd wordt, bevestigt het 
merendeel van de aanvaarde gestileerde feiten over de divergentie van Oost-Azië en 
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Latijns-Amerika. Allereerst bevestigen gegevens dat Latijns-Amerikaanse landen hun 
binnenlandse markten sterker beschermd hebben, hoewel de mate van bescherming 
van de Oost-Aziatische binnenlandse markt ook niet onderschat moet worden. Ten 
tweede gaven Oost-Aziatische overheden meer uit aan exportpromotie dan Latijns-
Amerikaanse overheden. Onze gegevens bevestigen tevens de rol van de Oost-
Aziatische regeringen in het sturen van de financiële middelen richting strategische 
industrieën. Kosten voor fiscale en financiële prikkels waren hoger in Korea en 
Taiwan dan in welk onderzocht Latijns-Amerikaans land dan ook. Tot slot 
ondersteunden Latijns-Amerikaanse regeringen wetenschap meer dan innovatie in 
bedrijven. Oost-Aziatisch beleid had meer balans in wetenschap en innovatie en 
stimuleerde de interactie tussen deze beide vlakken. Niet alleen uitgaven voor 
innovatiestimuli waren groter in Oost-Azië, ook het soort interventie verschilde: door 
financiële en fiscale stimuli te combineren, bleken Oost-Aziatische overheden 
ondernemender te zijn dan Latijns-Amerikaanse overheden. Sectoren waarop gericht 
werd verschilden ook: Oost-Aziatische regeringen stuurden middelen vooral naar 
strategische industrieën, zoals ICT. 
Ongunstige structurele macro-economische omstandigheden worden vaak 
beschouwd als een van de belangrijkste oorzaken van de lage investeringen in 
ontwikkelingslanden. De laatste empirische studie van dit proefschrift is een micro-
economisch perspectief en analyseert de impact van de macro-economische factoren 
op investeringsgedrag van bedrijven in de industrie. Met behulp van gegevens uit de 
Wereldbank Enterprise-onderzoeken schatten we een multilevel-model in van de 
investeringsbeslissingen van bedrijven. De gegevens dekken ongeveer 50 landen uit 
verschillende ontwikkelingsregio’s, van 2002 tot 2010. De belangrijkste nieuwheid van 
dit onderzoek bestaat uit het gebruik van data op bedrijfsniveau, in plaats van 
gecombineerde investeringen op nationaal niveau. Hierdoor kunnen de micromacro-
interacties die gecombineerde investeringen vorm gegeven hebben bekeken worden. 
Bevindingen suggereren dat de macro-economische factoren significante 
determinanten zijn van de investeringen van bedrijven. Fiscaal beleid, buitenlandse 
schulden, inflatie en wisselkoersbeheer dragen bij aan het verklaren waarom bedrijven 
besluiten om te investeren en hoeveel ze investeren. Dit onderzoek gaat ook na of het 
structurele component van de macro-economische omstandigheden invloed uitoe-
fenen op het investeringsgedrag van bedrijven. Terwijl beschrijvende statistieken 
aangeven dat de macro-economische factoren meer tussen landen dan binnen landen 
verschillen, worden investeringen van bedrijven meer geassocieerd met het 'binnen 
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land'-variatiecomponent van macro-economische factoren in plaats van hun 'tussen 
landen'-variatiecomponent. Dit resultaat lijkt te suggereren dat het investeringsgedrag 
van bedrijven de fluctuaties in de conjunctuurcycli volgt, terwijl structurele macro-
economische omstandigheden geen significante determinanten zijn voorbedrijfsin-
vesteringen. 
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